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Challenging the Republic

French Roma Policy in an Enlarged EU

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I declare this thesis has been composed by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the relationship between the colour-blind public philosophy of republicanism and the French state's policies targeting the Roma. It addresses one core research question: how did political actors use neo-republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma? To do this, it examines the discourse of French and European Union (EU) actors involved in the formulation and implementation of policies targeting the Roma from 2010 to 2016. This discourse comprised political speeches, policy reports, memos, media clippings and 50 in-depth interviews with French and EU actors. Building on Christina Boswell and James' Hampshire's theory of discursive strategies, this thesis focuses on the strategic deployment of republican ideas, notably the ways in which political actors were able to exploit their polyvalence.

This thesis argues that political actors used four key republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma in France. First, a commitment to universalism allowed political actors to deny accusations of ethnic targeting while pursuing policies that disproportionately targeted Roma migrants. Second, political actors deployed the idea of a 'neutral' public sphere to justify the eviction and deportation of residents living in so-called Roma camps. Third, political actors used a logic of administrative selection to predetermine which evicted 'Roma' migrants were worthy of state support. Fourth, recipients of this support were subject to a state-led process of assimilation akin to a modern 'civilising mission', which political actors defended as a necessary step towards integration.

This thesis concludes that it was precisely the polyvalence of republican ideas that allowed actors to deploy them to communicate and justify discriminatory policies. In doing so, it builds upon a growing literature on the role of republicanism in contemporary French politics and provides a rich empirical study that captures the influence of a general public philosophy on specific policy decisions. Additionally, it extends recent scholarship on the treatment of the Roma in Europe and contributes to debate about the challenges of free movement in an enlarged EU.

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ACRONYMS

AME	Aide médicale d'État
AR	Aide au retour
CADA	Centre d'accueil de demandeurs d'asile en France
CAF	Caisse d'allocations familiales
CAO	Centres d'accueil et d'orientation
CCAS	Centre communal d'action sociale
CEREMA	Centre d'études et d'expertise sur les risques, l'environnement, la mobilité et l'aménagement
CESEDA	Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile
CMU	Couverture maladie universelle
CNCDH	Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme
DAEI	Délégation aux affaires européennes et internationales
DDCS	Direction départementale de la cohésion sociale
DG EMPL	Directorate-General for employment, social affairs and inclusion
DG JUST	Directorate-General for justice and consumers
DG REGIO	Directorate-General for regional and urban policy
DIHAL	Délégation interministérielle à l'hébergement et à l'accès au logement
DILA	Direction de l'information légale et administrative
DRLP	Direction de la réglementation et des libertés publiques
ENA	Ecole nationale d'administration
FLN	Front de libération nationale
FN	Front national
HCI	Haut conseil à l'intégration
MOUS	Maîtrises d'œuvre urbaines et sociales
OFII	Office Français de l'immigration et de l'intégration
OQTF	Obligation de quitter la France
PCF	Parti communiste français
PMI	Protection maternelle infantile
PS	Parti socialiste
RSA	Revenu de solidarité active
SGAE	Secrétariat général des affaires européennes
UMP	Union pour un mouvement populaire

INTRODUCTION: REPUBLICANISM AND THE ROMA IN FRANCE

La France avant ne connaissait pas de “problème Rom”. La notion de minorité en France n'existe pas.¹

Pierre Lellouche (5 November 2010)

In the summer of 2010 President Nicolas Sarkozy launched a campaign to ‘mettre un terme aux implantations sauvages de campements de Roms’.² He deplored these camps as ‘zones de non-droit qu'on ne peut pas tolérer en France’ and stressed that collective evictions were imperative for restoring France’s ‘l’ordre républicain’.³ Speaking in Grenoble after an episode of localised riots that had little to do with the Roma, Sarkozy framed the illegal camps of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants on the fringes of French cities as a ‘Roma’ problem. In itself, the French state’s dismantling of illegal camps was not new but, from the moment Sarkozy framed the policy in explicitly ethnic terms, the Roma were thrust into the centre of heated public debate.

It was not long before there was a backlash against Sarkozy’s policies, especially after a leaked circular dated 5 July 2010 surfaced, instructing Prefects to implement ‘une démarche systématique de démantèlement des camps illicites, en priorité ceux de Roms’.⁴ The criticism of Sarkozy’s campaign was not confined to his political opponents. Members of Sarkozy’s own Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) party condemned the government’s targeting of the Roma for betraying universalist republican principles. Nevertheless, few critics disputed the need to clear illegal camps, citing the safety of camp residents as the principal concern. Sarkozy’s pronouncements also came under scrutiny outside France. The anti-Roma rhetoric sparked an international feud, not least with European Commissioner Viviane Reding, leading to a formal investigation of France’s adherence to the 2004/38/EC Directive on the free movement of European Citizens.⁵ Submitting its paperwork to the Commission at the eleventh hour, France

¹ Pierre Lellouche, Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires européennes, *Conférence de presse sur les relations franco-slovaques, la consolidation de la Zone euro, la question des droits de l'homme en Iran, l'accord militaire francobritannique et sur la situation des Roms au sein de l'Union européenne*, Bratislava (5 November 2010).

² Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, *Déclaration sur la lutte contre la criminalité, la délinquance et l'immigration illégale*, Grenoble (30 July 2010).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ministère de l'intérieur, *Circulaire sur l'évacuation des campements illicites* (5 August 2010), IOC/K/1017881/J.

⁵ 2004/38/EC.

escaped a legal battle by a hairline and consequently removed the word Roma from official policy documents.

Following a May 2012 change of government in France, Sarkozy's successor, François Hollande and his cabinet sought to rebrand state-led evictions of illegal camps by replacing references to the Roma with the euphemisms *campements illicites* and *bidonvilles*. Yet an unofficial link between the Roma and illegal camps remained and camp evictions more than doubled under Hollande. Political differences aside, after the controversy of 2010 both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments' clamp down on illegal camps was premised on a common dilemma: how to address a problem perceived to pertain to the Roma without directly naming or targeting any ethnic community. French officials tried to address this dilemma by designing policies explicitly devoid of ethnic distinctions to resolve a problem they, at least unofficially, framed in ethnic terms.

Why did the French state pursue such a paradoxical approach to illegal camps? The answer lies in the appeal of republicanism as the dominant public philosophy officials deployed to communicate and justify public policy in France. Forged in the wake of the French Revolution, republicanism holds a privileged position in France's political history. Those who champion it see themselves as upholding a political tradition passed down from previous generations and consider it their duty to carry it into the future.⁶ Although republicanism has proved remarkably resilient and malleable, its dominance in French politics is relatively new. Only after the collapse of the *trente glorieuses* in the late 1970s did French officials seek to revive a republican political discourse. This was not simply a regurgitation of outdated values but a conscious articulation of a new national project: neo-republicanism. A dedicated discussion of neo-republicanism will follow, but at this stage it is sufficient to note that its central tenets comprise a commitment to universalism founded on the rejection of ethnic and religious categories; a renewed emphasis on preserving the public sphere; a deep scepticism of communitarianism; and a firm belief that membership of the national community should surpass all other attachments.⁷

⁶ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁷ For a path-breaking study of the ideological development of neo-republicanism see: Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic: Nation, State and Citizenship in Contemporary France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

The task of this thesis is to untangle the relationship between the colour-blind philosophy of neo-republicanism and the French state's targeting of the Roma. My thesis addresses one core research question: how did political actors use neo-republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma? I do this by analysing the discourse of key French and European Union (EU) actors involved in the formulation and implementation of what I call 'French Roma policy' from 2010 to 2016. In my analysis, I focus on the strategic deployment of neo-republican ideas, notably the ways in which political actors were able to exploit their polyvalence.⁸ To achieve this, I draw and modestly build upon Christina Boswell and James' Hampshire's theory of discursive strategies.⁹ My research aims to show how it is precisely the flexibility and ambiguity of neo-republican ideas that allow them to be deployed strategically in political discourse. In so doing, I hope to contribute to a growing literature on the role of neo-republicanism in French politics and provide a rich empirical study that captures the influence of a general public philosophy on specific policy decisions.

The Resurgence of Republican Ideas

Republican ideas have experienced a revival in French politics since the late 1970s. Following the death of de Gaulle in 1970 and the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 that helped to drive the French economy into recession, France's future appeared uncertain. In response to the changing political landscape, French officials on the mainstream Right and Left resurrected republican ideas in public debate. The aim was to unite increasingly unemployed and apathetic citizens, guard against the rise of the Far-Right in France and counter the 'creep' of greater European unification. Perhaps most significantly, the deployment of republican ideas in French politics was linked to the emergence of a new public debate on immigration. It was not so much the arrival of guest workers, post-colonial exiles and other immigrant populations to France but their permanent settlement and clustering into communities that became the subject of controversy. Given the public nature of the issue, the French state assumed responsibility for ensuring the erosion of immigrant communities transformation of their residents from foreigners into Frenchmen.

⁸ Emphasising strategic deployment helps me to avoid the trap of 'subsumption' raised by David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis in their work *Discourse theory and political analysis: identities, hegemonies and social change* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 5.

⁹ Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, 'Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive institutionalist approach', *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1) (2017), pp. 133-150.

Yet, the question of how these immigrants ought to be integrated into French society remained open.

To address this newly politicised immigration question, the French state sought to design a set of policy solutions. As has often been the case in French history, the French state in the 1980s and 1990s drew inspiration from its own history to devise a programme of clearing immigrant ‘ghettos’ and assimilating residents into French society. This included the provision of public housing initiatives that promoted the cohabitation of people from diverse social, ethnic, religious and other particularistic communities in the same geographical area known as *mixité sociale*, compulsory schooling for all children regardless of their origin, and French language training and professional and cultural education schemes for adult immigrants to facilitate their assimilation to French society without extensive, or ongoing government support. The programme was based on the republican conception of the nation as a mosaic of individuals united not through ethnic or religious ties, but through their integration into a common national community of citizens. It also resembled a modern civilising mission, in which the French state aimed to civilise ‘immigrants’. A distinctly republican philosophy underpinned the French state’s policies on immigration, which, as this thesis demonstrates, were also circumscribed by its obligations of EU membership.

Even at this early stage, it is worth outlining some of the core concepts of French republicanism. Over the course of my research, it became clear that these concepts were given different meanings in the context of broader ideological debates, especially about immigration and identity, which varied across ideological groupings and over time. Additionally, and more directly relevant to the argument of this thesis, I found that the meanings of republican concepts differed depending on how officials strategically deployed them to communicate and justify their positions.

Nevertheless, despite the varied meanings of republican concepts, historians and political scientists tend to agree on their historical significance. When a person employs a republican concept, it has connotations of certain events, institutions and individuals in French history. Thus, while the meaning of republican concepts is neither fixed nor singular, it is not entirely ‘empty’ or up for grabs either. Chapter two of this thesis provides a detailed analysis of the historical development of key republican concepts I

encountered in my research. However, to demonstrate the flexible uses of republican concepts in the discourse of French officials, I have listed some examples in a table below.

Concept	Examples of the concept in political discourse	What do the examples tell us about the interpretations of the concept?
<i>Universalisme</i>	<p>‘Cet universalisme n’efface pas les variétés des sociétés humaines. Incompressible, il fonde un monde réellement commun parce que respectueux de chacun. C’est en se respectant qu’on peut vivre ensemble.’¹⁰ <i>François Hollande (PS)</i></p> <p>‘Le message évangélique, il est fait d’universalisme, pas de nationalisme.’¹¹ <i>Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP)</i></p>	<p>Sarkozy and Hollande appear to interpret <i>universalisme</i> as the precedence of shared values over particularistic affiliations. Hollande suggested that <i>universalisme</i> trumped particularistic affiliations such as religion and ethnicity and claimed that <i>universalisme</i> is about humans respecting one another and living harmoniously in one society. However, Sarkozy blurred the boundary between religion and <i>universalisme</i> by stating that evangelism was born from <i>universalisme</i>.</p>
<i>L’Espace public</i>	<p>‘Ici c’est la France, la Nation y est première et la religion y est seconde. Ici c’est la France, la religion se fait discrète dans l’espace public.’¹² <i>Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP)</i></p> <p>‘[Il faut] lutter avec la plus grande détermination contre l’islamisme radical, contre ces symboles qui visent à occuper l’espace public.’¹³ <i>Manuel Valls (PS)</i></p> <p>‘Je vais interdire les signes ostensibles dans l’espace public. Je vais prendre la loi de 2004 qui est la loi qui a interdit les signes ostensibles à l’école, et je vais l’étendre dans l’espace public.’¹⁴ <i>Marine Le Pen (FN)</i></p>	<p>Sarkozy, Valls and Le Pen appear to present <i>l’espace public</i> as a physical public place in which the behaviour of individuals is expected to conform to a set of norms. Yet, their interpretations of norms differ. In this instance Sarkozy framed <i>l’espace public</i> as a place where religion should be discreet, while Valls suggested there was no place for radical Islam or its religious symbols in <i>l’espace public</i>. The implication was that some Islamic practices were symbols of radicalism that challenged the norms of French society. Le Pen took this further by stating that she would extend the law banning religious symbols in schools to <i>l’espace public</i>.</p>

¹⁰ François Hollande, Président de la République, cited in ‘Découvrez le nouveau Musée de l’Homme à Paris’, *RTL* (17 October): <http://www.rtl.fr/culture/arts-spectacles/decouvrez-le-nouveau-musee-de-l-homme-a-paris-7780139812> (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹¹ Nicolas Sarkozy, Ancien Président de la République, cited in ‘Eglises transformées en mosquées: Sarkozy sous le feu des critiques’, *L’Express* (10 July 2015): https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/lr/eglises-transformees-en-mosquees-sarkozy-sous-le-feu-des-critiques_1698010.html (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹² Nicolas Sarkozy, Ancien Président de la République, cited in Alexandre Jeziorski, ‘« Ici c’est la France », l’anaphore très remarquée de Nicolas Sarkozy’, *L’Opinion* (17 November 2016): <https://www.lopinion.fr/video/ca-fait-buzz/ici-c-est-france-l-anaphore-tres-remarquee-nicolas-sarkozy-114522> (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹³ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in Sylvain Chazot, ‘Manuel Valls voit dans le port du voile islamique "une revendication politique"', *Le Lab Europe1* (25 August 2016): <http://lelab.europe1.fr/manuel-valls-voit-dans-le-port-du-voile-islamique-une-revendication-politique-2829610> (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹⁴ Marine Le Pen, Députée française et Présidente du Front National, cited in ‘Marine Le Pen veut interdire "les signes religieux ostensibles dans l’espace public". Un "sacrifice" nécessaire’, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (16 October 2016): <http://www.nouvelobs.com/en-direct/a-chaud/28912-presidentielle2017-lepen-marine-interdire-signes.html> (accessed 1 May 2018).

Concept	Examples of the concept in political discourse	What do the examples tell us about the interpretations of the concept?
Intégration	<p>‘Nous subissons les conséquences de cinquante années d’immigration insuffisamment régulée, qui ont abouti à un échec de l’intégration.’¹⁵ <i>Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP)</i></p> <p>‘On n’est pas français par son lieu de naissance, sa couleur de peau ou ses origines mais parce qu’on adhère à un projet, à des valeurs, à une communauté nationale... A l’école, certains de mes amis italiens, portugais et espagnols, souvent de milieux très modestes, ne parlaient pas leur langue natale! Il y avait une marche forcée vers l’intégration, voire l’assimilation.’¹⁶ <i>Manuel Valls (PS)</i></p>	<p>While Sarkozy appears to frame <i>intégration</i> as an end that immigration policies should achieve, allowing him to use <i>intégration</i> to justify hard-line immigration policies. Valls presented <i>intégration</i> as a process whereby foreigners learn the skills and behaviours deemed necessary to assimilate in France. For Valls, <i>intégration</i> was not an end it was a means to achieving assimilation.</p>
Communautarisme	<p>‘En défendant les valeurs républicaines et le respect des lois et en refusant le communautarisme et toutes les formes d’extrémisme, le Gouvernement défend et protège tous ceux qui, quelles que soient leurs opinions religieuses, prônent le respect et l’équilibre.’¹⁷ <i>Brice Hortefeux (UMP)</i></p> <p>‘Je défendrai [...] une vision de la laïcité que je veux incarner, la lutte contre le communautarisme.’¹⁸ <i>Manuel Valls (PS)</i></p> <p>‘Il y a aujourd’hui des gens qui se sentent en rupture avec la société française. Le communautarisme est le terreau de l’islamisme.’¹⁹ <i>Marine Le Pen (FN)</i></p>	<p>It is clear from the examples that Hortefeux, Valls and Le Pen spoke of <i>communautarisme</i> in a pejorative sense to describe the clustering of ethnic and/or religious communities into ghettos. Hortefeux presented <i>communautarisme</i> as an extremist idea that challenges republican values. Valls was more specific, positioning <i>communautarisme</i> as a threat to <i>laïcité</i>. Le Pen used <i>communautarisme</i> to discredit the presence of Islam in France by saying that <i>communautarisme</i> was the root of Islam.</p>

¹⁵ Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, *Déclaration sur la lutte contre la criminalité, la délinquance et l’immigration illégale*, Grenoble (30 July 2010).

¹⁶ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in Tristan Quinault-Maupoil, ‘Valls a voulu devenir français après un interrogatoire dans un commissariat’, *Le Figaro* (12 March 2015): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/citations/2015/03/12/25002-20150312ARTFIG00107-valls-a-voulu-devenir-francais-apres-un-interrogatoire-dans-un-commissariat.php> (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹⁷ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in ‘Hortefeux : « jamais le dialogue entre la République et la communauté musulmane n’a été aussi dense et approfondi »’, *Atlas Info* (8 September 2010): https://www.atlasinfo.fr/Hortefeux-jamais-le-dialogue-entre-la-Republique-et-la-communaute-musulmane-n-a-ete-aussi-dense-et-approfondi_a9262.html (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹⁸ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in ‘Valls juge Hamon "ambigu" sur la laïcité’, *Reuters* (22 January 2017): <https://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idFRKBN1572MS> (accessed 1 May 2018).

¹⁹ Marine Le Pen, Députée française et Présidente du Front National, cited in Christophe Forcari, ‘Marine Le Pen sort l’artillerie lourde contre la «racaille radicalisée»’, *Libération* (16 January 2016): http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/01/16/marine-le-pen-sort-l-artillerie-lourde-contre-la-racaille-radicalisee_1182377 (accessed 1 May 2018).

Concept	Examples of the concept in political discourse	What do the examples tell us about the interpretations of the concept?
<i>Laïcité</i> ²⁰	<p>‘Il n’est plus contesté par personne que le régime français de la laïcité est aujourd’hui une liberté : la liberté de croire ou de ne pas croire [...] La laïcité n’a pas le pouvoir de couper la France de ses racines chrétiennes.’²¹ <i>Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP)</i></p> <p>‘La laïcité n’est pas dirigée contre eux [les musulmans], mais au contraire [elle est] là pour les aider, pour les protéger. L’État que j’incarne est là à leurs côtés.’²² <i>Manuel Valls (PS)</i></p>	<p>Sarkozy and Valls presented <i>laïcité</i> as the absence of religion in the public domain. But neither treated all religions as equal. While Sarkozy spoke of <i>laïcité</i> as a form of freedom, he also said it could not separate France from its Christian roots. His comments suggested that Christianity was permissible in the public, while other religions were not because they did not have the same historical legitimacy. In contrast, Valls framed <i>laïcité</i> as a form of protection against discrimination. He did not make exceptions for Christianity; instead he implied <i>laïcité</i> was embodied by the French state’s duty to counter xenophobia against Muslims.</p>

The terms in this table should not be taken as definitive. Nor should they be seen as capturing an eternal essence. These ideas are flexible and were deployed for various reasons in relation to specific historical circumstances. As such, I am careful in this thesis to avoid presenting an illusion of a unified doctrine of republicanism ‘en bloc’ in my analysis. Instead, I focus on the ways in which officials could deploy the same republican concept in different ways, based on different interpretations. The terminology or language officials used might have been consistent, but the meanings varied. The examples in the table above demonstrates that officials on the left, right and the extreme-right employed the same words but their interpretations differed.

Although officials often interpreted republican ideas differently, they rarely questioned their relevance to solving public problems. To take only one example, the concept of *laïcité* is crucial to understanding political debates concerning religion, notably *l’affaire du foulard* in 1989, the 2004 law prohibiting religious symbols in French schools, and the banning of the burqa in 2010. The principle of universalism has also informed questions regarding race. For example, during his 2012 presidential election campaign François Hollande pledged to remove the word ‘race’ from the constitution, arguing that ‘il n’y a

²⁰ Despite its prevalence in other political debates in France, it is important to note that French officials did not use the term *laïcité* in their political discourses on the Roma.

²¹ Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, *Discours au Palais du Latran*, Vatican (20 December 2007).

²² Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’Intérieur, cited in ‘La laïcité « n’est pas dirigée » contre les musulmans assure Manuel Valls’, *La Croix* (18 October 2016): <https://www.la-croix.com/Urbi-et-Orbi/Actualite/France/La-laicite-nest-dirigee-contre-musulmans-assure-Manuel-Valls-2016-10-18-1200797172> (accessed 1 May 2018).

pas de place dans la République pour la race'.²³ This generated a public conversation over whether the French constitution could protect citizens against racism if it did not recognise race. In these debates, as elsewhere, it has become abundantly clear that republicanism has normative implications for French policy and contains a legitimising power that officials can draw upon to support their own initiatives.

My research on the Roma in France offers a new case through which critically to analyse neo-republicanism. The aim is not to condemn the republican public philosophy outright; instead, it is to show how political actors strategically deployed republican ideas to communicate and justify discriminatory policies against the Roma and how political actors exploited the polyvalence of republican ideas in their discourses on the Roma. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate how the strategic deployment of republican ideas facilitated discrimination against the Roma in France, and to suggest how, in some cases, officials could rely on republicanism as a rhetorical tool to communicate and justify their policies but pay little heed to its ideas when implementing their policies.

Alternative Ideas

While republicanism may have been the dominant public philosophy in French political discourse, it did not exist in an ideological vacuum. Other ideas were periodically present in the political discourse I analysed. I was able to identify seven key alternative ideas. I will not try to capture the meanings of these alternative ideas because I do not believe that any essential and decontextualised meanings exist. However, I will provide brief descriptions of the alternative ideas I encountered and give each idea an appellation, which I will use throughout the rest of the thesis.

The first alternative idea was racism: the idea that individuals belong to different races, and members of a race possess qualities specific to that race, marking them as inferior or superior to others. The second was crypto-Christianity: the covert practice of Christianity, which can be concealed by an attempt to abide by the norms of secularism or another religion in public. The third was heteronormative family values: the idea that a family

²³ 'Hollande propose de supprimer le mot "race" dans la Constitution', *Le Monde* (11 March 2012): http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/03/11/hollande-propose-de-supprimer-le-mot-race-dans-la-constitution_1656110_1471069.html (accessed 15 August 2017).

should generally include two parents of the opposite sex, and a small number of children, who live under the same roof but tend to sleep in different rooms. The fourth was anti-Gypsism: the discrimination of people based on the stereotype of a nomadic Gypsy. The fifth was classism: the notion that individuals or groups can be ranked into different classes by their socio-economic situation. The sixth was a sort of security-focused paternalism ideas: the idea that individuals require protection from the state against threats to their security. And finally, the seventh was multiculturalism: the idea that society should recognise cultures as distinct communities and support the coexistence of these diverse communities.

It is important to note that the brief descriptions of ideas are my own. I am conscious that these ideas are often far more complex and nuanced than the brief descriptions I have provided, that their precise meaning varied depending on the context in which officials deployed them, and that the line between these ideas and republican ones are not necessarily clear. However, the purpose of these descriptions is not to give a comprehensive literature review of the debates behind these alternative ideas or provide reductionist essentialist definitions. Rather, I included them to help signpost alternative ideas that appeared to be separate from republican ideas in the discourse of French officials I analysed.

The focus of this thesis is squarely on the strategic deployment of republican ideas. As I will show, republicanism was one of the most important – if not the most important – public philosophy officials used to communicate and justify French Roma policy. But these alternative philosophies are a reminder that, despite officials' insistence on republicanism, their discourses on the Roma also contained other ideas that sometimes seemed at odds with the republican ones they promoted. These alternative ideas offer vital clues as to why officials framed illegal 'Roma' camps as unacceptable. Their contempt for illegal 'Roma' camps was based on more than a rejection of illegality. It was also because these camps were often visible to the public eye. Officials tended to frame 'Roma' camps as challenging the norms governing the French public sphere, suggesting that their discourse was often based on crypto-Christian, heteronormative, anti-Gypsy, class-based, security-based and/or multiculturalist assumptions. Many of my empirical chapters explore how republican ideas became entangled with these alternative – and often competing – ideas.

Defining the Roma in France

Who were the ‘Roma’ that French officials discussed? Rather than providing an essentialist definition, I argue that it is better to interpret Roma as a social construct. As such, I do not attempt to specify precisely *who* the Roma were, by presenting a supposedly authoritative, static and abstract characterisation of ethnicity. Instead, I examine *how* specific actors have constructed Roma at precise points in time, under particular circumstances, based on ideological traditions. This approach acknowledges that the construction of ethnicity can take various forms. For example, how an individual or group articulates its self-conceptualisations is one permutation, whereas how an individual or group assigns ethnic categories to others is another. My study focuses on the latter by examining the ways in which French officials framed migrant populations living in informal settlements, known as *campements illicites* or *bidonvilles*, as Roma. This is because my research is concerned with how this constructed category of Roma became the subject of national public policy. Of course, to argue that ethnicity is a social construct is by no means original.²⁴ But, by highlighting the role French officials played in creating a Roma category from the outset, I can differentiate my research from others who overlook this point or simply hint at, but fail to tease out, the social construction of ethnicity.²⁵

Focusing on social construction also allows me to question the reasoning behind French officials’ framing of illegal camps as a Roma problem and show how French officials made ethnic claims that appear inconsistent with the republican ideas they endorsed. As the French state is constitutionally proscribed from collecting ethnic and religious data, it is clear that the racialisation of illegal camps was built on unfounded generalisations of camp residents. This stands in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon approach of using self-conceptualisations of race and ethnicity gleaned from the census or other official statistics

²⁴ For key works that use a constructivist framework to interpret race and ethnicity see: Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1998, 2007); Joane Nagel, ‘Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture’ *Social Problems*, 41 (1994), pp. 152–76; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, Second Edition (New York and London: Routledge, 1994); and Werner Sollors, *The Invention of Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

²⁵ See, for example: Owen Parker and David Toke, ‘The Politics of a Multi-Level Citizenship: French Republicanism, Roma Mobility and the EU’, *Global Society*, 27(3) (2013), pp. 360–78; and Alexandra Nacu, ‘From Silent Marginality to Spotlight Scapegoating? A Brief Case Study of France’s Policy Towards the Roma’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(8) (2012), pp. 1323–1328.

to design affirmative action policies.²⁶ As I show throughout the thesis, the generalisations of French officials were linked to the conspicuous nature of the *campements illicites* or *bidonvilles*. Officials' external observations of these visible living arrangements and superficial interactions with its resident populations crystallised into ethnic stereotypes, some of which were anchored in a long history of anti-Gypsyism in France.²⁷ These stereotypes were based on but not limited to the following factors: the appearance of individuals, the size and configuration their families, the practice of Romani language, the possession of Romanian and Bulgarian citizenship, as well as perceptions of poverty, poor hygiene and crime. These stereotypes permitted officials to construct their own definitions of ethnicity, and meant that most officials who referenced the Roma did not offer any explanation for the term, assuming it was self-evident.

Nevertheless, the French state did occasionally try to define its use of the ethnic term. For example, the French Ministry of Information (Dila) provided a classification of *gens du voyage* and Roma on *Vie Publique*:²⁸

"Gens du voyage" est un terme administratif qui désigne un mode de vie non sédentaire: il apparaît avec deux décrets de 1972, qui se réfèrent à la loi de 1969 sur l'exercice des activités économiques ambulantes. Celle-ci remplaça notamment le carnet anthropométrique institué par la loi de 1912 sur les nomades par un livret de circulation. Dans la pratique, cette appellation est souvent utilisée pour désigner les Roms (ou Tsiganes) de France (y compris les Manouches et les Gitans), bien qu'ils ne soient itinérants que pour environ 15% d'entre eux. La plupart des Roms en France sont français. Ceux qui ne le sont pas sont souvent d'origine bulgare ou roumaine et sont devenus citoyens européens après l'adhésion de ces deux pays à l'Union européenne en 2007. Ils bénéficient de la liberté de circulation dans l'Union européenne depuis cette date. Depuis janvier 2014, ils ont libre accès au marché du travail.²⁹

This classification advanced three central claims: the majority of non-French Roma were Romanian or Bulgarian, Roma could be sedentary or nomadic, and those nomadic Roma

²⁶ The Anglo-Saxon model does not prevent the emergence of ethnic stereotypes in practice but its explicit use of ethnic categories is the antithesis of the colour-blind principle which is integral to the French republican philosophy. For comparisons of Anglo-Saxon and French republican approaches to race, see: Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration* (Houdmills, Palgrave: 1998); and Erik Bleich, *Race Politics in Britain and France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

²⁷ Michael Steward (Ed.), *The Gypsy Menace: Populism and the New Anti-Gypsy Politics* (Hurst: London, 2012).

²⁸ *Vie Publique* is a government project created in 2002 to promote freedom of information. It is an annotated digital archive of unclassified government documents and speeches, which includes some definitions of key terms synopses. The French Ministry of Information is responsible for providing content, as well as curating, updating and managing the project.

²⁹ *Vie Publique*, *Roms et gens du voyage* (15 May 2015): <http://www.vie-publique.fr/chronologie/chronos-thematiques/roms-gens-du-voyage.html> (accessed 20 July 2017).

who held French citizenship came under the administrative category of *gens du voyage*. Following this logic, one could deduce that *gens du voyage* were in fact Roma.

Yet, not all French officials shared this interpretation. Some argued that conflating Roma and *gens du voyage* created a false link between foreign migrants and French citizens who held an itinerant legal status. This criticism intensified after President Sarkozy announced a cabinet meeting under the topic of ‘problèmes que posent les comportements de certains parmi les gens du voyage et les Roms’ on 22 July 2010. For example, Pierre Hérrison, Senator of the Haute-Savoie and President of the Commission nationale consultative des gens du voyage, argued that ‘Roms’ were ‘des étrangers, ressortissants de l’Union européenne’.³⁰ Five years later, a senior national civil servant shared this view, claiming that ‘les gens du voyage et les Roms sont deux communautés distinctes. Les gens du voyage français ne veulent rien à voir avec les Roms migrants principalement de Roumanie et Bulgarie’.³¹ In contrast to the Ministry of Information, these officials constructed Roma as non-French EU citizens, attaching an ethnic label to a group of foreign migrants in France. Clearly, the French state’s attempts to define Roma were often internally inconsistent.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that Roma discrimination has a long history in France. As Ilse About notes, in 1912 the French state created an anthropometric notebook, *une carnet anthropométrique des nomades*, a biometric and portable identity document for travellers. This notebook adopted the same approach the French state had hitherto reserved for criminals. In the early twentieth century, the French state issued recidivist criminals with special notebooks to monitor their movements. By issuing travellers with such a document the assumption was that they could not be trusted in the same way as other French citizens and therefore needed to be under public surveillance. Worse still, these notebooks facilitated the internment of gypsies in France under the Vichy regime.³² Yet anti-nomad policies lingered long after the war. The anthropometric notebook remained in place until 1969 when it was replaced by a *carnet de circulation* for

³⁰ Constance Jamet, ‘Gens du voyage, Roms : une réalité méconnue’, *Le Figaro* (24 August 2010): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/07/21/01016-20100721ARTFIG00512-gens-du-voyage-roms-une-realite-meconnue.php> (accessed 20 July 2017).

³¹ Interview with National Official, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

³² Hubert Filhol, *Un camp de concentration français. Les Tsiganes alsaciens-lorrains à Crest, 1915-1919* (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 2009)

French travellers. Although the explicit reference to nomads vanished, these documents became a system for controlling the geographic mobility of travellers and a way for the state to exert genealogical surveillance on families and related families through filiation and matrimonial links.³³

In contemporary France, the stigma attached to nomads and Gypsies has morphed into a suspicion of free movement. Migrants residing in illegal camps found themselves entangled in the stereotype of the suspect nomad. Although many may have been economic migrants who moved to France in the hope of accessing better opportunities than in their country of origin, their precarious and exposed living arrangements led officials – and other observers – to assume they were nomadic. As this thesis will demonstrate, French officials often tried to avoid explicit anti-gypsy references, not least to avoid allusions to Vichy, but a bias against vagrancy underpinned public policies. For example, a number of French social services, such as the ability to register oneself as a patient at a local doctor's surgery, were contingent on having a fixed domicile. Given that residents living in illegal camps did not possess a formal proof of domicile, many were not eligible to register as patients irrespective of their medical needs and/or proximity to the surgery. Consequently, illegal camp residents did not receive the same degree of public support as other individuals who could demonstrate a fixed proof of address.

Anti-Gypsyism also underpinned officials' confusions between so-called Roma migrants who populated illegal camps and French travellers known as *gens du voyage*. During an interview, one official uttered the words 'voleurs de poule', a pejorative pseudonym typically used in relation to *gens du voyage*, to describe non-French immigrants they deemed Roma living in an illegal camp. The implication was that immigrants living in illegal camps possessed the same characteristics as French travellers (*gens du voyage*) and were consequently classed as untrustworthy thieves. Perhaps more fundamentally, President Sarkozy's overt criticism of the Roma in his speech at Grenoble in July 2010 responded to events that had nothing to do with the Roma: a riot concerning members of the *gens du voyage* community in the town of Saint Aignan. This example, and many

³³ Ilse About, 'Underclass Gypsies: An Historical Approach on Categorisation and Exclusion in France in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', in Michael Stewart (Ed.), *The Gypsy 'Menace': Populism and the New Anti-Gypsy Politics* (London: Hurst, 2012), p. 98.

others throughout my thesis, revealed a deep-rooted historical and racial prejudice in the French state's communications and justifications of its policies regarding the Roma.

Theory and Methods

I draw upon theories of discursive institutionalism to explain how political actors used neo-republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma. Rather than viewing ideas as either delimiting political action or strategic tools used by political actors, discursive institutionalists argue that although deeply entrenched ideas can restrict the course of political action this does not prevent political actors from selecting or combining ideas to shape policy. Discursive institutionalists highlight discourse as the means through which ideas are connected to policy. In line with this position, my thesis takes the discourse of French and EU political officials as its central object of investigation. Focusing on discourse also allows me to examine the normative dimension of republicanism. In the words of Stuart Hall, the celebrated cultural theorist:

[Discourse] governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write or conduct oneself, so also by definition, it 'rules out', limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about it.³⁴

Vivien Schmidt, the founding theorist of discursive institutionalism, distinguishes between three levels of ideas.³⁵ According to Schmidt, policy ideas represent specific initiatives that policymakers propose or implement, programmatic ideas consist of broader programmes that underpin initiatives, and public philosophies provide an overarching framework of principles on which society should be structured. My thesis is a study of public philosophies – not of programmatic ideas or of policy ideas, or how these three levels of ideas interact. Schmidt's three levels of ideas are helpful insofar as they allow me to categorise republicanism as a public philosophy, but I have chosen not to use the three levels of ideas as a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between republicanism and French Roma policy. This is because I am

³⁴ Stuart Hall, 'The spectacle of the other', in Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates (Eds.), *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (London: Sage, 2001), p. 73.

³⁵ Vivien Schmidt, 'Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1) (2008), pp. 303-326.

primarily interested in the strategic deployment of republicanism. By concentrating on strategic deployment rather than influence, I have sought to minimise the risk of reading republicanism into discourse. In other words, I have sought to avoid confirmation bias. This is because my analysis is based on observed explicit invocations of republican concepts in discourse.

To develop a conceptual framework, I have employed Boswell and Hampshire's work on the discursive strategies actors employ to mobilise ideas.³⁶ Boswell and Hampshire highlight three discursive strategies: actors can prioritise one level of ideas over others, exploit the polyvalence of public philosophies, and combine different policy or programmatic ideas by presenting them as legacies. I have concentrated on the second discursive strategy – in which actors exploit the polyvalence of public philosophies – to organise the analysis of my data. This has led me to make three theoretical claims based on selectivity, prioritisation and exploitation of ambiguity. First, I argue that actors can *selectively* emphasise one strand of a public philosophy, even if it conflicts with another strand of the same public philosophy, Second, I maintain that actors can *prioritise* one public philosophy over another to conceal – and sometimes legitimise – discredited and normatively unacceptable ideas. Here the logic is that certain ideas, for example, the alternative ideas listed above, are not legitimate so officials invoke republican ideas to conceal a perceived legitimacy deficit. Focusing on concealing ideas rather than interests also lets me avoid making assumptions about the preferences of public officials. Third, I claim that some public philosophies are sufficiently *ambiguous* that they are open to bias that actors can *exploit*. This explains why officials were able to use the same set of republican concepts but assign different meanings to them.

To locate data through which to examine these claims, I collected the discourse of public officials working on the formulation and implementation of French Roma policy. As a preliminary step, I gathered official publications, transcripts of political speeches and radio and television interviews on the topic of illegal camps and the Roma in France. These were available on ministerial websites and Vie Publique, an online archive of

³⁶ Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, 'Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive institutionalist approach', *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1) (2017), pp. 133-150.

unclassified documents run by the French government's Direction de l'information légale et administrative (Dila).

As the official use of the term 'Roma' was so politically sensitive, I quickly realised that private interviews with public officials would give me a deeper understanding of how the French state framed the Roma 'problem' and why they employed supposedly colour-blind policies to address it. Additionally, interviews helped me to separate, for analytical purposes, the normative pressure of republican ideas on French officials, the ways in which these officials mobilised republican ideas to justify their policies, and the gap between republican policy prescriptions and discriminatory outcomes. As I indicate in chapter one of this thesis, the fact that I was an outsider meant that interviews were generally candid conversations in which officials tended to reflect on the significance of republican ideas. The result was a rich and diverse dataset of political discourses on the topic of French Roma policy.

To analyse this data, I followed Anselm Strauss' grounded theory method of qualitative analysis.³⁷ This was an iterative process consisting of open coding, axial coding and selective coding. I document this process in detail in chapter one, but here it may be useful to get a sense of how each step guided my analysis. Open coding led me to realise that I was specifically interested in actors and the ways in which they deployed republican ideas to communicate and justify policies. Axial coding helped me to narrow my focus to a small sample of republican concepts and differentiate them from concepts based on the alternative ideas I mentioned above. And selective coding allowed me to hone in on four key republican concepts: universalism, the public sphere, selection and integration. This final step enabled me to identify systematically examples of how officials used these four concepts to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma. Ultimately, these four republican concepts formed the basis for my empirical chapters.

³⁷ Anselm L. Strauss, *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1987).

Outline of Chapters

This thesis comprises four empirical chapters, prefaced by two prologue chapters establishing the theoretical, methodological and historical foundations on which my argument rests. Chapter one focuses on the theory and methods that underpin my analysis of political discourse. It makes a case for using discursive institutionalism as a theoretical framework to examine the relationship between republican ideas and French Roma policy, clarifies the theoretical and empirical contributions that studying the case of the Roma affords, and details the data collection and analysis methods I employed to bring this project to fruition.

Chapter two traces the evolution of French republicanism since its birth, and its rise to become France's dominant political ideology since the end of the 1970s. It highlights the key concepts that crystallised at different points in French political history, which became incorporated into the canon of (neo-)republican ideas. It suggests how this canon shaped the institutional memory of officials in contemporary France and Brussels and became a resource for them to strategically deploy.

The subsequent chapters provide an empirical analysis of how officials used certain republican ideas to justify and communicate policies targeting the Roma. Chapter three explores how the French state's insistence on the republican idea of universalism allowed officials to deny the existence of policies targeting the Roma. It reveals differences between the Sarkozy and Hollande governments' approaches to universalism, arguing that universalism only became a discursive strategy to demonstrate commitment to France's republican tradition under Hollande, in spite of the Hollande government's intensified program of evacuations. It also illustrates the persistence of a tacit link between the Roma, *campements illicites* and *bidonvilles* in the political discourse despite claims of universalism.

Chapter four focuses on the place where universalism was enforced: the public sphere. It highlights the ways in which officials deployed the idea of a 'neutral' public sphere to communicate and justify the eviction and (sometimes) deportation of residents living in illegal Roma camps. It argues that neutrality was defined in terms of a particular concept

of what officials deemed to be normal and acceptable and suggests that officials framed illegal Roma camps as an unacceptable communitarian threat to the French public sphere.

Chapter five investigates the basis on which the French state chose to support or reject evicted Roma residents. It exposes a logic of administrative selection based on whether a resident possessed the willingness and capacity to integrate, and maintains that interpretations of what constituted such a willingness and capacity were highly subjective and suspect. The chapter also raises ethical concerns about the outsourcing of public policy to non-government associations, who were subcontracted to decide which Roma to support or reject.

Chapter six scrutinises the process of integration that selected Roma undertook in exchange for state support. It argues that this process was akin to a modern republican civilising mission. It finds that despite the French state's rigorous administrative selection and socialisation programmes, evicted Roma tended to remain segregated from rather than integrated in French society.

In the conclusion, I step back from the specific strands of republican ideas addressed in the empirical chapters to reflect on the potency of the republican public philosophy in contemporary French political discourse. I consider how the case of the Roma might help to explain the ways French officials communicate and justify policies targeting other vulnerable and exposed immigrant communities in France.

THEORY AND METHODS

Over the last thirty years scholars have come to accept that republican ideas have influenced contemporary French politics. Yet the question of *how* this influence has operated remains contested.³⁸ My thesis focuses on the ways in which public officials strategically deployed republican ideas to justify and communicate policies targeting the Roma. To explore this phenomenon, I examine the discourse of French and EU officials from the summer of 2010 to the autumn of 2016, a period that begins with Sarkozy's campaign to systematically clear 'campements de Roms' and concludes with a wave of Islamist terrorist attacks that quickly overshadowed the Roma in public debate.³⁹ This requires three steps: a theoretical framework to conceptualise the relationship between ideas and policy, a justification of the merits of applying the theoretical framework to the case of the Roma in France; and a set of methodological guidelines for collecting and analysing data capturing the strategic deployment of republican ideas. This chapter follows these three steps to establish a research design on which to structure my empirical analysis in chapters three to six of this thesis.

Before I begin, let me clarify what I mean by French Roma policy. Political scientists have dedicated considerable attention to studying policy as a distinct field of enquiry, splitting into strands focusing on policy formulation and policy implementation.⁴⁰ In this thesis I do not wish to use the case of the Roma to devise a detailed schema of the different parts of public policy as, for example Theodore Lowi and Benjamin Ginsburg

³⁸ For various conceptualisations of the influence of French republicanism see: Erik Bleich, *Race Politics in Britain and France* (Cambridge, 2003); Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1992); Dominique Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); Sophie Duchesne, *Citoyenneté à la Française* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1997); Claude Nicolet, *L'idée républicaine en France, 1789-1924* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982); Charles Joppke, 'Transformation of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe', *World Politics*, 59(2) (2007), pp. 243-273; Martin Schain, *The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Sara Wallace Goodman, 'Questioning National Models', *Perspectives in Europe*, 40(2) (2010), pp. 47-50; and Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford, 1994).

³⁹ Nicolas Sarkozy, *Déclaration sur la lutte contre la criminalité, la délinquance et l'immigration illégale*, Grenoble (30 July 2010).

⁴⁰ For a concise review of the literature on policy formulation and implementation see the introduction of: John R. Turnpenny and Andrew J. Jordan, *The Tools of Policy Formulation Actors, Capacities, Venues and Effects* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015).

have done in their work on American politics.⁴¹ Rather, I share Michael Moran, Martin Rein and Robert Goodin's position that actors make policy 'in response to problems' and 'what is perceived as puzzling or problematic is not predetermined or fixed for all time'.⁴² In the words of C. Wright Mills, policy becomes public when 'personal troubles' shift into the realm of perceived 'social problems'.⁴³

I draw upon the work of Joseph Gusfield who emphasises the public character of social problems because 'all social problems do not necessarily become...matters of conflict or controversy in the arenas of public action. They do not eventuate in agencies to secure or movements to work for their resolution.'⁴⁴ Gusfield also raises the question 'how is it that an issue or problem emerges as one with a public status, as something about which "someone ought to do something"?'', drawing attention to the role of actors and institutions in resolving public problems.⁴⁵ Gusfield's conceptualisation clarifies the dual function of the French state in relation to the Roma: French officials were responsible for constructing the Roma problem, but they were also charged with its resolution. Accordingly, I define 'French Roma policy' as not simply the French state's response to an objective Roma problem but the measures that diverse officials designed and implemented to respond to their own constructions of Roma as a public issue. The specific functions officials played will be discussed later in this chapter. At this point, however, it is sufficient to note that the key task of political officials was to decide 'which [problem] to solve, what counts as a solution, and whose interests to serve'.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Theodore Lowi and Benjamin Ginsburg, *American Government* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), p. 607. They define public policy as 'an officially expressed intention backed by a sanction, which can be a reward or a punishment.' Public policy, they argue can be 'a law, a rule, a statute, an edict, a regulation or an order'.

⁴² Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E Goodin (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 26.

⁴³ Charles Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).

⁴⁴ Joseph Gusfield, *The Culture of Public Problems: Drink Driving and the Symbolic Order* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 5.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E Goodin (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 28.

Theoretical Framework

Once dismissed by positivists, political scientists now tend to agree that ideas matter to public policy.⁴⁷ This ideational shift⁴⁸ represents a break from the previously ‘well-established dictum that politics is about who gets what, when and how’.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, opinions diverge on precisely *how* ideas and policy interact. This section reviews three different theories mapping the relationship between ideas and policy. First, interest-based accounts view ideas as tools that political actors manipulate to gain support for their objectives. Second, institutional interpretations see ideas as constraints, limiting the decisions political actors can take. Third, discursive institutionalism offers a novel approach by reconciling interest-based and institutionalist arguments to suggest that actors are restricted by the legacy of ideas, but they enjoy some autonomy in selecting and combining ideas.⁵⁰ I see discursive institutionalism as the most convincing theory because it views structure and agency as mutually constitutive, explains both continuity and change, takes historical context seriously, and highlights the normative quality ideas can have to help actors define a vision of how society should be governed.

Interest-Based Accounts

Interest-based accounts tend to interpret ideas as tools that actors strategically use to obtain outcomes. From this perspective, actors can use ideas as weapons to win political battles, focal points in political negotiations that allow actors to agree on outcomes that

⁴⁷ See Erik Bleich, ‘Integrating Ideas into Policy-Making Analysis’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 35 (2002), pp. 1054-1076; Jeffrey Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, *World Politics*, 50(2) (1998), pp. 324-348; Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture and World Politics’, *International Organization*, 50(2) (1996), pp. 325-347; Randall Hansen and Desmond King, ‘Eugenic Ideas, Political Interests, and Policy Variance’, *World Politics*, 53(2) (2001), pp. 237-263; and James I. Walsh, ‘When do Ideas Matter?’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(4) (2000), pp. 483-516.

⁴⁸ For reviews of the ideational turn in political science see Sheri Berman, ‘Ideas Norms and Culture in Political Analysis’, *Comparative Politics*, 33(2) (2001), pp. 231-250; Mark Blyth, ‘Any More Bright Ideas?’, *Comparative Politics*, 29(2) (1997), pp. 229-250; Jeffrey Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, *World Politics*, 50(2) (1998), pp. 324-338; Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture and World Politics’, *International Organization*, 50(2) (1996), pp. 325-347; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4 (2001), pp. 391-416; John Kurt Jacobsen, ‘Much Ado about Ideas’, *World Politics*, 47 (1995), pp. 283-310.

⁴⁹ Erik Bleich, *Race Politics in Britain and France* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 18.

⁵⁰ Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, ‘Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive institutionalist approach’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1) (2017), pp. 133-150.

satisfy their interests,⁵¹ resources mobilised by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to promote their policy preferences,⁵² or signposts to guide actors down the most stable or productive path of action.⁵³ Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones claim that by prioritising particular elements of issues political actors can induce or block policy change, suggesting that ideas are mechanisms for choosing among interests.⁵⁴ In contrast, Robert Henry Cox and Daniel Béland, maintain that political actors can manipulate the ‘valence’ of ideas to promote their interests.⁵⁵ Baumgartner and Jones highlight selection while the Cox and Béland focus on ambiguity, but both accounts emphasise the role of actors in deploying ideas.

A sub-genre of interest-based accounts is ‘rational choice institutionalism’.⁵⁶ Rational choice institutionalism, as the name suggests, applies the logic of rational choice theory to explain the role of ideas in policy.⁵⁷ It focuses on how rational actors pursue their interests within political institutions by following a logic of calculation, and define institutions as structures of incentives.⁵⁸ Rational choice institutionalists claim that actors strategically deploy ideas to maximise their preferences while relying on institutions to minimise uncertainty. However, their argument rests upon four core assumptions: actors are self-interested beings who behave rationally, their preferences are fixed, their interests are objective, and institutions are inherently ‘good’ and stable, thereby reducing risk.⁵⁹

⁵¹ Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, ‘Ideas, Interests, and Institutions’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (Eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Second Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).

⁵² John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (New York: Longman, 1984).

⁵³ This interpretation stems largely from international relations theory, see: Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (Eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Kathleen McNamara, *The Currency of Ideas* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁵⁴ Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

⁵⁵ Robert Henry Cox and Daniel Béland, ‘Valence, Policy Ideas, and the Rise of Sustainability: Valence and Sustainability’, *Governance*, 26(2) (2013), pp. 307–28.

⁵⁶ See a discussion and critique of rational choice institutionalism in: Vivien Schmidt, ‘Reconciling Ideas and Institutions through Discursive Institutionalism’, in Robert Henry Cox and Daniel Béland (Eds.), *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁵⁷ For examples of rational choice institutionalism see: Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Resources for the Future, 1982); and Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁵⁸ Vivien Schmidt, ‘Reconciling Ideas and Institutions through Discursive Institutionalism’, in Robert Henry Cox and Daniel Béland (Eds.), *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

Interest-based accounts highlight the ability of actors to use ideas to support their own positions. By focusing on the toolkit of strategies that actors employ, interest-based accounts are particularly good at explaining policy change. Emphasising the agency of political actors also implies that ideas require communication to affect policy, a point which discursive institutionalism extends to argue that communication takes the form of discourse. Interest-based accounts allow scholars to generalise about the range of reasons motivating the decisions political actors make, providing opportunity for comparison across a wide array of cases.

Nevertheless, interest-based accounts have limitations, which have elicited considerable criticism, especially from institutional interpretations.⁶⁰ The principal shortcoming is that interest-based accounts fail to appreciate the ways in which ideas shape the construction of interests. Some of its advocates such as Baumgartner and Jones allow for bounded rationality, and offer a nuanced theory of how actors adopt and deploy different ideas.⁶¹ Yet, even these sophisticated studies tend to take interests as a given, and see ideas as hooks that are tactically appropriated to further these interests. The implication is that interest-based accounts risk deterministic tendencies by suggesting that actors have a relatively limited range of responses with which to navigate new circumstances.⁶²

Institutionalist Approaches

Countering the claims of interest-based accounts, institutionalists argue that ideas cannot be analytically or empirically separated from interests because they are mutually constitutive. Political scientist, Peter Hall identifies three main strands of institutionalist

⁶⁰ For a range of critiques of instrumentalism see: Jane J. Mansbridge (Ed.), *Beyond Self-Interest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Ellen M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism', *Politics & Society*, 26(1) (1988), pp. 5–34; and Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For studies that specifically criticise rational choice theories of instrumentalism see: Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Bo Rothstein, *Social Traps and the Problem of Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Fritz Wilhelm Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

⁶¹ Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

⁶² Ellen M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism', *Politics & Society*, 26(1) (1988), pp. 5–34; and Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

theories: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. Of these strands, historical institutionalism is the most relevant to my analysis of the relationship between the republican public philosophy and French Roma policy due to its focus on path dependency. How then, do historical institutionalists conceptualise the relationship between ideas and policy?

Historical institutionalists highlight how institutions, understood as sets of regularised practices with a rule-like quality, structure the choices of political actors and shape the direction of policy.⁶³ From this perspective, institutions are historical products that exist as anterior and *a priori* to any actor operating within them at a given moment in time.⁶⁴ Rather than emphasising the role of actors, historical institutionalists examine the prevailing institutions to understand how power is parcelled out. As such, they see pre-existing policies as legacies that constrain new policies.⁶⁵ Through this logic, certain policies appear more administratively viable than others because they are consistent with prevailing legacies.⁶⁶ As Peter Hall suggests, ‘some interests will be privileged as a result of the overall organization of interlocking institutional frameworks, while others receive less attention’.⁶⁷ According to Hall, policy outcomes are fashioned by the institutional context. Historical institutionalism shares a close affinity with theories of path dependency that account for biases towards policy continuity arising from lock-in effects of past decisions.⁶⁸ As Sheri Berman argues, ‘policy paths were the result of...long-held ideas and the distinct policy legacies these ideas helped to create’.⁶⁹ The implication is

⁶³ Peter Hall, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Rationalist and Sociological Perspective’, in James Mahogany and Kathleen Thelen (Eds.), *Explaining Institutional Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁶⁴ Mark Blyth, ‘Institutions and Ideas’, in David Marsh and Gary Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Second Edition (Houndmills: Palgrave: 2002), p. 300.

⁶⁵ Ellen M. Immergut, ‘The Theoretical Core of New Institutionalism’, *Politics and Society*, 26(1) (1998), pp. 5-34; Peter Katzenstein (Ed.), *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and the Military in Postwar Japan*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, ‘State Structures and the Possibilities for “Keynesian” Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain and the United States’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, (Eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

⁶⁶ Peter Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 373-374.

⁶⁷ Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 264.

⁶⁸ Stephen Krasner, ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative conceptions and historical dynamics’, *Comparative Politics*, 16(2) (1984), p. 223-246; ‘Douglas North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Paul Peirson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, *American Political Science Review*, 94(2) (2000), p. 251-267.

⁶⁹ Sheri Berman, *The Social Democratic Moment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 7.

that policy outcomes might not necessarily reflect actors' intentions; they may be unintended consequences constrained by the path dependent nature of institutions.⁷⁰

Berman also suggests that interest-based accounts take ideological structures for granted when they can shape the very interests of actors deploying ideas.

Historical institutionalism is an important counter-approach to interest-based accounts. By concentrating on how the 'rules of the game' impact policy, for example what political elites deem as acceptable and unacceptable modes of action, historical institutionalists demonstrate how norms can be institutionalised and highlight that institutions can be both formal or informal.⁷¹ Another strength of historical institutionalism is that it captures the important imprint historical legacies can have on contemporary politics. From this perspective, ideas are political traditions that invoke specific memories of the past.⁷²

Yet, historical institutionalism also has shortcomings. First, although historical institutionalists help uncover the ways in which ideas constrain policy, they tend to downplay the role of actors. In doing so, historical institutionalists overlook the interests and strategies of political actors, failing to explain how or why political actors mobilise ideas to justify policies. Second, focusing on how ideas constrain policy helps to account for policy continuity, but it struggles to explain change. This is problematic as it suggests that ideas are static. Some historical institutionalists have recently tried to overcome this problem by incorporating incremental change into their theories, interpreting it as drift, layering or conversion.⁷³ However, similarly to interest-based accounts, historical institutionalists tend to describe change as exogenous, rather than emanating from the actors themselves. Third, although historical institutionalists take history seriously, they tend to overlook other variables, such as unforeseen events, impending elections or party politics, that could drive political action. Precedents established in the past may leave an imprint on political elites' agendas, but other pressures that these elites may experience at

⁷⁰ Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies*, 44(5) (1996), p. 938.

⁷¹ Peter Katzenstein *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and the Military in Postwar Japan*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

⁷² Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford, 1994), p. 15.

⁷³ Kathleen Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills Germany, Britain, the United, and Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Wolfgang Streek and Kathleen Thelen (Eds.), *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

a particular moment in time deserve equal attention. Fundamentally, both historical institutional and interest-based approaches share one limitation. While historical institutionalists can explain policy continuity and interest-based accounts can explain change, neither can adequately account for both.

Discursive Institutionalism

In an attempt to balance the strengths and flaws of historical institutionalist and interest-based accounts, my thesis adopts the recent theory of discursive institutionalism. Combining elements of interest-based and historical institutional approaches, discursive institutionalists argue that, although actors are constrained by deeply entrenched ideas, they are nonetheless able to select and combine ideas to shape policy. Political scientist Vivien Schmidt, the founding theorist of discursive institutionalism, draws a distinction between three levels of ideas.⁷⁴ First, ‘policy ideas’ consist of specific measures that policymakers propose or implement. Second, ‘programmatic ideas’ encompass broader programmes that underpin policies. Programmatic ideas define problems that specific policies aim to solve, set objectives and norms, and present methods and instruments for policymakers to apply.⁷⁵ Both policy and programmatic ideas tend to be products of expert knowledge and technical rather than emotive. Third, ‘public philosophies’ include fundamental ideas, ‘sentiments’,⁷⁶ ‘global frames of reference’,⁷⁷ or worldviews (*Weltanschauung*).⁷⁸ Public philosophies comprise a set of values and moral principles that guide how society should be structured. As I stated in my introduction, my thesis is a study of public philosophies. It does not consider programmatic or policy ideas, or how these levels of ideas interact. Instead, it delves deeper into one public philosophy, French

⁷⁴ Vivien Schmidt’s levels of ideas share some similarities with the work of Jay Mehta, ‘The Varied Role of Ideas in Politics: From “Whether” to “How”’, in Robert Henry Cox and Daniel Béland (Eds.), *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁷⁵ Vivien Schmidt, ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1) (2008), pp. 303-326.

⁷⁶ John L. Campbell, *Institutional Change and Globalization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁷⁷ Bruno Jobert, ‘Représentations sociales, controverses et débats dans la conduite des politiques publiques’, *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 42 (1992), pp. 219-234; and Pierre Muller ‘Les politiques publiques: Débats autour de la notion de référentiel’ (Eds.), Alain Faure, Gielles Pollet, and Philippe Warin (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1995).

⁷⁸ Vivien Schmidt, ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1) (2008), pp. 303-326.

republicanism, and the ways in which French officials use it to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma in France.

Accordingly, my thesis shares the view of discursive institutionalists who see discourse as the link between ideas and policy. Actors, they contend, are ‘sentient agents’ who communicate and debate ideas through discursive interactions, which in turn influences public policy.⁷⁹ The focus on discourse differentiates discursive institutionalists from their interest-based and historical institutionalist counterparts. Their argument is that without examining discourse it is impossible to identify how ideas are conveyed and how they influence collective action. In other words, how can one know what another person is thinking unless they say or write it? This question goes straight to the heart of the policymaking process because, notwithstanding authoritarian governments, political actors are required to communicate and justify their ideas sometimes through formal cabinet processes. Discursive institutionalists thus perceive actors as dynamic agents who both shape and are shaped by institutions.

Christina Boswell and James Hampshire take a deeper look at the role political actors play from a discursive intuitionist perspective. They identify three discursive strategies that political actors can employ to selectively mobilise ideas.⁸⁰ First, they argue, actors can prioritise one level of ideas over others. For example, actors may highlight programmatic ideas to support a new policy without drawing upon underlying public philosophies. Alternatively, actors may skirt around technical aspects of policies, such as feasibility, pilot programmes, or implementation plans, while foregrounding emotive ideas that resonate with public philosophies.

Second, actors can exploit ambivalence in public philosophies. As Boswell and Hampshire contend, public philosophies are complex composites of ideas that lend themselves to diverse interpretations.⁸¹ One element may have a distinct connotation, historical significance, or status that others do not. Actors can select one strand of public philosophies to push a particular agenda while downplaying another strand that could

⁷⁹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War’, *International Organization*, 48(2) (1994), pp. 185-214.

⁸⁰ Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, ‘Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive institutionalist approach’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1) (2017), pp. 133-150.

⁸¹ Ibid.

contradict or undermine their agenda. Boswell and Hampshire highlight the susceptibility of national traditions of immigration and ‘philosophies of integration’ to these manipulations, citing French republicanism as an example.⁸² Similarly, scholars across a variety of discourses point to the flexibility of French republicanism and demonstrate some of the ways in which political actors have taken advantage of its ambiguity in an attempt to legitimise an array of policies.⁸³ This thesis explores how French policymakers have relied upon the polyvalence of republicanism to justify a new ‘Roma’ policy, parts of which might appear to contradict some of republicanism’s underlying principles. Yet, by appreciating the ability of actors to select and combine strands of republican ideas, it is possible to make sense of these contradictions.

The third discursive strategy that Boswell and Hampshire suggest is that actors can connect different policy or programmatic ideas over time by presenting them as legacies.⁸⁴ Actors advocating or opposing prospective or current policies can use this strategy to associate the policy with previous measures that cast it in a positive or negative light. This relates to historical institutionalist theories that stress the path dependency of policies over time. Yet, discursive institutionalism sees policy legacies as ideological constructs, created and reproduced by actors, who can mobilise these legacies strategically to achieve their objectives. For example, Hollande’s Interior Minister, Manuel Valls, employed this strategy when he appropriated the language that former French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, used in an interview in 1989, to justify the Hollande government’s response to the Roma question in September 2012. By claiming that ‘[La France] ne peut pas accueillir toute la misère du monde et de l’Europe’, Valls made a connection with one of France’s leading Socialist politicians of the post-Second World War period. However, by failing to capture the entirety of Rocard’s statement – ‘La France ne peut accueillir toute la misère du monde, mais elle doit savoir en prendre

⁸² Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration* (Basingstoke, 1998); Erik Bleich, *Race Politics in Britain and France* (Cambridge, 2003); and Christophe Bertossi and Willem Jan Duyvendak, ‘National Models of Immigrant Integration: The Costs for Comparative Research’, *Comparative European Politics*, 10(3) (2012), pp. 237–247.

⁸³ Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015); Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford, 1994); and James Hollifield, ‘Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden Consensus’ in Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin and James Hollifield (Eds.), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).

⁸⁴ Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, ‘Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive institutionalist approach’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1), (2017), pp. 133–150.

fidèlement sa part’ – Valls was criticised for manipulating the legacy of Rocard for his own ends.⁸⁵

My thesis shares Boswell and Hampshire’s interest in the role of actors by concentrating on their second discursive strategy: actors can exploit the polyvalence of public philosophies. Through analysing how French and EU officials exploited the polyvalence of French republicanism I developed three theoretical claims for future scholars to test based on selectivity, prioritisation and exploitation of ambiguity. First, I argue that actors can *selectively* emphasise one strand of ideas *within* a public philosophy, even if it conflicts with another strand of the same public philosophy. Second, I maintain that actors can *prioritise* one public philosophy over another different public philosophy or alternative set of ideas to conceal – and sometimes legitimise – discredited and normatively unacceptable ideas. Here the logic is that certain ideas (such as the alternative ideas listed above) are not legitimate so officials invoke republican ideas to conceal the legitimacy deficit. Focusing on concealing ideas rather than interests also lets me avoid making assumptions about the preferences of public officials. Third, I claim that some public philosophies are sufficiently *ambiguous* that they are open to bias that actors can *exploit*. These three claims structure my analysis of how French and EU officials deployed republican ideas to justify and communicate policies targeting the Roma. But they also allow me to extend theories of discursive institutionalism to explain more about the relationship between public philosophies and public policy.

As this discussion has suggested, I find discursive institutionalism the most appropriate theory on which to build my theoretical framework. Unlike interest-based and historical institutionalist approaches discursive institutionalism accounts for both continuity and change, allowing researchers to view structure and agency as intertwined, rather than polarising forces. This reflects Antony Giddens’ theory of ‘structuration’, which posits that structure and agency have a mutually constitutive relationship.⁸⁶ Discursive institutionalism also takes historical context seriously: this matters because modern France was forged as a republic and its history has always been entwined with

⁸⁵ ‘Roms - Valls: "La France ne peut pas accueillir toute la misère" de l'Europe’, *AFP* (11 September 2012): http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/roms-valls-la-france-ne-peut-pas-accueillir-toute-la-misere-de-l-europe-11-09-2012-1504871_23.php (accessed 17 December 2017).

⁸⁶ Antony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory* (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1979).

republicanism. Furthermore, discursive institutionalism draws attention to the normative property of ideas, which as my thesis reveals is a key driver of political action.

However, in spite of its strengths, discursive institutionalism is not without flaws. Some critics argue that it risks categorising everything as an idea or social construction, rather than perhaps an unintended outcome or unconscious action.⁸⁷ This derives from the positivist claim that the abstraction of ideas and discourse means they cannot be clearly identified or separated from other variables shaping policy. Nevertheless, this thesis shares Schmidt's view that instead of ignoring ideas and discourse because they might not be *the* cause, it is still worthwhile to ask whether they constitute *a* cause.⁸⁸

Additionally, critics could argue that discursive intuitionism oversimplifies the nature of political systems. I support this view. Schmidt posits that communicative discourse, the interaction between political actors and the general public, is more relevant to centralised governments, and coordinative discourse, the private deliberation between political actors, is more pertinent to decentralised governments. Yet, in reality both centralised and decentralised political systems employ communicative and coordinative discourse to respond to different circumstances. This is especially clear in France, which has a hybrid semi-presidential system, characterised by a centripetal force pulling towards the Elysée in Paris and its corresponding legislature, and a counter force dispersing authority throughout the 96 departments, recently supplanted by 13 newly formed regions across France.⁸⁹ This is why I do not employ Schmidt's distinction between communicative and coordinative discourse in my thesis. Besides this relatively small point of contention, this thesis sees the theories of discursive institutionalism as the most productive way of mapping the relationship between ideas and policy.

⁸⁷ See critiques of constructivism by Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); and John Kurt Jacobsen, 'Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy', *World Politics*, 47 (1995), pp. 283-310.

⁸⁸ Vivien Schmidt, 'Reconciling Ideas and Institutions through Discursive Institutionalism', in Robert Henry Cox and Daniel Béland (Eds.), *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁸⁹ To give an example of this tension, since General Charles de Gaulle, French presidents have typically drawn upon a regional support base to boost their legitimacy in the capital. Arguably, Nicolas Sarkozy's lack of regional presence outside Paris (and the wealthy parts of the *region parisienne*) contributed to his waning popularity.

Case Selection

It is necessary to clarify why I selected the case of the Roma in France. The rationale is twofold. First, the interaction between republicanism and what I term ‘French Roma policy’ makes it a ‘critical case’ for exploring strategic deployment of public philosophies.⁹⁰ Second, scholars have hitherto overlooked the role of republican ideas when studying the stigmatisation the Roma in France. This means they cannot fully comprehend why French officials sought to employ colour-blind policies to resolve a problem they framed in ethnic terms. Those who have examined the stigmatisation of the Roma in France also tend to focus on the national level of politics, downplaying the diversity of political actors working on the formulation and implementation of French Roma policy across multiple levels of government, geography, and seniority. With these considerations in mind, this section highlights the theoretical and empirical contributions this thesis hopes to make.

Theoretical Significance

The case of French Roma policy is theoretically significant for three reasons. First, focusing on how republican ideas were deployed in relation to a newly politicised Roma problem helps explain the flexibility and resilience of public philosophies as new circumstances emerge. Not only does this afford me the opportunity to examine the relationship between public philosophies and policies, it also allows me to avoid artificial comparisons between national models.⁹¹ The philosophy of French republicanism has its own set of principles that emerged as products of particular events and were conditioned by specific historical experiences. For example, the republican model of integration, requiring immigrants to discard ethnic and religious particularisms in exchange for membership into the national community is a distinctly French construct. Comparing this model of integration with another national model to explain the relationship between ideas and policy would mean assuming that each model is a stable, homogenous block, rather than an intricate and malleable cluster of ideas. I adopt the view of Christophe

⁹⁰ Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succeed Again* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁹¹ Christophe Bertossi and Willem Jan Duyvendak, ‘National Models of Immigrant Integration: The Costs for Comparative Research’, *Comparative European Politics*, 10(3) (2012), pp. 237–47.

Bertossi, who claims that models of integration should be treated as ‘complex structures of reference on the basis of which a multiplicity of conceptions of identity, equality, and inclusion are developed by a wide range of social agents in each national context’.⁹²

Although cross-national comparisons can facilitate generalisations, in this case, focusing on a single case study affords more insight into the potency of a grand public philosophy in public policy.

Second, by deliberately looking at public philosophies, my thesis delves deeper into the arguments of discursive institutionalists who propose a relational ontology of ideas and policy. As Vivien Schmidt notes, discursive institutionalists have hitherto devoted little attention to testing public philosophies because of their seemingly overwhelming influence on policy and multifaceted nature.⁹³ I argue that these features make public philosophies especially fruitful sites of study, and given the insistence of French officials to ground their policy proposals in republican terms, identifying strands of the republican public philosophy was relatively straightforward. Focusing on public philosophies therefore highlights how an unmistakably republican discourse has seeped into French policymaking, demonstrating that ideas, institutions and actors are inextricably linked. Furthermore, by examining how public officials interpreted and mobilised these strands of republicanism, it is possible to explain why elements of French Roma policy might appear internally inconsistent. The case of the Roma thus offers a good site for exploring the selective mobilisation of different strands of a public philosophy, exemplifying the polyvalence of public philosophies. Additionally, my investigation of how officials defined policy objectives versus their reflection on policy outcomes extends theories of discursive institutionalism to study another level of contradiction. In doing so, it exposes the elevated status of republican ideas in French politics and provides clues as to why officials might find it difficult to refute republican ideas even if they produced unsatisfactory policy outcomes.

Third, the contentious and highly politicised nature of French Roma policy meant it generated rich sources of discourse through which to examine the strategies of French

⁹² Christophe Bertossi, ‘National Models of Integration in Europe: A Comparative and Critical Analysis’, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 55(12) (2011) pp. 1561-1580.

⁹³ Vivien Schmidt, ‘Reconciling Ideas and Institutions through Discursive Institutionalism’, in Robert Henry Cox and Daniel Béland (Eds.), *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

public officials. Even referencing the term ‘Roma’ could spark fiery public debate and deliberation, lead to serious legal dispute, and stimulate an explosion of criticism from sources outside the administration, ranging from EU institutions, French and foreign media, activist organisations, the United Nations and even the Pope. French public officials exercised a number of discursive strategies to counter these internal and external pressures. Some of the internal tension, or coordinative discourse, was made public, through media, political debate, radio and televised interviews. However, complementing publicly available sources, I undertook in-depth elite interviews with key French and EU officials, to delve deeper into this internal process and shed light on unanswered questions. A detailed discussion of my methods is below. Nevertheless, it is important to mention here because it points to the fact that French Roma policy exemplifies both coordinative and communicative discourse.

Empirical Significance

My thesis also makes three important empirical contributions. First, it builds upon a growing inter-disciplinary literature on the treatment of the Roma minority in Europe.⁹⁴ Since Sarkozy first politicised the Roma question in the summer of 2010, scholars writing

⁹⁴ For a good overview of the treatment of the Roma in Europe that draws together different disciplinary approaches and diverse country case studies see: Michael Stewart (Ed.), *The Gypsy ‘Menace’: Populism and the New Anti-Gypsy Politics* (London: Hurst, 2012). For select case studies of the treatment of Roma in EU member states see: Tina Magazzini and Stefano Piemontese, “‘Roma’ Migration in the EU: The Case of Spain between “New” and “Old” Minorities”, *Migration Letters*, 13(2) (2016), pp. 228–241; Ionela Vlase and Mălina Voicu, ‘Romanian Roma Migration: The Interplay between Structures and Agency’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(13) (2014), pp. 2418–37.

in English⁹⁵ and French⁹⁶ have become increasingly interested in the French case. Yet few have drawn the link between French Roma policy and republicanism. A notable exception is the work of Owen Parker and David Toke, who present a compelling study of how Roma mobility reveals a conflict between French and EU conceptions of citizenship.⁹⁷ By arguing that French discourses have tended to present mobility and integration as binary opposites, while EU discourses emphasise mobility as a facilitator of integration, Parker and Toke suggest that French republicanism and European integration are incongruous. However, the focus of their argument is on the limitations of European citizenship, rather than the influence of French republicanism. My thesis addresses this gap to examine the relationship between French republicanism and the formulation and implementation of Roma policy. In doing so, it complements Parker and Toke's European focus by providing a detailed analysis of multiple components of the French policymaking

⁹⁵ Alex Balch, Ekaterina Balabanova, and Ruxandra Trandafoiu, 'A Europe of Rights and Values? Public Debates on Sarkozy's Roma Affair in France, Bulgaria and Romania', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40(8) (2014), pp. 1154–1174; Quinn Bennett, 'Please Don't Be Our Guest: The Roma Expulsion from France Under European Union Law', *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 40 (2011), p. 219; Celine Bergeon, 'Romanian Roma in France: Between Migration and Exclusion Policies', *Revue d'Études Comparatives Est-Ouest*, 41(4) (2010), pp. 197–212; Magali Bessone et al., 'Integrating or Segregating Roma Migrants in France in the Name of Respect: A Spatial Analysis of the Villages d'Insertion', *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 36(2) (2014), pp. 182–196; Sergio Carrera, 'Shifting Responsibilities for EU Roma Citizens: The 2010 French Affair on Roma Evictions and Expulsions Continued', *CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe Paper*, 55 (2013); Robert Gould, 'Roma Rights and Roma Expulsions in France: Official Discourse and EU Responses', *Critical Social Policy*, 35(1) (2015), pp. 24–44; Diana E. Mahoney, 'Expulsion of the Roma: Is France Violating EU Freedom of Movement and Playing by French Rules or Can It Proceed with Collective Roma Expulsions Free of Charge', *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 37 (2011), p. 649; Alexandra Nacu, 'The Politics of Roma Migration: Framing Identity Struggles among Romanian and Bulgarian Roma in the Paris Region', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37(1) (2011), pp. 135–150; Alexandra Nacu, 'From Silent Marginality to Spotlight Scapegoating? A Brief Case Study of France's Policy Towards the Roma', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(8) (2012), pp. 1323–1328; Owen Parker and David Toke, 'The Politics of a Multi-Level Citizenship: French Republicanism, Roma Mobility and the EU', *Global Society*, 27(3) (2013), pp. 360–78; Owen Parker, 'Roma and the Politics of EU Citizenship in France: Everyday Security and Resistance', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(3) (2012), pp. 475–491; Audrey Patten, "'Empty Human Rights Lip Service": France's Roma Expulsions and the Failure of the European Union to Exercise Its Racial Equality Directive', *Polish Yearbook of International Law*, 31 (2011), pp. 315–47; Melanie H. Ram, 'European Integration, Migration and Representation: The Case of Roma in France', *Ethnopolitics* 13(3) (7 October 2013), pp. 203–224; Melissa Stewart, 'Hollande Administration Continues Discriminatory Deportation of Roma in France', *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, 27(1) (2012), pp. 247–255.

⁹⁶ Catherine Coquio and Jean-Luc Poueyto (Eds.), *Roms, Tsiganes, Nomades: Un Malentendu Européen*. (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2014); Samuel Deléphine, *Atlas Des Tsiganes : Les Dessous de La Question Rom* (Paris: Autrement, 2016). Etienne Liebig, *De l'utilité politique des Roms: une peur populaire transformée en racisme d'état* (Paris: Michalon Editeur, 2012); Jean-Pierre Liégeois, *Roms et Tsiganes*. Repères (Paris: La Découverte, 2010). Olivier Legros, 'L'insertion des migrants roms en France : faux problème, mauvaises solutions ?', *Humanitaire* [Online], 33 (2012); Céline Bergeon 'Les Roms roumains en France, entre politique migratoire et politique de non- accueil'. *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, 41 (2010), pp. 197–211.

⁹⁷ Owen Parker and David Toke, 'The Politics of a Multi-Level Citizenship: French Republicanism, Roma Mobility and the EU', *Global Society*, 27(3) (2013), pp. 360–78.

machine, an element lacking in accounts that tend to treat the French state as a unitary actor.

Second, my thesis contributes to scholarship examining the challenges of European integration, especially the free movement of EU citizens.⁹⁸ Following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU project, scholars have highlighted the privileges and plights of what they term intra-EU migrants⁹⁹ or European migrants.¹⁰⁰ A recent work by political scientist Ettore Recchi investigates the theory and practice of free movement through a cross-national quantitative approach. Recchi asserts that free movement is:

[...] a regime *sui generis* which still technically takes the form of international migration, but it does so on the conditions of internal migration. In order to mark this change semantically, EU documents increasingly refer to intra-EU movements as ‘mobility’, rather than as ‘migration’, restricting the latter term to the movements of people from third countries. In everyday terms, ‘mobility’ means migration ‘in first class’, without the nuisance of documents nor the risks that characterize the journey and settlement of traditional migrants.¹⁰¹

Recchi rightly contends that EU Roma citizens have been disproportionately affected by member states’ interpretations of the EU free movement regulatory framework. Yet, he commits a number of oversights. For example, Recchi assumes that Roma are EU citizens. This may be possible to prove in countries other than France where the collection of ethnic data is permitted but, even if this were possible, further complications exist. A person who self-identifies as Roma may not be willing to publicly disclose their

⁹⁸ Dimiter Toshkov and Elitsa Kortenska, ‘Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Integration in the European Union?’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53 (2015), pp. 910–925; Juan Díez Medrano, ‘The Limits of European Integration’, *Journal of European Integration*, 34(2) (2012), pp. 191–204; Simon McMahon, *Immigration and Citizenship in an Enlarged European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); and Ludivine Damay and Heidi Mercenier, ‘Free Movement and EU Citizenship: A Virtuous Circle?’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(8) (2016), pp. 1139–1157.

⁹⁹ Miloslav Bahna, ‘Intra-EU Migration from Slovakia’, *European Societies*, 15(3) (2013), pp. 388–407; John Graeber, ‘Citizenship in the Shadow of the Euro Crisis: Explaining Changing Patterns in Naturalisation among Intra-EU Migrants’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2016), pp. 1–23; Jon Mulholland and Louise Ryan, ‘Doing the Business: Variegation, Opportunity and Intercultural Experience among Intra- EU Highly-Skilled Migrants’, *International Migration*, 52(3) (2014), pp. 55–68; Izabela Grabowska, and Michal P. Garapich, ‘Social Remittances and Intra-EU Mobility: Non-financial Transfers between U.K. and Poland’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2016), pp. 1–17.

¹⁰⁰ Violetta Parutis, ‘“Economic Migrants” or “Middling Transnationals”? East European Migrants’ Experiences of Work in the UK’, *International Migration*, 52(1) (2014), pp. 36–55; Linda McDowell, ‘Old and New European Economic Migrants: Whiteness and Managed Migration Policies’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35(1) (2009), pp. 19–36; and Zinovijus Ciupijus, ‘Mobile Central Eastern Europeans in Britain: Successful European Union Citizens and Disadvantaged Labour Migrants?’, *Work, Employment & Society*, 25(3) (2011), pp. 540–550.

¹⁰¹ Ettore Recchi, *Mobile Europe: The Theory and Practice of Free Movement in the EU* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 1.

ethnic identity to the stigmatisation the term Roma has historically elicited. Conversely, a person or group who live in a so-called 'Roma camp' may not in fact identify as Roma at all and might not even be European citizens. Instead their dwellings might reflect their socio-economic circumstance rather than their cultural or ethnic community. Recchi's use of the term EU Roma is also misleading because, as sociologists and anthropologists have stressed, the Roma are by no means a homogenous or unified group.¹⁰² To avoid this quagmire, my thesis concentrates on those whom French political actors framed as Roma in their political discourse. This highlights that the category of Roma is a social construction without any essential ethno-cultural base.

Another oversight is that Recchi's work makes no claims about why Roma move, implying that they are naturally nomadic, which is not necessarily the case. Few Roma are nomadic, in the sense that they deliberately have no permanent dwelling. Instead, their migration tends to be driven by their marginalisation and suffering from deep structural poverty and the prospect of a better life in a country other than their own.¹⁰³ Additionally, and in contrast to Recchi's assertion above, my research findings reveal that those perceived as Roma in France do not experience migration 'in first class'. Other migrants, such as refugees from the Middle East and North Africa living in informal settlements also received similar alternative housing and support from the French state. Thus, although Recchi's work draws important conclusions about the gap between theories and practices of EU mobility, he has a tendency to focus on the higher end of the socio-economic spectrum, overlooking the experience of poorer migrant populations, such as the Roma who disproportionately bear the brunt of anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiments. My thesis addresses this oversight by studying how a leading EU member state has managed the integration of mobile Europeans at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum.

Third, my thesis extends the recent literature on the rise of neo-republicanism in French politics. As I suggested in the introduction, since the 1980s French political actors have

¹⁰² See: Judit Durst, "'What Makes Us Gypsies, Who Knows...?': Ethnicity and Reproduction' in Michael Stewart and Márton Rövid (Eds.), *Multidisciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies* (Budapest: Central European University), pp. 13-35; and Gaja Maestri, 'Are they nomads, travellers or Roma? An Analysis of the Multiple Effects of Naming Assemblages', *Area* (2016).

¹⁰³ Chiara Manzoni, 'Should I Stay or Should I Go? Why Roma Migrants Leave or Remain in Nomad Camps', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (2016), pp. 1-18.

revived and adapted republican ideas to respond to new challenges of immigration and integration.¹⁰⁴ French Roma policy is a particularly interesting case because it is one of the few examples of a neo-republican response to a question detached from religion. The Roma may be constructed as an ethnic, cultural or socio-economic ‘problem’ but never as a threat to the core republican value of *laïcité*. This sets the case apart from the majority of empirical studies that examine neo-republican responses to Muslims or post-colonial migrants in France. Although not always stated explicitly, these studies highlight conflicts between *laïcité* and religious expression. This meant that an implicit tension between religion and republicanism has tended to underpin neo-republican scholarship to date. This is not surprising in part because of French republicanism’s roots in anti-clericalism. Nevertheless, to see republican ideas deployed in a context where religion does not necessarily feature is striking because it validates Bent Flyvbjerg claim that single cases are crucial for refuting initial hypotheses.¹⁰⁵ Drawing on the philosophy of Karl Popper, Flyvbjerg reminds us that the observation of a single black swan falsifies the argument that all swans are white. Falsification, he states, ‘is one of the most rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be subjected: if just one observation does not fit with the proposition it is considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected [...] The case study is well suited for identifying “black swans” because of its in-depth approach: what appears to be “white” often turns out on closer examination to be “black”’.¹⁰⁶ By investigating political actors’ formulation and implementation of French Roma policy this thesis demonstrates a new mutation of neo-republican ideas.

Methodology

To examine the strategic deployment of republican ideas, I analysed discourses of French and EU officials who formulated and/or implemented policies targeting the Roma in France from the summer of 2010 to the autumn of 2016. The aim was to discover what (if any) republican ideas officials employed, and explore the ways in which officials used these republican ideas to communicate and justify the policies on which they worked. Given the sensitivity of the Roma question in France, accessing and categorising

¹⁰⁴ See: Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015).

¹⁰⁵ Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research’, in Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium and David Silverman (Eds.), *Qualitative Research Practice* (London: Sage, 2004), pp. 420-434.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 424.

officials' discourses required careful preparation, tact and creativity. Some publicly available data, such as government circulars, contained words and messages the government of the time wished to share with the public. Longer policy reports tended to target technical audiences, especially those charged with implementing the national government's measures.

Yet, much of the information I required was not apparent in public sources. This is why elite interviews played such a significant role in my doctoral project. Interviews permitted me to ask officials to elaborate on specific measures, explain and define the choice of words they used to describe these measures, spell out rationales behind these measure, and reflect on whether these measured achieved the government's objectives. Asking these questions afforded a more nuanced understanding of how officials communicated and justified policies targeting the Roma. It also generated a rich source of textual data for systematic coding. This section sets out the sources I have collected and methods I have employed to locate and analyse the strategic deployment of republican ideas.

Sources

My thesis draws upon two sets of data. The first is a collection of publicly available political discourses. These included political speeches, and transcripts of television and radio interviews given by members of the Sarkozy and Hollande Governments, such as the President, Prime Minister, Interior Minister, Minister for European Affairs, Minister for Housing. I also gathered publicly released policy documents available online, including circulars, bills, draft legislation, senate and legislative committee reports, and technical policy papers intended for the readership of regional and local officials. It is important to note that in French politics, a circular is more than a memo. It is a document in which political leaders (e.g. ministers and prefects) provide direction to their staff and civil service 'pour exposer les principes d'une politique, fixer les règles de fonctionnement des services et commenter ou orienter l'application des lois et règlements'.¹⁰⁷ Circulars tend to allow scope for varied interpretations while setting the

¹⁰⁷ Legifrance, '1.3.7. Circulaires, directives, instructions', *Guide de legistique* (12 December 2011): <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Guide-de-legistique/I.-Conception-des-textes/1.3.-Hierarchie-des-normes/1.3.7.-Circulaires-directives-instructions> (accessed 17 December 2016).

parameters for what the government believes to be acceptable actions, making them especially productive sites to examine the role of ideas in the French policymaking process.

Additionally, I consulted monthly newsletters published on the website of the Délégation interministérielle à l'hébergement et à l'accès au logement (Dihal), a national agency comprising of civil servants from various policy backgrounds, responsible for coordinating the government's policy on *campements illicites* defined by the circular of 26 August 2012.¹⁰⁸ These newsletters helped me understand policy development over time, especially under the Hollande government. Complementing national documents, I gathered regional and local government reports and reviews (*bilans*) of specific initiatives. I also consulted select press coverage of national, regional and local officials' remarks on the Roma, which, while on the record, tended to be more candid conversations than scripted speeches and rigorously edited documents.

The second set of data consisted of discourses that did not exist in the public domain. As I mentioned above, these were primarily elite, in-depth interviews. These interviews were crucial sources of information for interpreting the ways in which officials framed and responded to the Roma question. By using a semi-structured format, I was able to probe officials on why they employed particular measures as well as what they saw as the limits of acceptable political action. Interviews also revealed that most officials viewed policies targeting the Roma as largely unsuccessful in practice. Throughout December 2014, June and September 2015, and February, March and April 2016, I conducted 50 interviews with French and EU officials.

The majority of interviews were face-to-face but I undertook two interviews over the phone to accommodate conflicting schedules. Discussions ranged from half an hour to three hours long. Some were one-on-one discussions, while others comprised of multiple respondents who had decided to meet with me as a group rather than individually. I

¹⁰⁸ Ministère de l'éducation nationale, Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé, Ministère de l'égalité des territoires et du logement, Ministère de l'intérieur, and Ministère du travail, de l'emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social, *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

deliberately wrote to officials separately to request interviews. Early on in my data collection process, one official asked me why I was seeking to talk to her if I had already met her colleague, who she insisted was an expert in my field of study. The official did not consider that I specifically wanted to speak to her to gain her perspective and compare it to that of her colleague. After that experience, I decided to contact each official separately to minimise rejections. I did not mind if officials wanted to meet me in a group, but I sought to minimise the risk of officials declining to talk to me on the basis that I had already talked to their colleagues.

I interviewed incumbent and former office bearers, political advisors, and civil servants working in local, regional, national and European governments at different levels of seniority. Although the French system distinguished between *Régions* and *Départements*, for the purpose of this thesis I use the term ‘regional officials’ to refer to Prefects and other civil servants working in the Prefecture. I also deliberately targeted political actors in cities with a population over 500,000 and secured interviews in Paris, Lille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Marseille and Nice. Only Toulouse is missing from this sample despite numerous communications with secretaries and attempts to arrange meetings in person and over telephone. Although not part of my initial geographical target, I travelled to Quimper, Annecy and Ajaccio to interview political actors who previously held important positions in the larger cities mentioned above. I chose to focus on larger cities because the majority of camps are situated on the outskirts of urban centres, and I inferred that political actors in these cities would likely to be involved in implementing policies affecting the camps. The population cut-off served as an arbitrary but necessary limit, restricting my fieldwork to a manageable size appropriate for doctoral research. Towards the end of my fieldwork, I became aware that some smaller cities, such as Grenoble, Nantes and Montpellier had experience implementing French Roma policy. Some of the officials I interviewed had formerly worked in one or other of those smaller cities, and provided glimpses into their local initiatives. Nonetheless, I focused on the larger cities mentioned above due to time and resource constraints.

To account for the European dimension, I interviewed key civil servants from three Directorates at the European Commission in Brussels who oversaw the implementation of EU directives in France. This was important because it provided background information on external factors that shaped French Roma policy, such as the logic behind the

European Commission's requirement of all member states to develop national Roma strategies and the funding sources available for local and regional integration initiatives. Discussions with EU officials also helped me appreciate how they perceived the French government's policies, which led me to draw conclusions about the tension between the EU's commitment to affirmative action and France's refusal to recognise ethnic or religious minorities.

Additionally, I interviewed representatives from Adoma, the state-contracted *opérateur* charged with housing and integrating displaced camp residents, and two NGOs actively engaged in protecting the Rights of Roma in France. Although not strictly employed by the government, NGO representatives were part of the policymaking machine as a result of their involvement in Dihal's working groups. Unsurprisingly, NGO representatives shed light on the discrimination of Roma populations and shared specific examples, which undermined the French state's insistence on colour-blind policies. These interviews contributed to a comprehensive and varied sample of actors involved in the formulation and implementation of French Roma Policy. During each interview I asked respondents to recommend other relevant political actors with whom they thought I should meet. Towards the end of my fieldwork I noticed that the recommendations often pointed me to people whom I had already interviewed, indicating that the sample was near completion.¹⁰⁹

When I initially identified interview targets, I did not expect to receive positive responses to my meeting requests from such a large and diverse pool of political actors. I used purposive sampling to locate the names and email addresses of relevant political actors in publicly available sources including policy documents, newsletters, working group attendance lists, organisational charts, press coverage and NGO reports. Roughly two thirds of the political actors I emailed agreed to meet me. I was surprised by the effectiveness of 'cold' emailing in the first instance, however this success was enhanced by the support of a senior ministerial adviser I interviewed early in the process, who gave me a list of key political actors to contact with her endorsement. All but one person on the list consented to an interview, and while there was a risk my reliance on this adviser's list

¹⁰⁹ Glenn Beamer discusses the convergence of interview recommendations in: Glenn Beamer, 'Elite Interviews and State Politics Research', *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, 2(1) (2002), pp. 86-96.

could have skewed my research sample, in fact the respondents I spoke to on this list expressed a wide range of views. Additionally, I made sure to interview people other than those suggested by the adviser, thus making doubly sure to guard against potential bias.

Nevertheless, accessing political actors was not always easy. It often involved multiple exchanges and on two occasions respondents asked for proof of identification and a copy of my curriculum vitae before accepting a meeting. In Toulouse, as I mentioned above, I was confronted by immovable ‘gatekeepers’ who obstructed my repeated requests to interview their superiors. This reluctance might have been due to the sensitivity of the Roma question in Toulouse but it is also a common obstacle for researchers seeking interviews with elites.¹¹⁰ An official working at the Préfecture de Police also declined to talk to me. Although a number of people had recommended I interview her, she denied any involvement in polices regarding illegal camps and Roma migrants. I thought interviews with elected officials and their advisers would be the most challenging to secure, due to their public profiles and the sensitivity of the Roma question. Nevertheless, I was lucky to interview seven national political advisers and six local political advisers and mayors.

Type of Official	Number Interviewed
National political advisers	7
Local political advisers and mayors	6
Regional civil servants and prefects	18
National civil servants	12
EU civil servants	3
Consultants	2
NGO representatives	2

Most interviews took place in the respondents’ offices, which helped me to see the institutional environment of the workplace, better understand the role of the respondent and, in some cases, catch other political actors passing by who contributed to the interview. The sample was predominantly male (34 males and 16 females). Many officials, especially in senior or developmental roles, were also alumni of the prestigious École Nationale d'Administration (ENA), as might be expected of the upper echelons of the French political class. Some were experienced at giving public interviews, slipping in

¹¹⁰ See Teresa Odendahl and Aileen M. Shaw, ‘Interviewing Elites’, in Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstien, *Handbook of Interview Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), pp. 299-316; and Paul Benjamin Richardson, ‘Engaging the Russian Elite: Approaches, Methods and Ethics: Engaging the Russian Elite’, *Politics*, 34(2) (2013), pp. 180–190.

prepared sound bites and clear policy statements at appropriate moments. Others preferred to speak about specific examples and policy instruments of a more technical nature. Four respondents declined to be recorded but were happy for me to take notes. The remainder did not take issue, appreciating that an aural record of the meeting would be a valuable resource for me given that French is not my mother tongue.

In Brussels, I conducted two interviews in English because the respondents preferred it to French, but the remainder of my interviews were in French. This meant that I had to sharpen my technical language skills to ensure smooth conversation. I decided to take this as an opportunity to read and listen to public sources before I progressed to the fieldwork stage of my doctorate, providing me with a basis from which to check the validity of interview responses.¹¹¹ I also took the time to research respondents' backgrounds and search for recent press clippings referencing them or their work. I used the information to contextualise comments and draw on examples from their own experience to relate to respondents. My principal aim was to ask respondents questions that had the potential to shed light on pressures, agendas and other variables influencing policy choices that public data could not reveal.¹¹²

The interviews were semi-structured. I prepared a questionnaire for each interview drawn from a common stock of general questions as well as specific questions tailored to each respondent's role and experience (see a sample list of interview questions at Appendix 1). Five respondents asked for a list of questions prior to the interview to help them prepare for discussion. I have attached an appendix of sample questions I asked during interviews. While conducting interviews, I did not always stick strictly to the format of the questionnaire, allowing conversation to flow naturally from the respondents' answers. I wanted interviews to be informative exchanges not forced interrogations. I opened interviews with a summary of my research objectives and asked respondents to tell me about their role in the policymaking process. Given that ethnic categories such as 'Roma' are considered anti-republican and taboo, I was careful to avoid using the term in the first instance. I spoke of 'la politique à l'égard des campements illicites' and as discussion progressed, I introduced the term 'Roms' to see if it provoked a reaction.

¹¹¹ Philip Davies, 'Spies as Informants', *Politics*, 21(1) (2001), pp. 73-80.

¹¹² David Lilliker, 'Interviewing the Political Elite', *Politics*, 23(3) (2003), pp. 207-214.

Overwhelmingly respondents rejected the existence of a ‘politique à l’égard des Roms’ but had no issue talking about ‘Roms’ in relation to the policy measures discussed in the interview. I also employed the same formulation of phrases adopted in policy documents so that I was literally speaking the same language as political actors rather than using unfamiliar concepts or jargon.

Some questions focused on practical or technical issues, for example: ‘Quelles mesures avez-vous pris pour empêcher l’installation de nouveaux campements illicites?’ Others tested whether respondents targeted the Roma, after asking who lived in the camps, I asked: ‘La présence des campements illicites représente-t-elle un défi pour l’état?’. I also asked questions to determine whether respondents mobilised republican concepts, for instance: ‘Une politique envers les Roms doit-elle incarner certaines valeurs? Si oui, lesquelles?’. This allowed me to identify whether republican ideas featured in the discourse of French officials and judge their role relative to other ideas. One question consistently caused contention among respondents: ‘La politique suivie à l’égard des Roms a-t-elle changé depuis l’élection de François Hollande? De quelle façon?’. I had not anticipated that a question about the different approaches of respective conservative and socialist governments would raise concerns. On reflection, I understood that civil servants took their political neutrality seriously. However, even those who were politically appointed tended to treat the question with caution, some declining to comment. Only one political staffer took the chance to frame his government’s policies as a positive step forward and cast his predecessors in an unfavourable light. As I completed more interviews, I became increasingly adept at picking up inferences and reading the mood of discussion to determine which questions to ask.

Gaining the trust of respondents was no small task. The fact that I am an Australian, studying in the United Kingdom made me an unlikely expert on the Roma in France. Almost all respondents asked me how I came to study such a topic that seemed so removed from my personal experiences. My strategy for building trust was two-fold. First, I tried to put respondents at ease. Contextual research about each individual helped to provide topics that I thought would spark conversation if discussion became stilted. I made a point of telling each respondent that their comments would be treated anonymously even if they had not insisted upon it and expressed gratitude for their time and expertise. Second, I used the fact that I was an outsider as an advantage. Although I

had a reasonably good grasp on the key policies and public debate on the Roma question, having just read publicly available sources, and I understood the structure of the French political system, having studied at Sciences-Po Paris during my undergraduate degree and completed an MPhil in European Politics at Oxford, I positioned myself as if I were a sponge eager to absorb any information officials were willing to share. This meant respondents could effectively teach me everything they thought I needed to know about the French government's approach, placing them in an active rather than defensive position. However, this did not mean I 'played dumb'. Instead, I positioned myself as an active listener, interjecting facts and comments into the conversation to help guide discussion.

In some ways, I benefited from being an outsider. As I was not French, writing in French or affiliated with a French institution, I did not appear threatening. Respondents did not seem concerned that I would expose private or sensitive information to the French press, nor were they worried about my political orientation or sceptical about my underlying motives. On occasion, respondents shared private documents with me. Sometimes they sent me reports and policy papers by email or gave me physical copies to keep. At other times, they showed me documents during the meeting as clarification or to exemplify the sorts of initiatives on which they were working. I kept detailed notes during each interview and tried to capture as much of this information as possible. I did however recognise the sensitivities of accessing private, sometime classified, data and used my judgement to make ethical decisions about how and when to use the data, as I will discuss at the end of this chapter.

Complementing the sources collected during my doctoral fieldwork, I drew upon the transcripts of seven telephone interviews with French political actors undertaken as part of my Masters dissertation on the securitisation of the Roma question in early 2013. The questions were focused on security politics rather than the relationship between republicanism and French Roma policy, but the interview transcripts afforded background information into the formulation and implementation of policies before 1 January 2014. This date was significant because it marked the end of the transition phase of EU enlargement enforced on Bulgaria and Romania, which lifted restrictions on free movement. Additionally, the interviews provided more information on the policies under the Sarkozy government because the previous regime was not such a distant memory and

some officials had held their position for years, working under both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments. These interviews prompted me to compare the strategic deployment of republican ideas throughout the period in question, enriching the analysis.

Data Analysis

To analyse the publicly available and private discourses, I undertook a qualitative discourse analysis of the text. The initial task was to transcribe all interview material into an electronic form, a laborious process that took me several months but was facilitated by the help of a generous Francophone friend and a native French research assistant (who focused on one exceptionally long and technical interview). They were faster and more accustomed to typing large-scale documents in French. This was an iterative process whereby I simultaneously transcribed recordings and reviewed transcriptions from my French colleagues, adding contextual comments (for example, to explain silences, respondents' reactions and interruptions) and ensuring that no words were misrepresented or forgotten. I subsequently inserted the text from the interview transcripts, policy documents, newsletters, press clippings and civil society reports into NVivo software, a programme to store data and facilitate coding.

To code the data, I followed Anselm Strauss' grounded theory method of qualitative analysis.¹¹³ This involved three key steps. The first step was open coding, that is the unrestricted categorisation of the data by scrutinising the text, line by line. The aim is to generate concepts that open up enquiry. As Strauss notes, concepts derived through open coding are provisional but they prompt the researcher to ask further questions about the conditions, strategies, interactions and consequences that underpin them.¹¹⁴ Some of the codes may be *in vivo* codes, that is, terms used by the people who are being studied. For example, I employed the term 'intégration' to categorise officials' comments on the process through which immigrants became part of French society because officials preferred it to assimilation, a term more common in the English language. I also chose to use 'intégration' because the term has strong intellectual connotations of Gérard Noiriel's

¹¹³ Anselm L. Strauss, *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1987).

¹¹⁴ Anselm L. Strauss, *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 28.

path-breaking study, *Le Creuset Français*, which argued that until the 1970s public officials and intellectuals wrote immigration out of the French national narrative. In this sense, ‘intégration’ was both an *in vivo* code and a sociological construct. The latter, as Strauss argues, ‘are based on a combination of the researcher’s scholarly knowledge and knowledge of the substantive field under study...[adding] more sociological (social science) meaning to the analysis’.¹¹⁵

The second step was axial coding, which is essentially a more focused type of open coding. It involved intense analysis, revolving around the axis of one category derived from the data at a time, allowing me to map the relationship between that category, its subcategories and other categories. For example, through this approach I was able to link officials’ denial of any ‘Roma’ policy with their recurring use of the terms *campements illicites* and *bidonvilles* and categorise these comments under the code ‘universalism’. The final step in Strauss’ method was selective coding. This consisted of deliberate and systematic coding of data into core categories. At this stage, I had decided upon most of the core categories and was able to narrow the analysis by reclassifying existing codes as components of the core categories. All other codes became subservient to the core categories. In the final thesis, I chose to focus on four core categories: universalism, the public sphere, selection and integration. Each represented a strand of French republican public philosophy. Each word or phrase coded under these categories was used by officials to communicate or justify policies targeting the Roma. Later, these four categories respectively formed the subjects of my four empirical chapters.

While coding the data, I made sure to label each document with the characteristics of the person from whom the words originated. This meant clarifying whether the person was a local, regional, national or EU official, indicating where they were located in a geographical sense and the level of position they held (e.g. elected/appointed and their rank as junior/senior). I also measured the frequency of keywords and phrases through a content analysis, and took note of deviations from the coding framework I devised. The point of these tasks was to facilitate comparisons and identify patterns. Interview transcripts sometimes revealed information that I had not yet considered but

¹¹⁵ Anselm L. Strauss, *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 34.

corroborating the interview data with other sources increased its validity and reliability. On a more fundamental level, coding meant that I could draw inferences about the ways in which officials strategically deployed republican ideas in relation to policies targeting the Roma.

I should note, however, that coding as a single researcher has some limitations. Given the modest resources of a doctoral project, I was not able to follow John Kingdon's advice in his study of interviewing US congressmen of having other researchers review a portion of the data to assess coding reliability, minimise scope for error and identify problematic responses.¹¹⁶ Yet on balance, the fact that I was present in all of the interviews was of greater advantage. I was in a better position than any 'external' researcher to understand the subtleties of conversation, and judge the tone, reactions and intimations of the respondents on the topic of French Roma policy. These details were important because they often provided crucial clues for interpreting the mechanism underpinning the relationship between republican ideas and French Roma policy.

Throughout my research, I sought to fulfil my ethical obligations by making judgements to protect the officials I interviewed and the 'Roma' population that they identified. The first decision related to anonymity. To preserve the anonymity of interview respondents, I have removed their name and precise job title in citations throughout this thesis. Each interview citation contains only a respondent's location and level of government or institution to which she or he were affiliated. I use the term 'official' to refer to civil servants and the term 'political adviser' to designate staffers working for elected politicians. In some cases, I differentiate between junior and senior respondents to demonstrate points of continuity or change but I have avoided divulging too much background information that would give away an individual's identity.

I also had to exercise caution when examining documents that officials shared with me during interviews. One of these was a *diagnostic* report of a camp conducted by a subcontractor, which included personal details of evicted camp residents, such as their names and medical history. This information should never have been shared with me but

¹¹⁶ John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, Third Edition (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1989).

as I suggest in chapter five of this thesis, it should not have been disclosed to government officials either. To protect the anonymity of the evicted residents, I did not reproduce any personal details in the text of my thesis. Furthermore, conscious of the sensitive nature of the Roma question, I made sure to keep the comments officials shared with me in context. This helped me to distinguish between the different venues of discourse. For example, one official spoke of a stereotype of Roma as ‘voleurs de poules’, which I acknowledged was a candid comment expressed in a private interview setting separate from the sorts of language used in public debate. Ethical judgement also affected my decision to use an ethnic lens to examine the discourse of officials who refused to recognise ethnicity. Advocates of the influence of neo-republicanism in French politics would likely criticise this decision as an Anglo-Saxon imposition. Yet, in light of the abundance of unambiguous references to the Roma evident in the discourse of public officials, it is a choice I consider to be justified.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to develop a roadmap to guide my study of the interaction between republican ideas and the formulation and implementation of French Roma policy from the summer of 2010 to the autumn of 2016. I argue that discursive institutionalism is the most appropriate theoretical framework for conceptualising the interaction between ideas and policy. I have presented theoretical and empirical justifications for choosing the case of French Roma policy, outlined the sources – both publicly available and private – I collected, and detailed the methods I employed to analyse the discourses of key public officials. I turn now to the historical significance and development of French republicanism to illustrate how this public philosophy rose to prominence.

THE EVOLUTION OF REPUBLICANISM IN FRANCE

Despite their prevalence in contemporary French political discourse, the dominance of republican ideas is relatively new. Prior to the 1980s republicanism was widely contested – whether by a clerical vision of Catholicism or by Napoleonic ideas of *grandeur*. In the words of historian Claude Nicolet, ‘France is a Republic. But *the* Republic is not France...in the last two centuries France has also been an absolutist monarchy of the divine right, two empires, two constitutional monarchies, a “State”, subject to provisional revolutionary governments, not to mention periods when there has been no state at all’.¹¹⁷ Only after the *trente glorieuses* (c. 1945 to 1975) did French officials seek to revive republican ideas. The aim was to unite increasingly unemployed and apathetic citizens, respond to challenges of integrating immigrants, and guard against pressures from the far-right Front National (FN) party and the impinging ‘creep’ of EU integration. Since then, officials have deployed republican ideas as their philosophy of choice to communicate and justify policies, especially relating to questions of how to manage migrants.¹¹⁸ But it is important to remember republican ideas were forged in distinct historical contexts, during the peak of the high-colonial era and at a time when the French state had little independence from the Catholic church, so when officials deploy these terms today they can scarcely avoid engaging with history. With this in mind, this chapter explores the ways in which officials used republican ideas to address changing circumstances throughout modern French history and how these ideas became the dominant public philosophy in French political discourse, transcending partisan lines.¹¹⁹ First, it traces the historical development of republican ideas from the French Revolution to postwar France. Second, it examines the impetus behind the recent revival of republican ideas. Third, it concentrates on four (neo-) republican ideas officials have deployed to communicate and justify contemporary policies, including but not exclusive to the Roma in France.

¹¹⁷ Claude Nicolet, *L'idée Republicaine en France (1789-1924)* (Paris, 1982), p. 9.

¹¹⁸ Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015).

¹¹⁹ In tracing the roots of French republicanism and its rise to become France’s dominant public philosophy, this chapter draws heavily on secondary sources.

A Brief History of Republican Ideas

French officials who endorse republican ideas see themselves as upholding a specific legacy.¹²⁰ This is because republican ideas carry rich connotations of moments in French political history that, when applied in the present, conjure memories of the past. To account for this dialogue between past and present, this section identifies major events in modern French history through which republican ideas crystallised and developed. It traces the trajectory of republican ideas from the French Revolution of 1789, through its alleged apogee in the Third Republic, and reconstruction in postwar France. In doing so, it aims to expose how contradictions between republican ideas emerged as officials sought to deploy them in new circumstances and presents these ideas as an archive from which future officials could draw to communicate and justify their policies.

The Birth of the French Republic

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the emergence of an anti-clerical Republic was but one of the possible responses to the pre-revolutionary corruption of the *Ancien Régime*.¹²¹ Rival responses challenged and on occasion toppled the new republican order. The political turmoil of the First and Second Republics, the violent history of the Terror (1793-1794), the war between the revolutionary government and the Vendée (1793-1795), and the years of the Restoration (1815-1830), July Monarchy (1830-1848) and Second Empire (1852-1870), demonstrate that the history of early republicanism is a story of conflict rather than stability.¹²² Even eschewing the discontinuities that marked

¹²⁰ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford, 1994).

¹²¹ Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 11.

¹²² Selected studies on the First Republic include: François-Alphonse Aulard, *Histoire Politique de la Révolution Française: Origines et Développement de la Démocratie et de la République (1789-1804)* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1901); Roger Dupuy and Marcel Morabito, *1795: Pour une République sans Révolution* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1996); François Furet, *Revolutionary France (1770-1880)* translated by Andonia Nevill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); François Furet and Ran Halévi, *La Monarchie Républicaine: La Constitution de 1791* (Paris: Fayard, 1996). For a selection of works on the Second Republic see: Maurice Agulhon and Janet Lloyd (Eds.), *Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789-1880* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Sudhir Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Intellectual Founders of the Republic: Five Studies in Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Sudhir Hazareesingh and Vincent Wright, *Francs-Maçons sous le Second Empire: Les Loges Provinciales du Grand-Orient à la Veille de la Troisième République* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2001); Jacqueline Lalouette, *La Libre Pensée en France 1848-1940* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1997); Philip Nord, *The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

its history, the First Republic took at least three political forms: a parliamentary dictatorship (1792-1795), a limited-suffrage republic (1795-1799), and a plebiscitary system following Napoleon Bonaparte's coup d'état of 18 Brumaire (9 November 1799).¹²³ The First Republic was not a distinct, coherent system of government but an experiment with no clear beginning or end. In fact, the First Republic was not declared in the immediate aftermath of the 1789 Revolution, but in 1792 after the dismissal of the constitutional monarchy. Nor was it formally abolished. The First Republic still existed officially long after Napoleon Bonaparte was appointed First Consul of the Republic in 1802, and its end was only signalled by the return of the Bourbons in 1814.

The difficulty in defining the parameters of the First Republic, claims historian Patrice Gueniffey, was linked to the uncertainty of what 'the Republic' meant at the time of its inception.¹²⁴ According to the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), the Republic was 'any government guided by the general will, which is the law'.¹²⁵ Yet, Rousseau did not suggest what form the government enforcing the law should take, or distinguish between elected and hereditary officials, arguing that, if supported by the general will, even 'the monarchy itself is republican'.¹²⁶ Charles Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) also emphasised the legal dimension of the Republic, referring to the Republic as a regime governed 'in keeping with fixed and settled laws', but did not specify the content of those laws.¹²⁷ This ambiguity of the early republic and the ideas it represented left room for embellishment, which as Serge Bernstein argues, led many public officials and intellectuals to mythologise the Revolution as the singular, uncontested moment of French republicanism.¹²⁸

In addition to unpacking this revolutionary myth, scholars of modern French history have tended to view the French Revolution not as a single moment but a period in which the

University Press, 1995); Roger Price, *People and Politics in France, 1848-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹²³ Patrice Gueniffey, 'The First Republic' in Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert and Christophe Prochasson (Eds.) *The French Republic: History, Values, Debates* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 19.

¹²⁴ Patrice Gueniffey, 'The First Republic' (Ithaca and London, 2011), p. 20.

¹²⁵ Timothy O'Hagan, *Rousseau: The Arguments of the Philosophers* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 142.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Charles Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, translated by Thomas Nugent (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2011), p. 26.

¹²⁸ Serge Bernstein, 'Le Modèle Républicain: Une Culture Politique Syncrétique', in Serge Bernstein (Ed.), *Les Cultures Politiques en France* (Paris: Seuil, 1999), p. 114.

normative and civic dimensions of republicanism began to take shape. As political scientist and historian Sudhir Hazareesingh suggests, there are five ways in which the Revolution informed the republican public philosophy: it established the principle of popular sovereignty; affirmed the possibility and desirability of constructing a rational political order; emphasised the universality of principles; projected a specific conception of patriotism and nationalism; and highlighted the notion that political structures could be used to promote greater equality (of outcome) and social justice.¹²⁹ These translated into five ideas that republican enthusiasts of the nineteenth century used to communicate and justify policies: a belief in universal (male) suffrage, a commitment to enlightenment rationality, secularism and anti-clericalism, an interest (albeit limited) in social conditions, and a civic conception of patriotism.¹³⁰ These ideas became reference points, differentiating republicans from their rivals and they inspired the political developments of the brief but volatile Second Republic (1848-1851), such as the freedom of press, application of universal (male) suffrage and the abolition of slavery.¹³¹

As the French Revolution was far from peaceful, it is not surprising that the early years of the French Republic were characterised by ideological conflict. Two key tensions underpinned republican ideas officials deployed in this period. First, republicanism emphasised popular participation in French public life, most notably through universal suffrage granted in 1793. Yet, although public officials and intellectuals accepted the value of greater public participation, they also believed that mass involvement in political life could not be effective unless the public was educated in the principles of ‘good’ citizenship. Through educating its citizens the French state could reduce ignorance and illiteracy, which political elites of the time considered paramount obstacles to the development of a stable political community.

The second tension was between elitism and representation. The early years of the Republic saw political and intellectual elites as the sole drivers of republican ideas on the basis that only they possessed the skills capable of designing policy and the practical means of attaining it. This reflected a lingering class hierarchy from the Ancien Regime.

¹²⁹ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford, 1994), p. 68.

¹³⁰ Philippe Darriulat, *Les Patriotes: La Gauche Républicaine et la Nation, 1830-1870* (Paris: Seuil, 2001), p. 8.

¹³¹ Claudine Goldstein, *République et Républicains en France de 1848 à nos Jours* (Paris: Ellipses, 2000), pp. 15-19.

Yet, this elitism had to be reconciled with the fact that republicanism was born out of a populist movement that forged a direct relationship between state and citizens, and decisions were made in the interest of protecting these citizens. A sovereign people could not be governed by constantly being told what to do.¹³² Nevertheless, fears associated with uncontrolled mass involvement outweighed the legitimacy of citizens, which came to a head in December 1848 when Louis Napoleon was elected president of the Second Republic and four years later abolished the Republic.

The Republican 'Apogee'

The collapse of the Second Republic led to a hiatus of the republican regime and the marginalisation of republican ideas. It was not until the creation of the Third Republic (1870-1940) that French officials in mainstream politics resurrected the ideas of the First and Second Republic and deployed them to inform policy.¹³³ This is why the Third Republic is commonly referred to as 'the apogee of republicanism'.¹³⁴ Advocates of republicanism in intellectual and public circles often celebrate the legacy of the Third Republic as the purest form of French republicanism, generating nostalgia for an idealised France that in fact never existed. The myth of the Third Republic concealed social and ideological divisions in French society. A key dichotomy emerged between the ruling elites (politicians), and radicals (both inside and outside the National Assembly), who reminded the elites that the Republic was a product of a popular revolution rather than the establishment of a new aristocracy. This distinction was enhanced by the rise of socialism and anarchism, the aggravation of social cleavages between peasants, workers and the middle classes, and the emergence of France as the world's second largest imperial power.¹³⁵

Despite its tensions, the Third Republic was the longest and most stable Republic in post-revolutionary France at the time, lasting seventy years. Three political figures were instrumental to the success and longevity of the Third Republic: Adolphe Thiers, the journalist, historian and first President of the Third Republic who believed that France

¹³² Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford, 1994), p. 71.

¹³³ Robert Tombs (Ed.), *Nationhood and Nationalism in France* (London: Harper Collins, 1991).

¹³⁴ Maurice Agulhon, *The French Republic 1878-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

¹³⁵ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford, 1994), p. 80.

should be simultaneously liberal and conservative and introduced extensive social reforms; Léon Gambetta, who relentlessly campaigned to re-establish the Republic in the 1860s and 1870s and fought to secure its social base in rural France; and Jules Ferry, who among other things was the architect of the secular French state school system. The initiatives of these men and others significantly reshaped republican ideology and set precedents for future republican policies.

From the political developments of the Third Republic emerged a new stock of republican ideas, some of which continue to feature in the discourse of French officials today.¹³⁶ Three ideas that crystallised in the Third Republic stand out. The first was the value placed on free, compulsory and secular primary education. This was reflected in the creation of *l'école républicaine*, the state school, through which 'peasants', argued Eugen Weber, were transformed into Frenchmen.¹³⁷ *L'Ecole républicaine* continues to be one of the most powerful institutions of republican integration today.¹³⁸ The idea was that *l'école républicaine* would reshape individuals into rational republican citizens through a process of education, suggested that membership into the community of citizens had no preconditions. The school was the place where knowledge was disseminated and republican ideals were projected. In practice this ideal was often betrayed, as the case of the Roma demonstrates, but few would dispute the symbolic value of *l'école républicaine* as the principal institution of republican integration.

The second idea to come out of the Third Republic was *laïcité*, loosely defined as the removal of religion from the public domain. Although *laïcité* is mainly remembered through enforcement of the 1905 law on the separation of church and state, in reality it was a product of a long, complex process of untying the church from the state and school.¹³⁹ The third idea was the emphasis on citizenship as the defining condition of membership to the national community, illustrated in the political scandal of the Dreyfus

¹³⁶ Philp Nord, 'The Third Republic' in Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert and Christophe Prochasson (Eds.) *The French Republic: History, Values, Debates* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 44-55.

¹³⁷ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France: 1870-1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ For a study of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Third Republic see: Christian Amalvi, 'Marianne dans les Manuels Scolaires Confessionnels: Une Histoire Singulière (1880-1964)', in Maurice Agulhon, Annette Becker and Evelyne Cohen (Eds.), *La République en Représentations: Autour de l'Oeuvre de Maurice Agulhon* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2006), pp. 147-158.

Affair.¹⁴⁰ Nationalists and anti-republicans viewed Captain Alfred Dreyfus as inherently treacherous and unworthy of full membership into the French nation due to his Jewish origins. In contrast, republicans emphasised the principles of equality and fraternity: all members of society were entitled to the same rights and privileges and subject to the same treatment of justice. The exoneration and reinstatement of Captain Dreyfus in 1906 was considered a major victory for republican ideas. The principle of equal citizenship also influenced France's treatment of its colonial citizens and immigrants: if they wished to make France their *patrie* they could theoretically do so if they demonstrated a willingness to integrate into their new national community. Nevertheless, in practice French officials viewed some colonial citizens as too uncivilised to integrate without assistance, subjecting them to an exercise of state-led socialisation, termed a 'civilising mission'.¹⁴¹

Although in many ways the Third Republic represented the triumph of republicanism, its success proved to be fragile. The installation of the Vichy government in July 1940 devastated the republican regime, betraying core republican principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, and discrediting its institutions.¹⁴² Contrary to some accounts of the resistance which try to separate the Third Republic from Vichy, the horrors of Vichy tarnished the rule of law on which the Republic was built. Vichy relied on the institutions, processes and employees of the Third Republic, and consequently undermined the Third Republic's reputation.¹⁴³ It is therefore not surprising that General de Gaulle did not explicitly choose republicanism as the principal discourse with which to rebuild postwar France.

Rebuilding the Republic in Postwar France

After the Second World War, France fell from power and grace. It had suffered its worst defeat in history, had been occupied by the Germans and, despite the Resistance, France

¹⁴⁰ For a thorough analysis of the Dreyfus Affair see: Eric Cahm, *The Dreyfus Affair in French Society and Politics* (London: Longman, 1996).

¹⁴¹ See: Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

¹⁴² Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-44* (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1972); and Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940-44* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). For a controversial study of the links between the Republic and Vichy see: Gérard Noiriel, *Les origines républicaines de Vichy* (Paris: Hachette, 1991).

¹⁴³ Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 16.

had largely been liberated by the Allies.¹⁴⁴ So liberation offered a new beginning but remained clouded by memories of demise, occupation and collaboration. France's economy was in ruin, food supply was limited and social discontent was rife. Returning from exile to head the provisional government of France, de Gaulle sought to rebuild the country. His reconstruction project was not just material but also ideological: to emphasise the resistance despite a fraught and complex history of collaboration with Nazi Germany. It is important to clarify that this narrative of postwar reconstruction was not simply Gaullist. Various ideas of resistance were prevalent in postwar France and persisted even while the General was out of office from 1946 to 1958. However, de Gaulle was able to cultivate these manifold ideas of resistance into a national myth, which reached its apogee in the 1960s.

The purpose of this resistance myth was to boost morale and unite French citizens. Although implicit, the language of resistance was linked to the republican idea of fraternity. The discourse of resistance also erased the link between the Third Republic and Vichy. For example, while the Third Republic's textbooks taught generations of children to believe in 'our ancestors the Gauls', the Vichy regime's emblem of the double headed axe and the linking of Pétain with Vercingétorix led to the banishment of Gallic symbols from the national narrative.¹⁴⁵

This banishment did not, however, simply advance the republican cause. The Third Republic lingered as an uncomfortable reminder of failure and the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) succeeded in transforming wartime resistance into political capital, rising to become the largest communist and pro-Soviet party in Western Europe.¹⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) undertook several reforms that appeared consistent with the ideas forged in the Third Republic and in its precursors, including the introduction of universal female suffrage and the establishment of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA), an academy preparing elite French citizens to become

¹⁴⁴ Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 6.

¹⁴⁵ Jack Hayward, *Fragmented France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 41.

¹⁴⁶ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London: Vintage, 2010), p. 66; Tony Judt, *Marxism and the French Left: Studies on Labour and Politics in France 1830-1981* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and Sumil Khilnani, *Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Post-war France* (London: Yale University Press, 1993).

republican leaders, which many public officials still attend today. Critics of the Fourth Republic, including de Gaulle himself, disparaged its rotating coalition governments and lack of a strong executive, condemning them as a source of political instability. Yet, perversely, the weak institutions of the Fourth Republic allowed innovative civil servants to advance technical policies that may not have been politically possible under a strong executive.¹⁴⁷ The civil servants concluded that France could no longer remain isolated from the world economy and international competition. From their perspective, the country needed a strategy of European stabilisation to pursue French interests. The Fourth Republic facilitated the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which later provided a foundation for the reorganisatoin of the French economy. By the end of the Fourth Republic, France was a strong and wealthy European state.

Although the Fourth Republic generated positive economic reforms, it was embroiled in conflicts related to the global reordering often termed decolonisation.¹⁴⁸ France's ill-fated colonial policy led to defeat in Indochina and war in Algeria, both of which were costly. Between December 1955 and December 1957, France lost two thirds of its currency reserves, despite steady economic growth.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, the colonial conflicts severely damaged the Republic's reputation. By the mid-1950s, republicanism appeared to have lost its ideological appeal. The advent of the Fifth Republic (1958-) did not see a rebirth of republican ideas, but de Gaulle's presidency plays a significant role in republican mythology.¹⁵⁰ Under the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle set out to restore the French state's authority and resolve the Algerian crisis that had undermined it. However, resolution was far from optimal, marked not by resounding victory for the French but a ceasefire and subsequent withdrawal of the French army from Algeria in 1962. The Algerian war was also a pivotal moment in France's imperial decline, which was exacerbated by the migration of Algerians to the hexagon. These changes also spurred an upheaval of republican institutions, manifested in the reduction of the powers of the Assembly and the strengthening of political parties and the executive. As such, the new constitution gave the president paramount power over policy-making and prime ministers. Many on the

¹⁴⁷ William Hitchcock, *France Restored; Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

¹⁴⁸ John Darwin, 'Empire Denied', *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000* (London: Penguin Books, 1988), pp. 425-485.

¹⁴⁹ Tony Judt, *Postwar* (London, 2010), p. 289.

¹⁵⁰ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *In the Shadow of the General* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Left viewed these changes as anti-republican, arguing that the subservience of an executive power to a legislative power was central to the republican tradition. Despite the absence of explicitly republican terms from de Gaulle's speeches, he, and his officials, deployed republican ideas to guide policies. For example, de Gaulle's 1962 referendum on the direct election of the president could be interpreted as the purest form of republican popular sovereignty, establishing for the first time an unmediated relationship between French citizens and the state.¹⁵¹

Most importantly, de Gaulle was responsible for the 'republicanisation' of the Right.¹⁵² Until the middle of the twentieth century, most parties of the Right viewed the democratic heritage of the Republic as the product of a populist insurrection. Under de Gaulle, the republican public philosophy took on a different emphasis. Gaullist republicanism appropriated elements of postwar Christian democracy, providing the Right with a legitimate and acceptable way of expressing national pride at a time when nationalism was still politically toxic due to its association with Vichy.¹⁵³ This entailed the creation of a robust welfare state for French citizens and new immigrants, based on a blend of republican integration with crypto-Christian values, rather than social democratic ones.¹⁵⁴ As officials deployed republican ideas to fit the political circumstances of the postwar period, republicanism transcended the boundaries of Right and Left, allowing different social and political groups to identify with an overlapping core set of republican values.

The Revival of Republicanism

Although de Gaulle adopted elements of republicanism, it did not yet dominate French politics. It was only after the *trente glorieuses* that French officials on the Left and Right endorsed republicanism as the prevailing public philosophy to drive their policies. This section turns to examine the impetus behind this revival of republican ideas in French public policy. It argues that French officials' deployed republican ideas to pursue three

¹⁵¹ However, this referendum and others throughout de Gaulle's presidency could also be associated with the Bonapartist tradition of plebiscites. See: Neil Rogachevsky, 'Are Plebiscites Constitutional? A Disputed Question in the Plebiscite Campaign of 1970', *French History*, 27(2) (2013), pp. 249-270.

¹⁵² Maurice Agulhon, *République, Tome 2, 1914 à nos jours* (Paris: Hachette, 1990), p. 298.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 295-352.

¹⁵⁴ James Hollifield, 'Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden Consensus' in Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin and James Hollifield (Eds.), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 148.

main missions: to unite frustrated citizens in the midst of economic crisis, to respond to a new public challenge of how to manage new immigrants intensified by the rise of far-Right populism, and to guard against the encroachment of EU integration.

From Crisis to Revival

When de Gaulle died in 1970, France was not in a strong position. The subsequent oil shocks destabilised the French economy to the point of recession. At roughly the same time, many guest workers mainly from France's former colonies who had helped rebuild postwar France, decided to settle permanently in the hexagon. While unemployment rose, the question of integrating immigrants became increasingly prominent in political debate. Some French citizens feared that immigrants might take their jobs, placing pressure on political elites. Politicians began to frame immigrants as scapegoats for economic deterioration, blaming them for the alleged *désintégration* of the nation. Additionally, the shortage of social housing meant that many of these immigrants lived in slums, exposing a level of deprivation and squalor that both French citizens and politicians considered intolerable. Responding to these challenges, French officials had to find a way simultaneously to integrate immigrants into French society and to appease frustrated French citizens. Throughout this period the French party system was also in flux. The 1968 protests broke the Left's consensus and by the 1980s the PCF was dying.¹⁵⁵ Gaullism faded in de Gaulle's absence and in 1981 François Mitterrand was elected as the first left-wing president since the Popular Front of 1936.¹⁵⁶ The Fifth Republic appeared to have reached a crisis.

As the foundations of the Fifth Republic buckled under political and economic pressures, public officials scrambled for an ideology to unite an increasingly fragmented and apathetic France. It was in this context that French politicians invoked neo-republicanism, both as a response to these pressures and as a means of bringing together a diverse electorate. Public officials began to use republicanism, not as a depiction of past events, but as a living political ideal that could offer solutions to contemporary public problems

¹⁵⁵ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: Disillusion and Decline* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

and lend credibility to their policies.¹⁵⁷ This allowed Mitterrand to redefine republicanism as a tool for national unity and consensus rather than a reference to class struggle and revolutionary principles.

The year 1989 marked a turning point in the revival of republican ideas in French politics. It was the bicentennial anniversary of the Revolution and France found itself in the midst of a global geopolitical reorientation after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The European Project was beginning to expand its borders to include member states, while impinging on France's ability to control its own national borders. 1989 was also the year of the *affaire du foulard*, which led to a heated public debate over immigration and secularism.¹⁵⁸ By the 1990s republicanism had become the dominant public philosophy in French politics; officials on both the mainstream Left and Right increasingly used republican ideas to communicate and justify policies. Since then, republicanism has occupied this privileged position among the French political elite and administration. Yet although a similar set of republican ideas appealed to a diverse array of political actors, their interpretations of these ideas differed significantly. Since 2011 even the Far Right *Front National*, under the new leadership of Marine Le Pen, has used republican rhetoric to detoxify its image and appeal to a broader portion of the French electorate.¹⁵⁹

Immigration and Politics

The revival of republicanism is closely linked to the emergence of immigration as a highly politicised issue. The French state has had immigration policies since at least the mid nineteenth century, and French political elites often debated – and especially in the years of Vichy, adopted – xenophobic positions. Yet, it was not until the 1980s that French political elites merged the ideas of immigration and xenophobia in public debate to mobilise the electorate. This situation is not unique to France. The politicisation of immigration has been well documented across Europe, and as the literature suggests, it was often related to the collapse of the far Left, whose former supporters have tended to switch their allegiance to the Far Right in a geopolitical climate increasingly hostile

¹⁵⁷ Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 18.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁵⁹ Jim Shields, 'Marine Le Pen and the "New" FN: A Change of Style or Substance?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 66 (2013), pp. 179-196.

towards Europe's ethnic and religious minorities, especially Muslims.¹⁶⁰ As was the case elsewhere, politicians in France framed France's resident immigrant population as a public problem that required a public policy response.

Three factors characterised the French response to immigration. First, the integration of immigrants into French society became a key policy priority. As millions of North Africans from France's former colonies and a growing number of sub-Saharan Africans sought to permanently settle in France, public debate shifted from controlling the inflow of migrants to managing the assimilation of migrants once they arrived in the Hexagon.¹⁶¹ The fear was that without the hand of the state, immigrants might concentrate into ethnic ghettos, undermining the idea of an indivisible Republic and eroding legitimacy of its key institutions. From this perspective, immigration carried the threat of multiculturalism, which officials saw as a dangerous foreign public philosophy that undermined the idea of a Republic *une et indivisible*. It was within this context that the French state saw certain immigrants as assimilable while regarding others as not. As discussed below, assimilability has become a fundamental condition of neo-republican integration.

Second, until the late 1980s France's long history of immigration was systematically absent from the country's official memory. Gerard Noiriel's seminal work *Le Creuset Français* ended this amnesia and generated a surge of scholarship re-evaluating France's

¹⁶⁰ For works on the increasingly contentious role of immigration in politics see for example, Ariely Gal, 'Globalisation and the Decline of National Identity? An Exploration across Sixty-Three Countries', *Nations and Nationalism*, 18(3) (2012), pp. 461–482; Alessandra Buonfino, 'Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the discourse of Immigration in Europe', *New Political Science*, 26(1) (2004), pp. 23–49; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Claudia Diehl and Rainer Schnell, "'Reactive Ethnicity" or "Assimilation"? Statements, Arguments, and First Empirical Evidence for Labor Migrants in Germany', *International Migration Review*, 40(4) (2006), pp. 786–816; Amy Gutmann, *Identity in Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU* (London: Routledge, 2006); Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, 'Migration, Ethnic Relations, and Xenophobia as a Field of Political Contention: An Opportunity Structure Approach', in Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (Eds.), *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen, and Stephen Castles, *Migration, Citizenship and the Welfare State: A European Dilemma* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Paul M. Sniderman, Peri, Pierangelo Figueiredo, J.P. Rui Jr., and Thomas Piazza, *The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis* (USA: HarperCollins, 1995).

¹⁶¹ James Hollifield, 'Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden Consensus' in Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin and James Hollifield (Eds.), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 159.

history of immigration.¹⁶² Noiriel argued that eminent republican intellectuals and historians such as Ernest Renan, Pierre Vidal de la Blanche and Fernand Braudel fostered this amnesia by depicting the modern French nation as an ideological fixture that crystallised during the French Revolution, long before the widespread use of the term immigration.¹⁶³ By the time immigration became a significant phenomenon in France, Noiriel claimed, the national narrative was already fixed, with no room for the experience of immigrants or foreigners.¹⁶⁴

Noiriel's work was a breakthrough in the field of French immigration, and its empirical contribution is undisputed. Nevertheless, as historian Emile Chabal contends, Noiriel's argument was underpinned by two fallacious assumptions: it understated the role of colonialism in France's history of immigration and interpreted ethnic integration as a form of social integration.¹⁶⁵ The latter suggested that integration is the same process for all foreigners, which draws no distinction between the experience of postcolonial migrants from Algeria, for example, and the settlement of Portuguese populations in France. By equating ethnic integration with social integration, Noiriel attempted to dismiss populist claims that the explosion of migrants in France would produce a crisis of integration. In doing so, Noiriel failed to highlight challenges specific to the integration of ethnic groups, such as language barriers or religious differences, foreclosing the possibility of reaching practical, tailored solutions. Thus, even France's most distinguished scholar of immigration, who sought to reinsert immigration into the national narrative, found himself reproducing neo-republican ideas. In the subsequent chapters of this thesis we shall see that public officials have employed a similar logic to reject accusations of ethnic discrimination and justify policies that disproportionately stigmatised populations living in slums that officials framed as a Roma problem.

The third defining factor of France's experience of immigration is the growth of the Far-Right party, the FN, since the 1980s.¹⁶⁶ The FN has posed a threat to mainstream parties, pushing immigration to the top of the political agenda. The reasons for the emergence of

¹⁶² Gerard Noiriel, *Le Creuset Français* (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1988).

¹⁶³ Ibid., pp. 16-30.

¹⁶⁴ Michel Rapport, *Nationality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France: The Treatment of Foreigners 1989-99* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), pp. 327-353.

¹⁶⁵ Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 19.

¹⁶⁶ Emmanuel Godin, 'Does it make sense to treat the Front National as a French Exception?', in Emmanuel Godin and Tony Chafer (Eds.), *The French Exception* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2004).

the FN are many but, as James Hollifield asserts, the common thread binding a volatile electorate was opposition to Mitterrand's policies on immigration and a fear of unemployment.¹⁶⁷ In recent years the FN has moved from the fringes of French politics to become a mainstream party. This is in part due to its change in leadership in January 2011 when Marine Le Pen, the eldest daughter of FN founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, took over the party presidency. In an effort to de-demonise the FN, Marine Le Pen employed the idea of *laïcité*, albeit using it in a controversial manner, to argue that migration was causing 'l'islamisation de la France'. She argued that 'la France peut être laïque parce qu'elle est chrétienne de culture et on s'aperçoit d'ailleurs que les pays musulmans ont les plus grandes difficultés à être laïcs... laïcité n'est pas compatible, pas naturelle, avec l'islam, puisque l'islam confond le spirituel et le temporel'.¹⁶⁸ Additionally, Marine Le Pen's use of catchy slogans such as 'la France aux Français' and 'UMPS' – an amalgamation of the acronyms for the conservative Right-wing party, the UMP, and the Socialist party, the PS – undermined the idea of an ethnically neutral Republic and attacked France's ruling political elites.

Europe's current refugee crisis, France's sluggish economic recovery and the fear of terrorism have intensified anti-immigrant sentiment and bolstered support for the FN. Yet, although the FN has grown substantially since its early success in the 1983 municipal elections, it is debatable whether the party has changed in substance or merely in style. Their strategy 'if you can't beat republicans, join them', softened the party's xenophobic image, but it is unclear whether Marine Le Pen's ideology differs dramatically from that of her emphatically anti-republican father. Nonetheless, the FN's appropriation of republican language reinforces the dominance of republicanism in contemporary French politics.

European Integration

Since the ratification of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the integration of the European Union has posed new challenges to the national sovereignty of its member states, and

¹⁶⁷ James Hollifield, 'Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden Consensus' in Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin and James Hollifield (Eds.), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 163.

¹⁶⁸ Marine Le Pen in Teddy Duthel, *2017 Manuel Valls vs Marine Le Pen* (Lulu, 2017), p. 52.

tested the limits of France's republican ideas.¹⁶⁹ To be clear, European integration is distinctly different from the French concept of republican integration, yet their meanings are equally contested.¹⁷⁰ Drawing on the work of political scientist, Ernst Haas, European integration can be understood as 'the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states'.¹⁷¹ The end result, according to Haas, is 'a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing national states'.¹⁷² Given that republicanism has become the dominant national public philosophy in France, it is scarcely surprising that the deepening of supranational European integration has tested its limits.¹⁷³

Three challenges to republicanism stand out. First, the opening of EU borders and free movement of citizens within them. The Schengen Agreement was significant because it marked the first step in the formal removal of national border controls of EU member states. In doing so, it enabled the free movement of persons across national borders, fulfilling a fundamental objective outlined in Article 69 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1951. By abolishing physical borders between EU member states, France (along with Germany and the Benelux countries) relinquished national control and enforcement of immigration at three of its five land-locked frontiers. The application of the Single European Act in 1987 and the completion of the European Single Market in 1992 removed further obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, people (self-employed and employees), and capital throughout the European Community.¹⁷⁴ The free movement of people was codified in the 2004/38/EC Directive on the free movement of European Citizens.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁹ *The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders* (14 June 1985): 42000A0922(01).

¹⁷⁰ For an overview of different theories of European integration see: Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Eds.), *Debates on European Integration: A Reader* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

¹⁷¹ Ernst Haas, 'Persistent Themes in Atlantic and European Unity', *World Politics*, 10 (1958), p. 627.

¹⁷² Ibid., *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, Second Edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986).

¹⁷³ For a collection of essays on Republicanism and Europe see: Patrick Savidan (Eds.), *La République ou l'Europe* (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2004).

¹⁷⁴ Single European Act (29 June 1987): L:1987:169:TOC.

¹⁷⁵ 2004/38/EC.

Today the Schengen Zone encompasses 22 of the 28 EU member states, opening France's borders with all neighbouring states except Switzerland. Porous borders have specific ramifications in terms of republicanism. They erode national sovereignty, and call into question the legitimacy of other EU member states' decisions to regulate the flow of non-EU citizens. Elected by their own citizens, other EU member states are not obliged to represent the will of French citizens, posing a risk to the republican pact between French citizens and the nation-state. The largescale migration of refugees mainly from Syria and other parts of the Middle East to Europe since the summer of 2015 has accentuated this tension. It has also highlighted a new balance of power in Brussels, with Germany at the helm.

The second challenge to republicanism is the concept of EU citizenship. Signed in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty states that 'every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union'.¹⁷⁶ Specifically, Article 8 declares that EU citizens have the right to free movement and residence in any member state, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal and European Parliament elections in the member state of their residence, and the right to petition the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman. This poses ideological and practical challenges to republicanism.

Ideologically, the concept of supranational citizenship undermines the link between integration and French national citizenship. Before 1992, French citizenship was the key to permanent residence and the result of undergoing dedicated assimilation into French society. However, following the Maastricht Treaty, immigrants from EU member states were exempt from this procedure. French citizenship and integration into French society were no longer requirements of residency. Free movement is not without conditions. After a period of six months, EU citizens cannot reside indefinitely in a member state other than their own. According to the free movement directive 2004/38/EC, EU citizens can be refused entry or returned to their country of origin if they are deemed to pose a threat to public order, public security or public health. The directive also stipulates that residence is only guaranteed up until three months, after which EU migrants can be deported if they fail to demonstrate possession of 'sufficient resources' and therefore considered to be a burden on the welfare state of the host country. Yet, porous borders

¹⁷⁶ TEU (1992), Art. 9.

and lack of passport checks means that this is difficult to enforce, compromising the power of French authorities to make these calls.

The provision of voting rights to EU citizens in municipal and European parliamentary elections also allows non-French citizens to theoretically have some say, in French politics. This contradicts the emphasis on civic engagement, that is the engagement of French citizens in the political process, that has been a feature of modern French history, challenging the bond (known as *le pacte républicain*) between the French state and its citizens. It is important to remember that the voting rights of non-EU foreigners in France is a partisan issue. The question of whether foreigners residing in France should have the right to vote has been a longstanding debate in French politics and part of the Socialist Party's manifesto since 1981. Nevertheless, the fact remains that non-French nationals now have the capacity to shape elements of French politics that could influence the lives of French citizens, a key example of the often-criticised EU 'competence creep'.¹⁷⁷

The third challenge that European integration posed to republicanism was the 2004 and 2007 waves of EU enlargement. The 2004 enlargement wave included ten new member states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The 2007 enlargement wave encompassed Romania and Bulgaria, which are of particular interest to this thesis. Whereas the EU was previously a predominantly Western European project, these two waves of enlargement expanded the EU across Central and Eastern Europe to absorb former communist states.

Throughout accession negotiations, existing EU member states feared that the economic and political instability of the fallen USSR might lead to a civil war and an exodus of refugees.¹⁷⁸ This was arguably justified in the case of Yugoslavia, but not in other former communist states. Upon accession to the EU, no overarching Central and Eastern European civil war took place and citizens of these new member states tended to migrate for socio-economic reasons in search of a better quality of life. For these new EU citizens, accession to the EU meant access to the labour markets of prosperous Western European

¹⁷⁷ Stephen Weatherill, 'Competence creep and competence control', *Yearbook of European Law*, 23(1) (2004), pp. 1-55.

¹⁷⁸ James Hollifield, 'Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden Consensus' in Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin and James Hollifield (Eds.), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 165.

states without the need to apply for a visa, or work permit that previously required renewing every two years. Transitional measures still applied to these new member states for seven years following their accession, the objective of which was to gradually introduce free movement and prevent mass migration. For France, and other existing EU member states, enlargement marked the arrival of immigrants from new national and ethnic minorities, such as the Roma.

Whether Romanians and Bulgarians personally identified as Roma or whether they were merely perceived as such, is extremely difficult to prove. Whether those perceived to be Roma were even Romanian or Bulgarian nationals is also questionable. However, putting self-identification to one side, the French state's colour-blind discourse on immigration gave rise to ethnic stereotypes, which transformed into a tacit construction of a Roma category. French officials saw the settlement of populations living in illegal camps on the outskirts of French cities as a Roma problem, prompting a public response. It is clear that European integration has limited the political action of French officials and altered the context in which republican ideas are deployed. Yet, as this thesis suggests, European institutions have fallen short of protecting the ethnic discrimination of its citizens moving freely across member states.

Key Neo-Republicanism Ideas

To address these new challenges, French officials drew upon (neo-) republican ideas to communicate and justify policies. This section focuses on four key neo-republican ideas: universalism, the public sphere, selection and integration. These ideas were not necessarily complementary or distinct. Their meanings were contingent upon the inter-subjective understandings of officials who deployed them and the circumstances to which they responded. But it is analytically useful to separate ideas to study how officials deployed them to communicate and justify policies. These four neo-republican ideas were not the only ones that officials deployed but I have chosen to focus on them because they emerged as the most germane to my study of political discourse on the Roma. To pave the way for my empirical study of political discourse on the Roma in subsequent chapters, this section analyses how officials deployed these four ideas to address challenges other than the Roma in contemporary France.

Universalism

Universalism is perhaps the most well-known republican idea, typified by the revolutionary notion of the French nation that is ‘one and indivisible’ and enshrined in article 1 of the 1958 Constitution.¹⁷⁹ Yet, as officials have deployed it to respond to developments in contemporary French politics, universalism has acquired particular neo-republican elements. Today it implies more than simply a rejection of the particular in favour of a common good. Neo-republican universalism is defined as the refusal to recognise the identities of ethnic or religious minorities in the French public sphere. The emphasis on the public sphere is significant because it relies on an ethnically neutral conception of not only public participation but also public space, as is discussed in detail below. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the republican notion of the public sphere is not neutral but normative, with neutrality defined in terms of a particular concept of what officials consider to be normal and acceptable.

Over the last three decades French political elites have invoked universalism to guard against the *désintégration* of the French nation. The depiction of *désintégration* as the principal existential threat to the Republic is not new. As Lucien Jaume asserts, ‘during the Revolution of 1789’ it was believed that ‘the situation, opinion, interest and even behaviour of the individual...should disappear behind the general will’.¹⁸⁰ Today the argument is less about regional divisions than alleged threats to national cohesion from external forces, such as immigrants, and minorities inside France. The fear is that ethnic, religious and cultural difference would reduce the Republic to what one journalist termed ‘the pandemonium of the tower of Babel’.¹⁸¹ Advocates of republicanism tend to depict multiculturalism as the antithesis of the republican idea of universalism. From this perspective, multiculturalism is an alternative public philosophy based on the idea that society should recognise and protect ethnic and religious communities and support the coexistence of these diverse communities. Some republican advocates go one step further to present multiculturalism as a threat to the republican public philosophy. Various republican intellectuals have expressed concerns about the ‘atomising’ and tendency of

¹⁷⁹ Philippe Forest, *Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? Littérature et Identité Nationale de 1871 à 1914. Texte Intégrale de Ernest Renan* (Paris: Pierre Bordas et Fils, 1991), pp. 12-48.

¹⁸⁰ Lucien Jaume, *Le Discours Jacobin et la Démocratie* (Paris: Fayard, 1989).

¹⁸¹ Christien Jelen, *Les Casseurs de la République* (Paris: Plon, 1997).

multiculturalism.¹⁸² The political commentator and historian Pierre-André Taguieff argues that multiculturalism is deeply divisive of the civic community and is likely to foster a society in which ‘tribe war would replace class war’.¹⁸³ Similarly, the philosopher Alain Finkelkraut asserted in 1989 that ‘the nation is disappearing in favour of tribes...[and] cultural unity will make way for a juxtaposition of ghettos’.¹⁸⁴

It is worth distinguishing the French interpretation of multiculturalism from the Anglo-American one. In English, multiculturalism is viewed positively and is based on the view that cultural differences should be accommodated for a society to function harmoniously.¹⁸⁵ In the United States, for example, ethnic communities are regarded as an outlet for minorities to have a voice. In France, however, multiculturalism is considered a dangerous threat to the republican pact between state and citizen that could fragment the nation into interest groups divided by race, religion, culture and previous nationalities.¹⁸⁶ This is what is pejoratively termed *communautarisme*. Carrying a stronger meaning in French than its English equivalent, communitarianism is a powerful political tool. This term has generally been used in public discourses to criticise calls for positive discrimination or counter demands for cultural diversity. The division of spaces à l’anglo-saxonne into China Towns, Little Italies and Harlems is precisely what republicans wish to avoid.¹⁸⁷ Viewed from this perspective, multiculturalism is considered the cause and *communautarisme* the consequence of the Republic’s *désintégration*.

Universalism is also closely related to the concept of *laïcité*. For example, French officials have used the refusal to recognise religious identities to justify policies that have disproportionate effects on religious minorities, especially Muslims. This colour-blind logic also applies to ethnic minorities, that is those who are characterised by linguistic,

¹⁸² Pierre-André Taguieff, *La République Enlisée: Pluralisme, Communautarisme et Citoyenneté* (Paris: Éditions des Syrtes, 2005), pp. 23-24.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Alain Finkelkraut, ‘La nation disparaît au profit du tribus’, *Le Monde* (13 July 1989) cited in Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 117.

¹⁸⁵ Natalya Vince, ‘France, Islam and Laïcité’, in Tony Chafer et. al. (Eds.), *The End of the French Exception?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p. 154.

¹⁸⁶ Natalya Vince, ‘France, Islam and Laïcité’, in Tony Chafer et. al. (Eds.), *The End of the French Exception?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p. 154.

¹⁸⁷ Beth Epstein, *Collective Terms: Race, Culture and Community in a State-Planned City in France* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), p. 92.

racial, cultural or moral codes different from those of the dominant population.¹⁸⁸ Two key examples illustrate the use of universalism in contemporary French politics. The first is the opposition of the Charter for Regional Languages in 1999. As Danièle Sallenave asserted, the acknowledgement of regional languages could lead to the division of the national community, which is a “community of citizens”, not a federation of various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups.¹⁸⁹

The second example of universalism is the French government’s longstanding ban on collecting racial and ethnic statistics, which erupted into a public debate in 2004.¹⁹⁰ The debate generated tension between those who saw ethnic and racial statistics as an important research tool and a means of measuring discrimination, and those who viewed ethno-racial classifications as contributing to an essentialisation of ethnic identities, with potentially dangerous consequences.¹⁹¹ The former position tends towards the Anglo-Saxon idea of multicultural diversity, whereas the latter is a classical defence of universalism to apparently protect all French citizens. There are also fears about what ethno-racial statistics might reveal. A republican might argue that uncovering ethnic diversity could play into the hands of Marine Le Pen who claims that ‘there are too many immigrants’ in France. Yet the validity of this view remains untested.

Although most French officials would insist that the institutions of modern France are founded upon universalist principles, the French state sometimes promotes ethnic and religious initiatives, albeit mostly at a local level. For example, some republican institutions, such as local town halls, now provide Muslims with prayer spaces, Muslim cemeteries now exist and there are Muslim chaplains in French prisons and the national army.¹⁹² The official discourse of universalism is also difficult to square with the

¹⁸⁸ Alec Hargreaves, *Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2007), p. 34.

¹⁸⁹ Danièle Sallenave, ‘Partez, briseurs d’unité’, *Le Monde* (3 July 1989), cited in Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 102.

¹⁹⁰ Sociologist Patrick Simon has championed the idea of collecting ethno-racial statistics in France. See for example: Patrick Simon, ‘The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France’, *French Politics, Culture & Society*, 26(1) (2008), pp. 7–31.

¹⁹¹ For works rejecting the collection of ethno-racial statistics see: Centre d’analyse stratégique, *Colloque sur les statistiques ethniques* (Paris: Centre d’analyse stratégique, 2006), and Henri Héduin, ‘Faut-il inventer des catégories “ethniques”?’ in *Differences* (June/July 2002), pp. 36–37.

¹⁹² Natalya Vince, ‘France, Islam and Laïcité’, in Tony Chafer et. al. (Eds.), *The End of the French Exception?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p. 154. For an example of a local political initiative established to serve the interest of a religious minority see: Emile Chabal, ‘Managing the Postcolony: minority politics in Montpellier, c.1960-c.2010’, *Contemporary European History*, 23(2) (2014), pp. 237–258.

persistent use of code words such as ‘youths’ and ‘delinquents’ to refer to ethnic categories (predominantly Arabs and black Africans).¹⁹³ As this thesis demonstrates, the term ‘*campements illicites*’ has been increasingly used as a pseudonym for the Roma. These anomalies are a reminder that universalist ideas were in fact ideals.

Even Dominique Schnapper, a leading intellectual champion of French republicanism, conceded that universalism is best seen as an ideal rather than a reality: ‘transcendence through citizenship appears to a humiliated people as something purely formal that has the function of consecrating the domination of the other under the guise of universality’.¹⁹⁴ Jeremy Jennings took this point a step further, arguing that universalism could be seen ‘as a perverse form of communitarianism, for which the national community is the supreme community, forcibly imposing a unitary common good over the plurality of sub-national groups’.¹⁹⁵ This would not be problematic if the French Republic were, in fact, ethnically and religiously neutral. However, as the empirical chapters of this thesis demonstrate, this ideal was often betrayed in practice.

The Public Sphere

Another central tenet of neo-republicanism is the preservation of a ‘neutral’ public sphere. As mentioned above, this concept of a neutral public sphere is normative, with neutrality defined in terms of what is normal and acceptable. To conceptualise this notion of the public sphere, scholars of French republicanism have tended to use the work of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas.¹⁹⁶ According to Habermas, the public sphere is defined as an abstract arena in which individuals can come together to freely discuss and debate societal issues, form public opinion and consequently influence politics. This definition is inextricably linked to the civic engagement of French citizens, a factor that republican policymakers and philosophers have long considered crucial to the success of the Republic and the legitimacy of its leader. Thierry Paquot, philosopher and professor at

¹⁹³ Cécile Laborde, ‘Citizenship’ Republic’ in Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert and Christophe Prochasson (Eds.) *The French Republic: History, Values, Debates* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 141.

¹⁹⁴ Friedrich Heckmann and Dominique Schnapper (Eds.), *The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies: National Differences and Trends of Convergence* (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2003), p. 16.

¹⁹⁵ Jeremy Jennings, ‘Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in France’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(4) (2000), p. 597.

¹⁹⁶ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, translated by Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).

the l'Institut d'urbanisme de Paris, stresses that unlike in English, the French singular and plural forms of the term 'public sphere' have different meanings. He builds upon this point to argue that *espace public* and *espaces publics* are separate and irreconcilable concepts. In contrast, Paquot defines singular term, *espace public*, using the Habermas' concept of the public sphere.¹⁹⁷ Paquot defines the plural term, *espaces publics*, as geographical places open to the public and free of charge, such as parks, streets, beaches, mountains, fields and forests.¹⁹⁸ These geographical places, he claims, are not necessarily publicly owned, as he argues shopping malls and department stores can also be considered *espaces publics*.

Paquot's distinction between the abstract *espace public* and the physical *espaces publics* is a useful conceptual tool, but it has three shortcomings. First, it fails to capture the particular republican significance of the public sphere. For example, republican institutions are conspicuously absent from Paquot's list of *espaces publics*. The omission of *l'école républicaine* is especially problematic. *L'école républicaine* has been a key forum in which the boundary between public and private has been tested, re-negotiated and re-defined. Second, Paquot offers no definition of the private domain, which makes it difficult to envisage the limits of the public sphere. From my perspective, the private domain is located outside the public sphere and includes matters of private interest, such as family, religion, ethnicity and sexuality. Third, *espace public* and *espaces publiques* are not entirely independent. Rather, I would argue they are two sides of the same republican coin. One is an abstract and imagined realm in which French citizens can freely exercise civic rights to shape politics, the other is a physical and geographic place that is governed by universalistic principles. Both are conceived as emancipatory spaces that allow individuals to leave behind private attachments in exchange for the common good.

Indirectly, however, Paquot's work makes an important contribution to understanding neo-republican ideas. By highlighting the physical and geographical dimension of *espaces publics*, he draws attention to an often-overlooked feature of the public sphere: its visibility. Not all types of visibility appear to challenge the republican concept of a

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Thierry Paquot, *l'Espace Public* (Paris: La Decouverte, 2009), p. 3.

neutral public sphere. However, officials have tended to criticise conspicuous manifestations of poverty, and concentrations of some ethnic and religious groups on the grounds that they challenge the neutrality of the public sphere. This point is particularly relevant to the Roma. As chapter four of this thesis will reveal, the geographical interpretation of the public sphere helps to explain why French policymakers have targeted *campements illicites* (visible and often in public places), rather than *squats* (hidden, and often in derelict private properties). The visibility of the public sphere means that if an individual or group fails to leave behind their private attachments, they appear to challenge the norms of what is considered acceptable in French society. The public sphere thus magnifies religious and ethnic difference and highlights the distinction between the majority population and minorities, a distinction that theoretically would be considered inconsequential in the private domain. The issue is not that minorities exist; it is that they are exposed. This implies that diversity is considered undesirable if on display but permissible if covert.

In recent years, French officials have drawn upon the idea of preserving a neutral public sphere to communicate and justify policies. Two interrelated examples demonstrate this point. The first was the 2004 law banning ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols in state schools, which put an end to a decade of legal uncertainty and controversy, known as the *affair du foulard*.¹⁹⁹ Although hijabs, turbans, skullcaps and large crosses were prohibited, it has often been argued that the Muslim headscarf was the principal target.²⁰⁰ The second example of French political elites’ efforts to preserve the public sphere was the 2010 law banning the burqa, the full face covering, in public.²⁰¹ These two examples polarised political opinion: liberals criticised the measures as an infringement of the freedom of religious expression, while republicans viewed them as a necessary means of protecting *laïcité* and defending the Republic from cultural fragmentation and

¹⁹⁹ For a controversial take on the headscarf debate see: Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

²⁰⁰ Natalya Vince, ‘France, Islam and Laïcité’, in Tony Chafer et. al. (Eds.), *The End of the French Exception?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p. 153.

²⁰¹ Jennifer Heider, ‘Unveiling the Truth behind the French Burqa Ban: The Unwarranted Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European Court of Human Rights’, *Indiana International & Comparative Law Review*, 22(1) (2012), pp. 93–129; Ryan W. Hill, ‘The French Prohibition on Veiling in Public Places: Rights Evolution or Violation?’, *Oxford Journal of Law and Religion*, 2(2) (2013), pp.417–39; and Sally Pei, ‘Unveiling Inequality: Burqa Bans and Nondiscrimination Jurisprudence at the European Court of Human Rights’, *The Yale Law Journal* 122(4) (2013), pp. 1089–1102.

désintégration.²⁰² The fact that the republican idea was enshrined in French law reveals that the preservation of the public sphere moved from rhetoric to institution, and highlights the dominance of republican ideology in contemporary French politics.

Yet, despite the fact officials strategically deployed the idea of preserving a neutral public sphere, the demarcation between public and private remains ambiguous. For example, the very case that prompted the 2010 legislation banning the burqa ruled that a private day-care nursery was within its rights when it fired an employee who refused to remove her burqa at work. Although the court stressed that this ruling should not be generalised as it related to the nursery's specific company regulations, it demonstrated that, if deemed necessary, the preservation of an ostensibly neutral public sphere could be applied to instances in the private domain. The conditions for which this might be permitted are unclear, and depend on specific legislation. However, the implication is that the French state now has the power to intervene in a private business if officials can justify it as protecting the Republic.

A striking example of the French state's intervention in the private domain is the urban planning and housing policy of *mixité sociale* (social mixing).²⁰³ The idea of *mixité sociale* first appeared in 1972 directive introduced by Olivier Guichard, the then Minister for Land, Infrastructure, Housing and Transport, stating that 20 per cent of social housing is reserved for 'particular categories'. Two decades later *mixité sociale* was formally enshrined in the 1991 *loi d'orientation pour la ville*. The aim of *mixité sociale* was to create a social housing system and local community in which families from a variety of different ethnic, religious and national backgrounds could live side-by-side.²⁰⁴ The logic behind it was that *mixité sociale* would transform poorer neighbourhoods, which often contained

²⁰² For a republican argument see for example Pascal Bruckner, 'Unveiled: A Case for France's Burqa Ban', *World Affairs*, 173(4) (2010), pp. 61–65.

²⁰³ For a selection of works on *mixité sociale* see: Marie-Helene Bacque et al., 'Social Mix Policies in Paris: Discourses, Policies and Social Effects' *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(2) (2011), pp. 256–73; Gérard Bénédict, 'L'évolution de La Mixité Sociale, Enjeu Du Renouvellement Urbain Des Grands Ensembles D'habitation de L'agglomération Strasbourgeoise', *Géographie, économie, Société*, 1 (2011), pp. 69–92; Beth Epstein, *Collective Terms: Race, Culture and Community in a State-Planned City in France* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011); Catherine Gremion, 'Mixite Sociale et Habitat Des Familles Immigrees: Perspective Historique', *French Politics, Culture & Society*, 22(3) (2004), pp. 76–90; Jean-François Leger, 'Mixité Sociale Entre Mythe et Réalité : Paris, Lyon, Marseille', *Population & Avenir* 3 (2013), pp. 4–8; and Lydie Launay, 'De Paris à Londres: Le Défi de La Mixité Sociale Par Les 'Acteurs Clés'', *Espaces et Sociétés*, 140 (2010), pp. 111–26.

²⁰⁴ Beth Epstein, *Collective Terms: Race, Culture and Community in a State-Planned City in France* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), p. 13.

new immigrant populations, into cohesive, integrated communities and prevent the creation of ethnic and religious ghettos. *Mixité sociale* is an interesting example because it applies universalist principles, traditionally linked to public sphere, to the private domain of the home. This raises the question of whether social housing (fully subsidised *hébergement* and partially subsidised *logement*) falls into the public or private sphere. It also suggests that officials consider those who cannot afford independent housing should be governed by universalist principles in both the public and private sphere. This example highlights that the distinction between public and private varies depending on socio-economic situation.

Selection

The third strand of neo-republican ideas is selection. Although public officials have often presented the idea of an inclusive and equal community of citizens as the bedrock of the Republic, their policies also reflect the conditionality of its membership. Republicanism is often a Janus-faced philosophy that officials use to foster cohesion through the integration of citizens, while excluding others who they deem incapable or unwilling to assimilate into French society. Of course, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens has always existed, but so have internal hierarchies based on gender, ethnicity as religion. Republican purists would strongly contest this claim, but even a glance at France's modern history reveals that the French state has systematically excluded 'others' (such as Jews and Catholics) whose loyalty to the Republic was deemed suspect.²⁰⁵ Additionally, as late as 1945, women were excluded from 'universal' suffrage.

Nevertheless, the selection of citizens based on a prerequisite of assimilability has become increasingly explicit in the discourse of French officials. As Epstein argues, whereas the policies of the early Third Republic encouraged immigrants to integrate after living in France for some years, the Fifth Republic asks some of them to do so before arriving.²⁰⁶ When *l'école républicaine* was founded, cultural conformity was the desired outcome of integration, not a litmus test for entry.²⁰⁷ The same logic applies to foreigners.

²⁰⁵ Gerard Noiriel, *Les Origines Républicaines de Vichy* (Paris, 1999).

²⁰⁶ Mary Dewhurst Lewis, 'Immigration', in Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert and Christophe Prochasson (Eds.) *The French Republic: History, Values, Debates* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 240.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

The discourse of French officials suggests foreigners are now expected to conform to French society and possess sufficient financial resources to live independently of the welfare state before they arrive in France.²⁰⁸ This was reflected in the 2007 Hortefeux Law that demands French language ability and acceptance of universal principles as a prerequisite for family reunification. A report by the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration (HCI) in 2003 also outlined conditions for integration: proficiency in French, the dispersal of immigrant populations across residential areas, the weakening of community ties and their replacement by an individualised relationship with the state, and above all, the acquisition of French citizenship in two generations.²⁰⁹ The implication is that immigrants must integrate pre-emptively or they are not welcome in France.

For example, as Amelia Lyons demonstrates in her study of the Algerian Welfare Network in the 1950s to the 1970s, French officials only helped support the integration of Algerians in France who they deemed to have 'civilising potential' by providing them with housing and comprehensive social support.²¹⁰ This argument was based on the assumptions that some Algerians did not wish to integrate, or were too 'culturally different' to be absorbed into French society.²¹¹ Given the influx of North African immigration to France during and after the Algerian War and the deep colonial ties between France and its former *département*, it is difficult to take these assumptions as more than deep-seated prejudice. Nevertheless, despite politicians' efforts to maintain a commitment to universalism in their public comments, references to the incompatibility of ethnic or religious communities were not always suppressed. For example, in 1984 the then Interior Minister, Gaston Defferre, asserted:

When Poles, Italians, Spanish, and Portuguese live in France and decide to naturalize, it matters little whether they are, Protestants, Jews, or atheists... But the rules of Islam are not simply religious rules. They are rules of living that concern... marriage, divorce, the care of children, the behaviour of men, the behaviour of women... These rules are contrary to all the rules of French law on the custody of children in case of divorce, and they are contrary to [French rules on] the rights of women with respect to their husbands. What is more, in France we don't have the same habits of living.²¹²

²⁰⁸ Patrick Simon, 'Contested Citizenship in France', in Alastair Cole, Sophie Meurier and Vincent Tiberj (Eds.), *Developments in French Politics Five* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), p. 208.

²⁰⁹ Haut Conseil à l'intégration, *Le contrat et l'intégration* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2003).

²¹⁰ Amelia Lyons, *The Civilising Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonisation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

²¹¹ For more detailed arguments on the incompatibility of Islam and the Republic see: Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1992).

²¹² Claude Lanzmann 'Entretien avec Gaston Defferre, Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Décentralisation, Maire de Marseille', *Les Temps Modernes*, 40(452-454) (1984), pp. 1561-1580.

By framing Islam as total belief system that cannot be reduced to the private sphere, Defferre suggested that the presence of Muslim migrants in France created public and political demands that conflicted with the secular and universalist ideas of the republican tradition. But, in trying to protect a colour-blind conception of French society, Defferre paradoxically essentialised Islam, ignoring its various interpretations. As such, Defferre's commitment to universalism concealed a logic of discrimination that prioritised some ethnic and religious communities over others.

Integration

The fourth neo-republican idea I found most germane to my analysis was integration. From the outset, the French Republic has been concerned with transforming individuals into French citizens to create a common national community. Originally integration was the assimilation of regional populations from, for example, Brittany, Provence and Burgundy, through the imposition of a national language, culture and identity.²¹³ Recently, integration has taken on a new meaning. Instead of uniting rural populations by turning 'peasants into Frenchmen', the aim of the French state's integration policies has been to absorb immigrants and foreigners residing in France. The assumption was that through gradually integrating immigrant groups into French society, their presence would be relatively small, their needs could be attended to, French institutions could continue without interruption, and over time immigrants would 'become French'.²¹⁴ In 1989 this new definition of integration became official. Responding to the perceived political crisis of immigration, socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard established the HCI. The task of this inter-ministerial committee was to provide answers to questions on the integration of foreign residents or French residents of foreign origin.²¹⁵ According to the HCI:

²¹³ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France: 1870-1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).

²¹⁴ For advocates of this view see: Jacques Barou, 'L'espace immigré ou comment les rendre invisibles', *Politique Aujourd'hui*, 4 (1984), pp. 115-123; Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflicts in Industrial Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Colette Pétonnet, *On est tous dans le brouillard* (Paris: Gallimard, 1979); Maxim Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France* (London: Routledge, 1992); and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, *Les Immigrés et la Politique: Cent cinquante ans d'évolution* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1988).

²¹⁵ Article 1 du Décret no 89-912 du 19 décembre 1989 portant création d'un Haut Conseil à l'intégration, *Journal Officiel* (23 December 1989).

The term integration (generally used to describe the situation of immigrants who have settled permanently in their host country) refers to both a [social] process and the policies that are put into place to facilitate it. Note: This process requires the effective participation of all those called to live in France in the construction of a society that brings them together around shared principles (liberty of thought and conscience, equality between men and women for example) as they are expressed in equal rights and common responsibilities...To lead a policy of integration is to define and develop actions that tend towards the maintenance of social cohesion at both a local and national level, so that everybody can live peacefully and normally by respecting the law and exercising their rights and responsibilities.²¹⁶

This definition recast integration in terms of immigration and reinforced the republican idea of political participation. The notion of citizenship is strikingly absent, however. Whereas integration traditionally implied the process whereby individuals were made into citizens, the absence of citizenship in this definition meant that the question of precisely what immigrants were integrating into was left open to interpretation. The implication was that any person who wished to live in France, regardless of their origins, could integrate if they agreed to participate in public life, reflecting the republican idea of the public sphere mentioned above. A 2003 HCI report made this emphasis on participation explicit:

integration is not only destined for French citizens of immigrant origin, but concerns any individual who participates in the public space...National identity is experienced through shared values: it is not enough to be born on French soil to feel French. In order to come together, we must forget our particularities and discover what we have in common with others.²¹⁷

Yet, as officials were selective, they did not consider all individuals as willing or capable of public participation on the grounds that some were more assimilable than others. What did the process of state-led integration entail for the select few? Children were predominantly subject to assimilation through education in *l'école républicaine*. As the historian Marc Sadoun observes, 'the Republic does not conceive of citizenship without the education of the citizen: the individual is not born but becomes French'.²¹⁸ He argues that the school provides a forum in which children can leave behind the dogmas and traditions of family, religion and ethnicity and learn to adopt the principles of republicanism. This implies that 'true' integration is only possible for second-generation

²¹⁶ Haut Conseil à l'intégration, *Glossary of Terms*: www.hci.gouv.fr/-Mots-de-l-integration-.html#I (accessed 14 June 2016).

²¹⁷ Ibid., *Le contrat et l'intégration* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2003), p. 104.

²¹⁸ Marc Sadoun, *La Démocratie en France* (Paris, Gallimard: 2000), p. 15.

immigrants and their descendants. The emphasis on integrating children has remained a priority for neo-republican political elites. For example, the Ministry of Education runs compulsory French language classes for new arrivals and established a Priority Education Zone policy from 1981 to 2007 providing more resources to educational staff working in disadvantaged, often largely immigrant, populations. Municipal governments also offer various forms of support to pupils outside school in an effort to reduce social inequality. But despite these efforts to reduce social inequality, French schools do not treat all populations equally. As Riva Kastoryano and Angéline Escafré-Dublet argue, French public schools promote ‘une laïcité “à deux vitesses” où la place accordée à la religion catholique (à travers le calendrier des jours fériés, par exemple) est plus importante que celle accordée à la pratique d’autres religions (absence pour le jour de l’Aïd).’²¹⁹

With regards to adults, the French state has approached the integration in terms of broader socialisation projects, by assisting them with social housing, language training, employment opportunities and health cover. In the absence of sending adults to *l’école républicaine*, the aim is to equip adults with the skills to navigate French society and prepare them for life within French society but without financial or social support from the French state. These projects are informed by a republican notion of paternalism that restricts the freedom of immigrants to help them blend into the French melting pot. This is exemplified in the French governments’ various transitional housing policies, ranging from the *cités de transit* of the 1960s and 70s that absorbed Algerian immigrants living in *bidonvilles* to local and regional *projets d’insertion* initiatives that offered alternative housing to Roma *campements illicites* today.²²⁰

Chapter six of this thesis provides a detailed analysis of *projets d’insertion*, but to understand the assumptions behind the integration of adults, it is useful to identify four key characteristics underpinning the French state’s agenda. First, transitional housing policies were intended to be temporary, lasting ideally for a matter of months not years. This is because such an inclusive package of integration is extremely costly and difficult to justify, especially in the context of a sluggish economic climate. Second, despite the

²¹⁹ Riva Kastoryano and Angéline Escafré-Dublet, ‘Diversité et laïcité à l’école’, *Policy Brief Accept Pluralism*, 1 (2011), pp. 1-8.

²²⁰ For an excellent examination of transitional housing projects in the 1960s and 1970s see: Amelia Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonisation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

projected view that integration is a state-led initiative, transitional housing policies tended to be financed by regional governments but implemented by non-government agencies and social workers, such as Adoma (formerly called Sonacotra). Third, transitional housing is constructed for small nuclear families of roughly two parents and three children. This posed a practical problem for the integration of larger families, especially Muslims and Roma migrants, who do not wish to be separated but cannot be accommodated by this type of housing. Fourth, transitional housing projects had varying degrees of privacy. Some were managed under lock and key, had security guards and strict visiting hours while others had limited surveillance and few rules. The process of integration varied between being hands-on or relaxed, depending on the type of transitional housing, the political climate in which it was created, the perception of the inhabitants and the relationship with the local community. The republican idea of integration thus translated into diverse applications in French policy. Officials may have invoked the same concept, but their interpretations of it varied.

Yet, in spite of the French state's efforts to integrate (or exclude) foreigners, the success of integration policies remains questionable. Without ethnic statistics, it is difficult to accurately identify ethnic minorities let alone measure feelings of belonging to and identification with French society.²²¹ Measurements aside, as the historian Patrick Weil has observed, some French citizens of foreign origin claim that legal citizenship made no difference in practice, they were still seen by others as foreigners and classed as 'the enemy within'.²²² Thus in practice integration did not necessarily lead to inclusion. The *Marche contre le racisme et pour l'égalité* (also known as the *Marche des Beurs*), a demonstration of second-generation North African immigrants in 1983, the *Indigènes de la République* movement (founded in 2005), and the 2005 suburban riots were symbolic of deep frustrations over the French state's blindness to ethnic discrimination and the persistence of social exclusion.

²²¹ It is important to note that the 2010 Trajectoires et Origines (TeO) survey provided a wide-ranging quantitative study of integration in France but it did not address the question of Roma integration.

²²² Patrick Weil, *How to be French: Nationality in the Making Since 1789* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), p. 1.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been twofold. First, it explored the ways in which officials used republican ideas to address changing circumstances throughout modern French history and second, it examined how these ideas became the dominant public philosophy in French political discourse. In doing so, it contextualised the republican ideas that officials used to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma and demonstrated that the French state has a legacy of deploying republican ideas to manage immigrant populations in France. However, I am not alone in studying the revival of republican ideas in French politics.²²³ Among those who endorsed this revival were three prominent voices: Pierre-André Taguieff, Alain Finkielkraut and Dominique Schnapper. Taguieff argued that France faced a threat of ‘multi-communautarisme’ (a play on the words multiculturalism and *communitarisme*) which, he contended, could lead to the erosion of the nation and maintained that a republican discourse of national unity was needed to restore the civic bond.²²⁴ Finkielkraut focused on *laïcité*, claiming that limiting religious freedom in the public sphere, especially in schools, was crucial to guarding against multiculturalism.²²⁵ Schnapper concentrated on the civic integration of citizens as the mechanism for countering national fragmentation.²²⁶ Despite their differences, these scholars shared a contempt for ethnic and religious interventions in French political life. For them, a republican discourse promoting universalism was the key to uniting the national community.

In contrast, those who critiqued the revival of republicanism aligned with three key arguments. First, normative prescriptions of republicanism were out of touch with the empirical reality of contemporary France. Michel Wieviorka’s work on cultural difference and Alec Hargraeves study of a multi-ethnic France epitomise this claim.²²⁷

²²³ For a comprehensive review of this new field of scholarship analysing the rise of republicanism see: Emile Chabal, ‘Writing the French National Narrative in the Twenty-First Century’, *The Historical Journal*, 53(2) (June 2010), pp. 495-516.

²²⁴ Pierre-André Taguieff, *La République enlisée: pluralisme, communautarisme et citoyenneté* (Paris: Editions des Syrtes, 2005).

²²⁵ See, for example: Alain Finkielkraut and Benny Lévy, *Le livre et les livres: entretiens sur la laïcité* (Paris: Verdier, 2006).

²²⁶ Dominique Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens. Sur l’idée moderne de nation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).

²²⁷ See: Michel Wieviorka, *La difference: identités culturelles: enjeux, débats et politiques* (Paris: Editions de l’Aube, 2001); and Alec Hargreaves, *Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2007).

Some scholars such as Cécile Laborde and Sophie Guérard de Latour, responded by advocating for the recognition of ethnic and religious discrimination while remaining committed to universalism.²²⁸ Second, critics argued the republican ideas of universalism and *laïcité* concealed structural racism. Most of the literature focused on Islamophobia, but a small proportion examined forms of racial discrimination.²²⁹ This argument also drove the (failed) movement for the French state to permit the collection of ethnic statistics spearheaded by Patrick Simon.²³⁰ Third, critics argued the separation of republicanism and race was artificial. In this view, many republican ideas were structurally racist because they crystallised in an era of high colonialism.²³¹ Historians have examined the link between republicanism and colonialism in detail, but even political scientists such as Sophie Body-Gendrot and Catherine Wihtol de Wendel have demonstrated clearly that contemporary republican institutions are far from race-neutral.²³² My thesis builds on these three critiques to illuminate the ways in which officials were able to exploit the polyvalence of republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma in France. The subsequent chapters of this thesis now turn to examine this phenomenon in detail.

²²⁸ See: Cécile Laborde, *Critical republicanism: the hijab controversy and political philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Sophie Guérard de Latour, 'Cultural Insecurity and Political Solidarity: French Republicanism Reconsidered' in Emile Chabal (Ed.), *France Since the 1970s: History, Politics and Memory in an Age of Uncertainty* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

²²⁹ See, for example: Natalya Vince, 'France, Islam and Laïcité', in Tony Chafer et. al. (Eds.), *The End of the French Exception?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010); and Trica Danielle Keaton, 'The Politics of Race-Blindness: (Anti)Blackness and Category-blindness in Contemporary France', *Du Bois Review*, 7(1) (2010), pp. 103-131.

²³⁰ Patrick Simon, 'The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, 26(1) (2008), pp. 7-31.

²³¹ See: Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, François Vergès, *La République coloniale: Essai sur une utopie* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2003).

²³² Sophie Body-Gendrot and Catherine Wihtol de Wendel, *Police et discriminations raciales: le tabou française* (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 2003).

DENIAL: THE STRUGGLE FOR UNIVERSALISM

‘300 campements ou implantations illicites devront avoir été évacués d’ici 3 mois, en
priorité ceux des Roms’.²³³
Brice Hortefeux (5 August 2010)

‘Il ne s’agit, en aucun cas, de stigmatiser telle ou telle population...mais il ne s’agit pas
non plus de fermer les yeux sur une réalité, celle qui peut être crimes et délits’.²³⁴
Brice Hortefeux (30 August 2010)

...

‘Ces populations ont des modes de vie extrêmement différents des nôtres et qui sont
évidemment en confrontation...les Roms ont vocation à revenir en Roumanie ou en
Bulgarie’.²³⁵
Manuel Valls (24 September 2013)

‘Il ne s’agit pas de stigmatiser mais il s’agit de regarder la réalité en face, les difficultés
que nous connaissons dans ces villes’.²³⁶
Manuel Valls (25 September 2013)

Since the summer of 2010, successive French governments have employed the republican idea of universalism to communicate and justify policies on the evacuation of peri-urban slums. Yet, despite claims of refuting ethnic stigmatisation, references to the Roma often crept into public documents and out of the mouths of officials, exposing a link between the ethnic category ‘Roms’ and the administrative terms *bidonvilles* and *campements illicites*. The French state’s tacit construction of *bidonvilles* and *campements illicites* as a Roma problem and discursive insistence on universalism appeared mutually inconsistent. How was it possible for officials to frame a problem in ethnic terms yet insist that their policy response was devoid of ethnic categories? This chapter argues that officials were able to exploit the ambiguity of republican ideas to target the Roma community. It shows how officials selectively foregrounded the republican idea of universalism over alternative ideas, especially racialised and class-based ideas, which gave rise to ethnic stereotypes that concealed rather than countered structural racism.²³⁷ First, the chapter

²³³ Ministère de l’intérieur, *Circulaire sur l’évacuation des campements illicites* (5 August 2010), IOC/K/1017881/J.

²³⁴ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Conférence de presse sur la mise en oeuvre des mesures d’évacuation des campements illicites* (30 August 2010).

²³⁵ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Radio Interview à France Inter* (24 September 2013).

²³⁶ Ibid., *Radio Interview à RMC* (25 September 2013).

²³⁷ Using colour-blind universalist language to justify and maintain structural inequality is not unique to France. See for example, Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: The New Press, 2010), p. 2: ‘In the era of colorblindness, it is no longer

investigates how officials in the Sarkozy and Hollande governments exploited the ambiguity of universalism by using the concept in different ways to justify their policies. Second, it examines whether universalist political rhetoric was consistent with language in policy documents and the language employed by officials on the ground charged with implementing the policies. Third, it explores how the universalist discourse of French officials was tested within the context of an enlarged EU.

Exploiting the Ambiguity of Universalism

Despite their different political orientations, the Sarkozy and Hollande governments shared the task of reconciling internal tensions between hard-line and humanitarian positions on how to manage immigrant populations. The question of ‘Roma’ migrants was no exception. The Sarkozy government saw its party divide into those who supported the President’s security-driven *discours de Grenoble* on 30 July 2010 and those who found its ethnic undertones unacceptable. The Hollande government witnessed a public fight between Interior Minister Manuel Valls who pushed for the eradication of illegal camps and Housing Minister Cécile Duflot who argued that evacuating camps without providing alternative accommodation was inhumane.²³⁸ As one regional official exclaimed ‘du temps de Nicolas Sarkozy nous traitons les camps avec humanisme et fermeté et maintenant nous les traitons avec fermeté et humanisme’.²³⁹ The suggestion that the change of administration had little effect is overstated, but it has some truth. The firm stance on law enforcement did not end with Sarkozy. In fact, the number of people evacuated from illegal camps more than doubled from 9,396 in 2011 under Sarkozy, to 21,537 in 2013 under Hollande.²⁴⁰ Nevertheless, each government’s policies reflected

socially permissible to use race, explicitly, as a justification for discrimination, exclusion, and social contempt. So we don’t. Rather than rely on race, we use our criminal justice system to label people of color “criminals” and then engage in all the practices we supposedly left behind. Today it is perfectly legal to discriminate against criminals in nearly all the ways that it was once legal to discriminate against African Americans. Once you’re labelled a felon, the old forms of discrimination – employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial of educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other public benefits, and exclusion from jury service – are suddenly legal. As a criminal, you have scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect, than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow. We have not ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.’

²³⁸ Cécile Duflot, Ministre de l’Égalité des territoires et du Logement, ‘Roms : une politique durable reste à construire’, *Libération* (16 August 2012): http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/16/roms-une-politique-durable-reste-a-construire_840136 (accessed 20 August 2017).

²³⁹ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

²⁴⁰ Jean-Baptiste Daubeuf, Hervé Marchal and Thibault Bersozzi, *Idées Reçues sur les Bidonvilles en France* (Paris: Le Cavalier Bleu, 2006), p. 116.

different readings of the republican idea of universalism. Regardless of their political affiliation, officials were able to exploit the ambiguity of universalism to communicate and justify their policies. This section studies different interpretations of universalism, arguing that while the Sarkozy government reluctantly drew upon universalism to repair a political rift with the European Commission, the Hollande government used universalism proactively to defend and distract from the intensified evacuations of illegal camps. First, this section traces the political developments that shaped the Sarkozy government's discourse of universalism. Second, it turns to examine the Hollande government's strategic deployment of universalism, which remained relatively consistent throughout his time in office.

Deploying Universalism to Counter the Communitarian Threat

On 28 July 2010 President Sarkozy called an emergency cabinet meeting on 'la situation des gens du voyage et des Roms en France'.²⁴¹ The 'situation' referred to the death of a 22 year-old French *gens du voyage* male in the village of Saint Aignan, in central France, who was shot by police at a road checkpoint on 16 July 2010, and the subsequent retaliatory attack on the Saint Aignan police station, looting and vandalism by members of the local *gens du voyage* community.²⁴² At the same time, riots erupted in Grenoble after police shot a 27 year-old local man who allegedly took part in an armed robbery at a casino. Although both cases involved persons of French nationality, the Sarkozy government's pairing of French *gens du voyage* and migrant *Roms* connected the issues of delinquency, nomadism and immigration as if they were seamless. Following the cabinet meeting, the President's office issued a press release, crystallising this connection:

²⁴¹ Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, *Communiqué sur la situation des gens du voyage et des Roms en France*, Paris (28 July 2010).

²⁴² 'Des gens du voyage saccagent une commune du Loir-et-Cher', *Le Figaro* (18 July 2010): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/07/18/01016-20100718ARTFIG00170-des-gens-du-voyage-saccagent-une-commune-du-loir-et-cher.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

Le Président de la République, en outre, a jugé totalement inadmissible la situation de non droit qui caractérise les populations Roms, venus d'Europe de l'Est, sur le territoire français. 200 campements illégaux ont été ainsi recensés, sources de trafics illicites, de conditions de vie profondément indignes, d'exploitation des enfants à des fins de mendicité, de prostitution ou de délinquance. Il a demandé au Gouvernement de procéder, dans les trois mois, à l'évacuation de ces installations chaque fois que le droit en vigueur le permet. En parallèle, une réforme législative sera entreprise afin de rendre plus efficace le dispositif d'évacuation des campements illégaux.²⁴³

Two days later, President Sarkozy delivered his *discours de Grenoble*, in which he asked the Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux to 'mettre un terme aux implantations sauvages de campements de Roms' and claimed that 'ce sont des zones de non-droit qu'on ne peut pas tolérer en France'.²⁴⁴ The phrase conjures a number of connotations, such as sovereignty, legality and civilisation, which are mutually constitutive and difficult to disentangle. In this instance, the phrase also served as a justification for the French state's evacuation policies. Sarkozy's explicitly ethnic reference to the Roma appeared to undermine the republican idea of universalism. Yet, by associating the Roma with illegal camps, he suggested that Roma operated outside of French law and challenged the norms of French living standards. Consequently, he framed these so-called Roma camps as ethnic ghettos that posed a communitarian threat to *l'ordre public* and could use this logic to rationalise evacuation policies targeting Roma as guarding against communitarianism. In a perverse way, universalism became the end rather than the means for the French state's evacuation policies. Selectively foregrounding the illegal aspect of camps also helped the Sarkozy government override claims of discrimination. As Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux maintained 'nous n'évacuons pas...des campements de Roms illicites parce qu'ils sont Roms, nous les démantelons parce qu'ils sont illégaux'.²⁴⁵ Yet, despite Hortefeux's attempt to justify the use of the term 'Roms', the policy remained discriminatory. If, for example, the government had replaced the term 'Roms' with 'Juifs' it is highly unlikely that the presidential order for a 'reconduction quasi-immédiate des Roms vers la Roumanie ou la Bulgarie en cas d'atteintes aux biens ou de fraudes' would have been considered anything but xenophobic.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, *Communiqué sur la situation des gens du voyage et des Roms en France*, Paris (28 July 2010).

²⁴⁴ Ibid., *Déclaration sur la lutte contre la criminalité, la délinquance et l'immigration illégale*, Grenoble (30 July 2010).

²⁴⁵ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Réponse de Brice Hortefeux à une question du député Le Roux lors de la séance de questions d'actualité au gouvernement* (14 September 2010).

²⁴⁶ Ibid., *Radio Interview à RTL* (29 July 2010).

For a brief period, members of the Sarkozy government defended the explicit targeting of ‘Roms’ as an acceptable means of restoring ‘l’ordre public’. As Secretary of State for Housing and Urbanism, Benoist Apparu said on 29 July 2010 ‘il y aura une reconduite à la frontière de tous ceux qui sont en situation illégale, et notamment bien évidemment, des Roms en question’.²⁴⁷ Secretary of State for European Affairs, Laurent Wauquiez, extended the argument outside the republican public philosophy by criticising universalism as an impractical concept that obstructs the reality of policymaking. Responding to a question on ‘les problèmes de comportement des Roms et gens du voyage’ he exclaimed that ‘en France, on a parfois un peu le sentiment que quand un sujet gêne, il ne faudrait pas en parler, il faudrait le cacher sous le tapis, jeter un voile pudique’.²⁴⁸ He added that ‘dès qu’on l’aborde, on dit: oh là là, attention vous allez stigmatiser. Je trouve que d’ailleurs, sur ce sujet...on a le retour d’un Parti socialiste version “oui oui”, avec un mélange à la fois d’angélisme et de déni de la réalité. Il y a un problème, on y fait face’.²⁴⁹ This comment also suggested that it required an official policy response.

Nevertheless, the Sarkozy government’s hard-line approach did not escape criticism, most notably from Brussels. The catalyst was the emergence of three French government circulars leaked by *Le Canard Social* on 9 September 2010.²⁵⁰ Among these circulars was one dated 5 July 2010, which stated ‘Trois cents campements ou implantations illicites devront avoir été évacués d’ici trois mois, en priorité ceux des Roms’ and ordered Prefects to engage in ‘une démarche systématique de démantèlement des camps illicites, en priorité ceux de Roms’.²⁵¹ Signed by Interior Minister Hortefeux, the circular enshrined the discrimination of the Roma community in a public policy document. This institutionalisation of anti-Roma rhetoric raised alarm bells for both supporters of France’s colour-blind universalist republican tradition and human rights activists, advocating for the protection of marginalised minorities in an Anglo-Saxon multiculturalist sense. It also triggered an emergency vote in the European Parliament,

²⁴⁷ Benoist Apparu, Secrétaire d’Etat chargé du logement et de l’urbanisme, *Radio Interview à Europe 1* (29 July 2010).

²⁴⁸ Laurent Wauquiez, Secrétaire d’Etat à l’emploi, *Radio Interview à RMC* (28 July 2010).

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ ‘Expulsions des Roms, un “mode d’emploi” explicite’, *Le Canard Social* (13 September 2010): <http://www.lecanardsocial.com/ArticleFil.aspx?i=182> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁵¹ Ministère de l’intérieur, *Circulaire sur l’évacuation des campements illicites* (5 August 2010), IOC/K/1017881/J.

which adopted a resolution to urge France to suspend all collective expulsions of Roma immediately.²⁵²

In an effort to appease Brussels and deflect further criticism, Interior Minister Hortefeux issued a new circular on 13 September 2010, which redacted the term ‘Roms’. The aim was to avoid ‘tout malentendu sur une éventuelle stigmatisation’.²⁵³ Although the policy measures remained consistent, the removal of the term ‘Roms’ signalled a shift in the Sarkozy government’s existing hard-line discursive strategy towards one of universalism. No longer was it acceptable to explicitly name the Roma in policy documents and other political discourse as a justification for restoring ‘l’ordre public’. Wary of the implications of the hard-line approach, Immigration Minister Eric Besson denied knowledge of the 5 August 2010 circular in a television interview with *France 2*.²⁵⁴ Yet, a leaked email revealed that Besson’s deputy chief of staff, Lucien Giudicelli, had helped review the circular in a meeting at Place Beauvau on 4 August, suggesting that the Immigration Minister was more involved than he had claimed.²⁵⁵ Variations of the phrase ‘il n’est pas question de stigmatiser une communauté dans son ensemble’ emerged as the new party line with the noticeable omission of any reference to ‘Roms’.²⁵⁶ Sarkozy government officials switched their discursive strategy to deploying the republican idea of universalism in an effort to mask policies targeting the Roma. Ironically, pressures from outside rather than inside France induced this renewed reliance on universalism in French political discourse.

Yet despite the Sarkozy government’s attempts to remove ethnic references from public policy, the roots of discrimination remained. On 14 September, a public argument erupted between Vivien Reding, European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, and French President Sarkozy during the European Summit in Brussels.

²⁵² Geringer de Oedenberg and Lidia Joanna, European Parliament, *Explanations of the vote* (9 September 2010), A7-0215/2010.

²⁵³ Marion Joseph, ‘Roms: voici la nouvelle circulaire de Brice Hortefeux’, *Le Figaro* (13 September 2010): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/09/13/01016-20100913ARTFIG00635-roms-voici-la-nouvelle-circulaire-de-brice-hortefeux.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁵⁴ ‘Circulaire sur les Roms: Bertrand assume, Besson un peu moins’ *Le Nouvel Observateur* (13 September 2010): <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/20100913.OBS9737/circulaire-sur-les-roms-bertrand-assume-besson-un-peu-moins.html> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁵⁵ ‘Roms : le cabinet de Besson aurait été averti de la circulaire du 5 août’, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (14 September 2010): <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/20100914.OBS9831/roms-le-cabinet-de-besson-auroit-ete-averti-de-la-circulaire-du-5-aout.html> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁵⁶ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Radio Interview à TF1* (27 July 2010).

Commissioner Reding called the developments in France regarding the Roma a disgrace and said ‘I personally have been appalled by a situation which gave the impression that people are being removed from a Member State of the European Union just because they belong to a certain ethnic minority. This is a situation I had thought Europe would not have to witness again after the Second World War’.²⁵⁷ Commissioner Reding’s comments only focused on the deportation of migrant ‘Roms’ from France. She did not address the systematic evacuations of so-called ‘campements des Roms’ inside France. This distinction is important because it provides insight into the limits of the Commission’s influence on French policy. Deportation relates to the rights of EU citizens to move freely within the Schengen zone, inscribed in the 2004/38/EC Directive. Evacuation is a matter of French property law, over which European institutions have little control. Both policies singled out ‘Roms’ as a priority, which raises questions of ethnic discrimination under the 2000/34/EC Racial Equality Directive.²⁵⁸ Nevertheless, despite this common feature, the issue of collective evacuations was understated in Reding’s remarks and absent from the Commission’s subsequent line of attack.²⁵⁹

Instead of conceding the problems of ethnic profiling, President Sarkozy and members of his government condemned Commissioner Reding for likening policies regarding the Roma in France to the treatment of Jews during the Second World War as ‘pas acceptable’²⁶⁰, a ‘dérapiage’²⁶¹, and ‘le type d’anachronisme ou d’absurdité que je veux dénoncer’.²⁶² Commissioner Reding subsequently apologised privately for the analogy and told AFP news agency ‘I regret the interpretations that were made, and which detract from the problem at hand. In no way did I wish to establish a parallel between the Second

²⁵⁷ Viviane, Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, *Statement on the latest developments on the Roma situation*, Brussels (14 September 2010), SPEECH/10/428.

²⁵⁸ 2000/43/EC.

²⁵⁹ European Parliament, *Parliamentary debate on databases relating to racial and ethnic origin in the EU*, Strassbourg (19 October 2010).

²⁶⁰ Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, cited in Jean-Jacques Mevel, ‘Viviane Reding, la dame en rouge qui défie la France’, *Le Figaro* (15 September 2010): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/09/15/01003-20100915ARTFIG00701-viviane-reding-la-dame-en-rouge-qui-defie-la-france.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁶¹ Pierre Lellouche, Secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, cited in Jean-Jacques Mevel, ‘Viviane Reding, la dame en rouge qui défie la France’, *Le Figaro* (15 September 2010): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/09/15/01003-20100915ARTFIG00701-viviane-reding-la-dame-en-rouge-qui-defie-la-france.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁶² Eric Besson, Ministre de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire *Radio Interview à France Inter* (23 August 2010).

World War and the actions of today's French government'.²⁶³ Although Reding softened her initial remarks on the French state's ethnic stigmatisation of the Roma, she did task her directorate with analysing the legality of the French state's policies. Reding announced that the Commission would carefully analyse the legality of the French policy within the next two weeks and take appropriate measures.²⁶⁴ I would argue that Reding's initial remarks can be characterised as a defence of multiculturalist ideas. By drawing a parallel between the Holocaust – an ethnic and religious genocide – and the French state's treatment of the Roma, Reding was essentially advocating the protection of an ethnic minority. This stood in stark comparison to the French state's commitment to universalist interpretation, that did not recognise ethnic categories. Yet, I would clarify that Reding's instruction to her directorate focused on the legal rights of EU citizens, rather than the protection of a particular European ethnic minority. This suggested that Reding drew upon ideas of legality to communicate her instruction to her directorate.

Just in time to meet the European Commission's schedule, on 29 September 2010 the European College of Commissioners informed the French government it had two weeks to present a legislative proposal for transposing the 2004/38/EC Directive into French law or it would face infringement proceedings.²⁶⁵ An hour before the deadline on 15 October the French government submitted the plan and timeline of implementation to the European Commission. On 19 October 2010 Commissioner Reding made a statement saying that 'France has responded positively, constructively and in time to the Commission's request' and that the Commission 'will now, for the time being, not pursue the infringement procedure against France'.²⁶⁶ This statement reflected ideas of legality because it focused on the protection of EU citizens' rights when residing in France. Reding also announced the creation of an EU Roma Taskforce and noted that the Commission will present an EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up

²⁶³ 'Roma spat casts shadow over EU summit', *The Financial Times* (16 September 2010):

<https://www.ft.com/content/500324ac-c175-11df-8e03-00144feab49a> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁶⁴ 'Roms: journée mouvementée entre Paris et Bruxelles', *Le Figaro* (15 September 2010):

<http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/09/15/01003-20100915ARTFIG00666-roms-sarkozy-prend-acte-des-excuses-de-reding.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁶⁵ See: European Commission, *Press Release: European Commission assesses recent developments in France, discusses overall situation of the Roma and EU law on free movement of EU citizens* (29 September 2010), IP/10/1207.

²⁶⁶ Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, *Statement on the recent developments concerning the respect for EU law as regards the situation of Roma in France*, Brussels (19 October 2010), MEMO/10/502.

to 2020 in April 2011.²⁶⁷ This framework focused solely on the Roma reflected the multiculturalist idea that ethnic groups deserve to be recognised and protected, rather than concealed under the cloak of universalism.

Commissioner Reding's announcement signalled a softening of relations between the Sarkozy government and the European Commission but it did not address the issue of collective evacuations. Although the Commission's focus on the expulsion of Roma reaffirmed the rights of EU citizens to migrate freely, only a handful of camp inhabitants faced deportation from France compared to the large number of residents affected by the large-scale evacuation of slums. Furthermore, despite the removal of the term 'Roms' from official discourses, the French government did not change their policies, continuing systemic discrimination without naming the targeted community. Instead, the collision between France and the Commission operated as a warning to other member states who had not transposed the EU free movement directive into national law and an opportunity for the policymakers in the Commission to create an EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies. Thus, Commissioner Reding's intervention altered the Sarkozy government's discursive strategy by forcing them to remove references to the Roma from their policies. Nonetheless, a tacit targeting of the Roma persisted among French officials.

Contributing to the Sarkozy government's systemic discrimination of the Roma living in French slums was absence of national welfare policies aimed at improving the socio-economic situation of slum-dwellers in France. *Villages d'insertion* had existed since the early 2000s but they were locally driven initiatives rather than part of a national policy to assist migrants. Instead, the Sarkozy government introduced a policy offering incentives for migrants to return or remain in their countries of origin. The first example was the 'aide au retour' policy, offering Romanian migrants in France a sum of €300 per adult and €100 per child and a free flight to Bucharest to voluntarily leave France. Even the words 'aide au retour' were a strategic choice to incentivise leaving France; the subtext of the French state's policy was that migrants living in slums were not welcome to stay and these slum dwellers were tacitly, and stereotypically, assumed to be Roma. This echoed Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's Aide au Retour policy from 1977 to 1981, intended to encourage Algerian, Portuguese and Spanish migrants to return to their countries of

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

origin.²⁶⁸ Regulating the return of migrants proved difficult due to France's multiple points of entry and the low cost of coach travel to return to France, rendering the policy costly and futile.²⁶⁹ Yet, despite its perverse effects, the policy aimed to encourage migrants to establish their lives elsewhere instead of settling in France. The Hollande government eventually neutered the 'aide au retour' policy by reducing the sum to €50, keeping the policy in a reduced form. The second example of incentivising Roma to leave was the deepening of bilateral relations between French ministers and their Romanian and Bulgarian counterparts, leading to the provision of French aid to these two countries.²⁷⁰ The rationale was that by confronting the socio-economic challenges in Romania and Bulgaria, the Sarkozy government could prevent the departure of dissatisfied citizens and address the problem at the source. Notably, these two examples targeted national not ethnic communities, reflecting the Sarkozy government's new commitment to universalism in their policies and political rhetoric. Officials strategically deployed universalist language to encourage slum dwellers they perceived as Roma to leave France.

Officials in the Sarkozy administration scarcely referred to the Roma in political debate for the remainder of their president's tenure. This shift away from ethnic references to a universalist discourse was a strategy French officials employed to reduce pressure from the European Commission and other members of the EU political community. On 7 April 2011 the Conseil d'Etat formally banned the controversial 5 August 2010 circular because it was 'une politique d'évacuation des campements illicites désignant spécialement certains de leurs occupants en raison de leur origine ethnique'.²⁷¹ The judgement represented a restoration of universalism as not only a discursive justification but also a framework for communicating policies on evacuating migrant camps. This coincided with the launch of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies, which outlined guidelines for member states to implement a comprehensive programme of Roma inclusion. The explicitly ethnic approach of the EU Framework was

²⁶⁸ This policy was announced by Prime Minister Raymond Barre in the l'Assemblée Nationale on 26 April 1977.

²⁶⁹ Jean-Marc Leclerc, 'Roms: un fichier pour éviter la fraude de l'aide au retour', *Le Figaro* (17 August 2010): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/08/17/01016-20100817ARTFIG00534-roms-un-fichier-pour-eviter-la-fraude-de-l-aide-au-retour.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁷⁰ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Communiqué de presse: rapport d'Amnesty International*, Paris (29 November 2012).

²⁷¹ Conseil d'Etat, *Campements illicites de Roms* (7 April 2011).

based on the multiculturalist idea that ethnic communities should be recognised and protected by the state. This presented various obstacles for France, which will be discussed in detail in the third section of this chapter. However, it is important to note that the challenge of reconciling the French state's universalist rhetoric with the Commission's insistence on protecting ethnic communities was the task of civil servants rather than the subject of political debate. As the 2012 French presidential election drew near, the Sarkozy government's focus drifted away from the Roma. In contrast to his *discours de Grenoble*, President Sarkozy made no direct mention of 'Roms' in his election campaign. When asked whether he would deliver the same *discours* if he had the chance to do it again, Sarkozy said 'oui, mais sans parler d'une communauté en particulier'.²⁷² His response suggested that betraying France's universal principles had come at too high a price, even in exchange for the far-right voters it may have attracted.

Using Universalism to Deny French Roma Policy

On 6 May 2012, Sarkozy lost the presidential election to Socialist candidate François Hollande. The new government adopted a different discursive strategy: to employ universalism proactively to communicate and justify their policies rather than as a reluctant retort. During his campaign, Hollande emphasised the humanitarian aspect of evacuating illegal camps 'quand il y a un risque pour la population, pour les enfants'.²⁷³ Noticeably, he made no reference to 'Roms'. This was a rare intervention from Hollande who scarcely commented on the issue of France's illegal camps while in office. Instead, he gave new Interior Minister Manuel Valls the task of managing the de-ethnicised policy, which had caused an international political crisis not so long ago. Valls took a firm stance on camp evacuations, which coupled with his hard-line style and political leaning towards the right, earned him the pseudonym 'le Sarkozy de Gauche'. Yet, unlike the former President, Valls spoke of a policy of 'campements illicites' and 'la problématique des Roms' separately.²⁷⁴ By avoiding the amalgamation 'campements des

²⁷² "Discours de Grenoble" : Sarkozy ne désignerait plus les Roms', *Le Monde* (14 April 2012): http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/breve/2012/04/11/securite-sarkozy-ne-designerait-plus-les-roms_1683826_1471069.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁷³ Elise Vincent, 'Après la polémique, les minces propositions de Hollande sur les Roms', *Le Monde* (8 March 2012): http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/02/17/apres-la-polemique-les-minces-propositions-de-hollande-sur-les-roms_1644795_1471069.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁷⁴ 'Des campements roms ont dû être "démantelés", explique Manuel Valls', *Le Parisien* (25 July 2012): <http://www.leparisien.fr/lille-59000/des-campements-roms-ont-du-etre-demanteles-explique-manuel-valls-25-07-2012-2102660.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

Roms', Valls framed the evacuation of camps as a universalist policy responding to a legal rather than ethnic question. Although Valls mentioned 'Roms' explicitly in his phrase 'la problématique des Roms', he was speaking to the French Senate, a group of political insiders, rather than publicly addressing the French population as Sarkozy had done in Grenoble. In this instance, Valls was careful to prioritise universalism over race-based ideas in public addresses and keep references to the Roma behind closed doors.

The Hollande government's strategic deployment of universalism crystallised into a denial of 'Roma' policy. Evidence of this emerged throughout my research interviews. One Minister's chief of staff claimed 'il n'y a pas une politique à l'égard des Roms. Il y a une politique d'application de la loi et la nécessité de faire des évacuations des campements illicites.'²⁷⁵ Another national political adviser argued 'on n'a pas de politique à l'égard des Roms au Ministère de l'Intérieur. Cette population, vue de ma fenêtre, est analysée dans la plupart des cas comme des citoyens Européens.'²⁷⁶ By denying French Roma policy, the Hollande government could defend its policies from accusations of deliberate stigmatisation. The logic was clear: if the government refused to recognise ethnic or religious difference, how could its policies target Roma? However, the consequences of policies can be markedly different from their intentions, and as section three of this chapter reveals, many officials still tacitly considered illegal camps as 'campements Roms'. Nevertheless, the discursive shift presented the link between universalism and 'campements illicites' as a *fait accompli*. As a political adviser noted 'en ce qui concerne les campements illicites, on n'est pas du tout dans l'idée que le modèle multiculturaliste, comme on dit, dans lequel on reconnaît des communautés, est un modèle fait pour la France'.²⁷⁷ This exemplified the official's prioritisation of the republican idea of universalism over multiculturalism. By employing this discursive strategy, the official framed multiculturalism as a threat to universalism and conversely imbued universalism with normative authority, suggesting that republicanism was *the* public philosophy of choice.

What did this new discourse on universalism achieve? First, it allowed the Hollande government to move away from the reputation and controversies of its predecessors. One

²⁷⁵ Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

²⁷⁶ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

²⁷⁷ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Paris (5 June 2015).

civil servant tried to absolve the Sarkozy government's ethnic policies by claiming that 'le système politique français, depuis la Révolution, ne reconnaît pas la notion de communauté',²⁷⁸ a comment which revealed more about the strength of a rather ossified republican tradition than the reality of France's modern history. Yet, politicians and their staffers insisted that the Hollande government's approach was in fact a break with that of his predecessor. An adviser to President Hollande exclaimed that 'pendant une petite période, sous Nicolas Sarkozy, il y avait une politique à l'égard des Roms'.²⁷⁹ Another political adviser described the events in 2010 as 'la première fois depuis Vichy qu'on cible un groupe ethnique', arguing that 'cette formulation ne fait pas partie des valeurs qui sont promues par ce gouvernement'.²⁸⁰ It is not unusual for a new Socialist government to seek to differentiate itself from its conservative predecessor in their discourses. However, this case marked the first time in French politics that the Roma question was used to this effect.

Second, deploying the idea of universalism helped to depoliticise a policy that was previously politically toxic. By removing ethnic references in political rhetoric, the Hollande government framed the Sarkozy government's approach as a populist departure from France's republican tradition and could consequently address any challenges relating to the evacuation of illegal camps through the policymaking process. Stressing the value of discourse, a senior political adviser told me that 'le caractère républicain commence avec les mots. Sarkozy a ciblé les Roms en écrit et en discours. On est sorti d'une politique Rom. Maintenant c'est une politique de campements illicites. Les mots ne sont pas les mêmes, l'instrumentalisation n'arrive plus. Les mots qui sont utilisés dans les discours publics, les interviews, le débat politique ont changé'.²⁸¹ This comment suggested that refining the government's rhetoric towards a universalist discourse was as politically important as managing its substantive policies. Perversely, by employing a universalist discourse to communicate the evacuation of illegal camps, the Hollande government displaced more migrants from illegal camps while suffering less criticism than its predecessor. Removing references to the Roma from public discourse did not stop the state-led discrimination of the Roma as officials continued to tacitly consider illegal

²⁷⁸ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

²⁷⁹ Interview with Political Adviser, Elysée, Paris (29 February 2016).

²⁸⁰ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

²⁸¹ Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

camp residents as Roma. Universalism concealed rather than reduced the systemic discrimination of the Roma.

Third, the Hollande government's use of universalism recast the policy of evacuating illegal camps as a humanitarian rather than security issue. From the Hollande government's position, this had the dual advantage of appealing to its Socialist base in France while satisfying requirements set by the Commission in Brussels. While discussing the evacuation of illegal camps, the new socialist Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault said 'c'est une question d'humanité et de respect des principes fondateurs de la République qui appellent à traiter de façon égale et digne toute personne en situation de difficulté sociale'.²⁸² The humanitarian rhetoric soon materialised into the new government circular of 26 August 2012, which introduced the notions of *anticipation* and *accompagnement* into the policy on illegal camps.²⁸³ By presenting these new measures as universalist, the Hollande government could deflect potential criticism from French citizens concerned that the state was prioritising the problems of foreign Europeans over their own.²⁸⁴ 'Plus on dit rom, plus ça crée cette possible concurrence des misères' exclaimed one official.²⁸⁵ From this perspective, providing the Roma with targeted assistance was not only anti-republican but also counterproductive.

Fourth, the Hollande government's mobilisation of universalism aligned with Article 1 of the French Constitution, lending further credibility to the legal argument behind the evacuation of illegal camps. One official argued, 'il s'agit d'une violation pure et simple d'un droit constitutionnel, le droit de propriété. Je vous le dis, je n'accepte pas et n'accepterai jamais que dans notre pays, les lois de la République soient bafouées'.²⁸⁶ Furthermore, by refusing to recognise ethnic or religious difference in their discourses, the Hollande government characterised evacuations as a process whereby each camp resident was treated individually before the law as a European citizen. However,

²⁸² Jean-Marc Ayrault, Premier Ministre, *Communiqué des services* (22 August 2012).

²⁸³ Ministère de l'éducation nationale, Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé, Ministère de l'égalité des territoires et du logement, Ministère de l'intérieur, and Ministère du travail, de l'emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social, *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

²⁸⁴ This argument was also adopted by the French Senate in their *Rapport d'information sur l'intégration des Roms: un défi pour l'Union européenne et ses États membres* (6 December 2012).

²⁸⁵ Interview with National Official 1, DAEI, Paris (29 February 2016).

²⁸⁶ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

categorising residents of illegal camps as individual citizens did not protect them from structural racism. According to a French Senator, ‘l’approche retenue en droit français, qui ne permet pas, par souci d’égalité républicaine, de fonder des politiques pour des groupes particuliers définis par leurs origines ethniques ou religieuses, paraît la plus appropriée. En effet, cette approche n’empêche pas pour autant de lutter contre les discriminations : elle replace seulement l’individu et non le groupe au cœur de la réflexion et autorise, de ce fait, la mise en place de politiques de rattrapage fondées sur des critères socioéconomiques objectifs’.²⁸⁷ Thus rather than eradicating Roma discrimination, the Hollande government’s deployment of universalism effectively individualised discriminatory policies.

Despite the Hollande government’s effort to deliver a strictly universalist public discourse, one exception deserves attention. On 24 September 2013, Interior Minister Manuel Valls gave a public interview on the radio station *France Inter* in which he stated ‘ces populations ont des modes de vie extrêmement différents des nôtres et qui sont évidemment en confrontation...les Roms ont vocation à revenir en Roumanie ou en Bulgarie’.²⁸⁸ This statement generated an intense media backlash as well as a lawsuit from *La Voix des Roms*, both of which came to a head in December 2016 in the midst of Valls’ presidential election campaign.²⁸⁹ The Minister’s comments exposed the continued existence of the link between ‘campements illicites’ and ‘Roms’. To rationalise this racial link, officials offered different clarifications on what Valls *meant* to say. One political adviser said the correct formulation would have been ‘ceux qui ne veulent pas s’intégrer doivent retourner en Roumanie ou en Bulgarie’²⁹⁰. Another said that Valls inferred the French state did not have the capacity to accommodate all residents even if it wanted to.²⁹¹ Nevertheless, both officials saw the comments as a mistake with grave reputational costs, suggesting a strong public reaction. The former lamented that Valls ‘est sorti de ses éléments de langage’.²⁹² The latter described how the incident earned Valls the unofficial title ‘Ministère des Roms’.²⁹³

²⁸⁷ Sénat, *Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des affaires européennes sur l’intégration des Roms* (6 December 2012).

²⁸⁸ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Interview à France Inter* (24 September 2013).

²⁸⁹ The French judiciary refused to hear the case. *La Voix des Roms* subsequently decided to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights. The case remains open.

²⁹⁰ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

²⁹¹ Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

²⁹² Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

²⁹³ Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

Adding to this controversy, two weeks later on 9 October 2013 a fifteen-year-old Roma migrant, Leonarda Dibrani, was arrested during a school excursion and deported with her family to Kosovo. Although Leonarda was illegally residing in France and not a citizen of the EU, she had lived in France most of her life and spoke fluent French. The case generated strong reactions from the French public as thousands of high school students took to the streets to demand Leonarda's return to France. The Hollande government responded by announcing that Leonarda would be allowed to return to France to continue her education, but the rest of her family would have to stay in Kosovo. The response was criticised by the Left for its heartlessness, by the Right for evading the law, and by all for splitting up the family. The Roma question once again became a divisive political topic, but this time it did not lead to an international rift. Reflecting on these events, one official conceded 'nous avons tout essayé de notre part de ne pas viser une population mais nous y sommes pas toujours parvenus. En tout cas, la stigmatisation des Roms n'a jamais été une stratégie consciente du gouvernement'.²⁹⁴ Therefore, in spite of concerted effort, the Hollande government's attempt to maintain a universalist public discourse was not always easy to realise.

A Universalist Policy?

This section turns to examine whether the Hollande government's use of universalism in public discourse translated into the language of public policy documents and the language employed by officials implementing policies. First, it focuses on the alignment of policy documents with political rhetoric, arguing that the Hollande government's universalist discourse masked internal tensions between 'humanisme' and 'fermeté'. Despite the Hollande government's efforts to maintain coherent discursive strategy, its key policy documents, notably the ministerial circular of 26 August 2012, represented a compromise between hard-line and humanitarian positions on the evacuation illegal camps. Second, this section examines whether officials on the ground used universalist ideas to communicate and justify the implementation of policies. In doing so, it maintains that while the 26 August 2012 circular did not explicitly reference the Roma, officials

²⁹⁴ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

implementing the ‘préparation’ and ‘accompagnement’ measures did not always employ universalist ideas when discussing these measures.

Aligning Policy and Political Rhetoric

Once in office, the Hollande government began to reform policy. Yet, the question of illegal camps divided his cabinet over what approach to take. The tension between ‘fermeté’ and ‘humanisme’ underpinned this cleavage. Interior Minister Valls represented the hard-line approach, emphasising the illegality of camps to justify continued evacuations. In an interview with *Europe 1* radio on 31 July 2012, Valls said ‘les préfets ont pour mission de démanteler les camps de Roms quand il y a eu une décision de justice. Les choses sont simples. Oui, quand il y a une décision de justice, il y aura un démantèlement de ces campements...chaque fois qu’il y a une décision de justice, chaque fois que les propriétaires de ces terrains, qui sont souvent des collectivités territoriales, en font la demande, il y aura ces démantèlements. C’est une politique à la fois ferme et respectueuse du droit’.²⁹⁵ In an effort to soften his position, on 13 August 2012 Valls published an article in the French newspaper *Liberation*, under the title ‘Campements illicites: le laisser-faire ne résout rien’.²⁹⁶ In the article, Valls insisted that ‘aucune politique publique ne sera focalisée sur tel ou tel groupe culturel’ but his unambiguously ethnic reference on national radio undermined this claim.

In contrast, Housing Minister Cécile Duflot led the humanitarian approach. Duflot’s criticism of Valls erupted into a public argument. On 16 August 2012, Duflot issued a public retort to Valls in her own *Liberation* article in which she denounced the stigmatisation of ‘Roms’, advocated for a long-term solution to ‘bidonvilles’, and highlighted President Hollande’s election promise of ‘pas de démantèlement sans solutions alternatives’.²⁹⁷ She also argued that ‘expulser, dans une absurde et coûteuse logique d’objectifs chiffrés – comme l’a fait le précédent gouvernement –, est non

²⁹⁵ ‘Valls: les démantèlements vont continuer’, *AFP* (31 July 2012): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2012/07/31/97001-20120731FILWWW00286-valls-les-demantelements-vont-continuer.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁹⁶ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, ‘Campements illicites: le laisser-faire ne résout rien’, *Libération* (13 August 2012): http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/13/campements-illicites-le-laisser-faire-ne-resout-rien_839576 (accessed 20 August 2017).

²⁹⁷ Cécile Duflot, Ministre de l’Egalité des territoires et du logement, ‘Roms: une politique durable reste à construire’, *Libération* (16 August 2012): http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/16/roms-une-politique-durable-reste-a-construire_840136 (accessed 20 August 2017).

seulement honteux, c'est aussi inefficace. On ne résout pas le problème, on le déplace. On crée des errants, on jette des familles dans les rues, sur les routes, on interrompt le travail social.’²⁹⁸ Duflot used the term ‘bidonvilles’ rather than ‘campements illicites’ to stress the poverty and squalor camp inhabitants endured. This served as a reminder to the ‘bidonvilles’ of the 1950s and 60s, which mainly comprised of North African migrant workers helping to rebuild postwar France, and Portuguese and Spanish migrants fleeing from authoritarian regimes. The implication was that just as social housing had replaced the postwar *bidonvilles*, the same approach could be used in contemporary politics. In line with this view, a senior official exclaimed that ‘le volet sécuritaire étant très puissant, il masque les avancées qui ont pu être faites depuis 2012 qui n’auraient pas été possibles sous Sarkozy’.²⁹⁹ The dispute between hard-line and humanitarian positions within the government had reached a public stalemate.

To resolve this public standoff, Prime Minister Ayrault called a ministerial meeting on 22 August 2012. Both Valls and Duflot were valuable to the Hollande government in different ways. At the time, Valls was fast becoming the most popular member of government while Duflot’s allegiance to the Greens made her a key component of the Socialist coalition. The Prime Minister needed to strike a compromise to ensure the government’s in-fighting did not evolve into a political crisis. During the meeting, the cabinet drafted a *bleue*, a minute produced following a cabinet meeting, for a holistic policy. This was swiftly finalised and released four days later on 26 August 2012 in the form of a government circular.³⁰⁰ In the meantime, Prime Minister Ayrault announced two measures to help counter discrimination against Romanians and Bulgarians seeking employment in France. The first was the expansion of the list of jobs available to Romanian and Bulgarian migrants before the end of the transition period for these new EU member states. The second was the removal of taxes for French employers wishing to hire Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. These new measures demonstrated a shift from the previous government’s discursive strategy: the Hollande government accepted Romanian and Bulgarian migrants not just as temporary visitors but as long-term

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Interview with National Official, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

³⁰⁰ Ministère de l’éducation nationale, et. al., *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

residents. The focus on nationality rather than ethnic categories also corresponded with the universalist rhetoric of the Hollande government's discursive strategy.

The circular issued on 26 August 2012 presented a national government policy on 'l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites'. It was signed by seven government Ministers, including Interior Minister Valls and Housing Minister Duflot. However, sceptics within the government and outside viewed the document as an administrative reconciliation of the hard-line and humanitarian positions settled in the cabinet room.³⁰¹ As one official privately divulged, 'il y a une politique gouvernementale globale, mais on voit bien que le Ministère de l'Intérieur parle plutôt de campements illicites – donc c'est plutôt l'approche juridique – alors que Duflot et le Ministère du Logement parlent de bidonvilles – c'est plutôt l'approche du logement. Alors la politique est la même mais l'un implique plus une réponse juridique d'évacuation et l'autre plus une approche qui n'est pas du tout la même'.³⁰² A political adviser to the Minister of Housing confirmed this division, stating 'chez nous, il n'y a pas de campements illicites, il n'y a que des bidonvilles'.³⁰³

Despite internal differences, the Hollande government presented the circular as a watershed reform, distinguishing it from the explicitly ethnic policies of the previous administration. This was evident in the overtly universalist disclaimer at the beginning of the document:

Il convient également, au regard de ces principes, d'assurer un traitement égal et digne de toute personne en situation de détresse sociale. Il vous incombe donc, en initiant le travail le plus en amont de la décision de justice qu'il est possible, de proposer des solutions d'accompagnement en mobilisant prioritairement les moyens de droit commun de chacun des partenaires. Cela suppose, dans une logique d'anticipation et d'individualisation, l'établissement, chaque fois que possible, d'un diagnostic et la recherche de solutions d'accompagnement, dans les différents domaines concourant à l'insertion des personnes (scolarisation, santé, emploi, logement/mise à l'abri...).³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ Fabrice Tassel, 'Roms: une circulaire de compromise', *Libération* (29 August 2012): http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/29/roms-une-circulaire-de-compromis_842585 (accessed 20 August 2017).

³⁰² Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris (4 December 2014).

³⁰³ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre du Logement, Paris (4 June 2015).

³⁰⁴ Ministère de l'éducation nationale, et. al., *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

The discursive emphasis on the treatment of individuals stood in stark contrast to the 5 August 2010 circular, which collectively targeted ‘Roms’. It also formally introduced the ideas of ‘anticipation’ and ‘accompagnement’, another nod to the Hollande government’s recognition of EU migrants residing in illegal camps as long-term residents. In line with these ideas, the circular contained four new instructions.³⁰⁵ First, to ‘mobiliser les services de l’Etat et les acteurs locaux concernés’. Second, to ‘établir un diagnostic’ of the families or individuals living in illegal camps. Third, to ‘mettre en place un accompagnement’ covering the areas of ‘scolarisation’, ‘santé’, ‘hébergement’ and ‘insertion professionnelle’. And fourth, to ‘mobiliser les moyens disponibles’ from the government’s housing, immigration, employment, education, health and social service budgets as well as from the EU, notably the FEDER and FSE funds.

At first glance, the Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular appeared to outline a new policy on illegal camps that was markedly different from its predecessor. But a closer reading of the language in the document reveals that, although the circular introduced measures on what to do before and after an evacuation, the evacuation procedure itself remained unchanged. In fact, the document contained no directions on exactly how, when, under what circumstances, and by whom evacuations should be carried out. The only indication to evacuations was a statement at the beginning of the document, which highlights the responsibility of Prefects:

En premier lieu le respect des décisions de justice ne saurait être mis en question. Il revient au préfet d’exécuter celles-ci, lorsqu’il est ordonné par le juge qu’il soit mis fin, au besoin avec le concours de la force publique, aux occupations illicites de terrains. Lorsque la sécurité des personnes est mise en cause, cette action doit être immédiate. Dans les deux situations, au-delà de la responsabilité de l’État, il en va des fondements même du contrat social dans notre nation.³⁰⁶

The message conveyed in this statement was that although it is up to a judge to order an evacuation, the remainder of decisions relating to the timing and style of evacuations were subject to the discretion of the Prefect. The ‘exécution’ of evacuations was open to various interpretations. This allowed Prefects to capitalise on the ambiguity of the language, placing them in a position of power. For example, a Prefect could decide to hold off on evacuating a camp to avoid disruption or to act quickly if there was a risk of

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

danger. They could also choose to dismantle a camp in segments or destroy it in one exercise. Institutionalising the role of the Prefect in a public policy document represented a shift in emphasis rather than procedure. Yet, the circular did make one important administrative change: it placed the national coordination of policies relating to the evacuation of illegal camps in the hands of the Dihal under the direction of *haut fonctionnaire*, Alain Régnier. Although created in 2010 in affiliation with the Ministry of Housing, Dihal morphed into an ‘interministériel’ body comprising civil servants from diverse backgrounds, which reported directly to the Prime Minister.

The advantages of this administrative change were two-fold. First it allowed the Hollande government to centralise the management of policies relating to ‘campements illicites’, minimising tensions between the hard-line and humanitarian positions inside the party, preventing potential disputes between ministries. Second, it framed challenges associated with illegal camps as a housing dilemma, classing Roma residents in the same universalist way as any other population living in precarious housing. As one official explained to me: ‘comme le gouvernement français ne voulait pas rentrer dans ce passage communautaire mais en même temps voulait faire quelque chose tout en conformité avec la tradition française, on a considéré que la question des bidonvilles. Donc essentiellement des Roms qui vivent dans les bidonvilles est une question de mal-logement et donc il était plus naturel de confier à la Dihal de traiter également, de la même façon que n’importe quel autre dossier mais ces bidonvilles et les populations qui vivent dans les bidonvilles’.³⁰⁷ This comment demonstrated how an official used universalism to justify policies through the argument that the Roma were treated no differently from any other population. Therefore, in spite of internal divisions, the Hollande government’s policy on illegal camps appeared to align with its universalist discursive strategy. ‘Dans la circulaire, vous avez vu que nulle part, nulle part, le mot “Rom” n’apparaît’ insisted an official.³⁰⁸

On 31 January 2014, following the controversy of the ‘Leonarda affair’ and Valls’ claim that ‘les Roms ont vocation à revenir en Roumanie ou en Bulgarie’³⁰⁹ on national radio, Housing Minister Duflot announced the launch of a national mission to ‘résorber les

³⁰⁷ Interview with National Official, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

³⁰⁸ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris (4 December 2014).

³⁰⁹ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Interview à France Inter* (24 September 2013).

bidonvilles'.³¹⁰ The mission was established in partnership with Adoma, a social housing contractor formerly called Sonacotra. The history of Adoma was significant because its predecessor was created in 1956 to help provide social housing solutions to Algerian guest workers living in France's postwar 'bidonvilles'. The Minister's choice of the word 'bidonvilles' rather than 'campements illicites' suggested that the Hollande government was trying to move away from the tainted security stance of the Interior Minister towards a more humanitarian approach.

Adoma became the key government contractor, undertaking the 'diagnostics sociaux' before evacuations and providing 'accompagnement' for residents in 'bidonvilles' in the regions of Ile-de-France, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur et Loire-Atlantique. Other organisations, such as Forum Réfugiés also competed for tenders. Yet, the privatisation of social services, especially the assessment of whether residents were deemed suitable for the highly selective 'projets d'insertion', raised both ethical and intellectual questions addressed in chapter five of this thesis. These questions aside, the national mission to 'résorber les bidonvilles' represented a reinforcement of the Hollande government's universalist discursive strategy from which Valls had deviated. The Hollande government did not propose a procedure of evacuation markedly different from its predecessor, but the key policy documents it produced displayed no explicit ethnic or collective stigmatisation. The Hollande government's strategic deployment of universalism masked the same discriminatory policies as those employed by the Sarkozy government without mentioning the ethnic community on which the policies were built.

Detaching Universalist Discourse from Policy Implementation

Despite the language of official policy documents, the language officials used to describe the implementation of 'anticipation' and 'accompagnement' measures appeared less universalist. One civil servant remarked 'il ne faut pas confondre les postures, les déclarations verbales et écrites des uns et des autres, avec la réalité du travail'.³¹¹ The inference was that official political discourse, that is political speeches and policy documents, was a guide not a prescription. Although it offered direction, documents such

³¹⁰ Ministère de la cohésion des territoires, *Remise du 19e rapport de la Fondation Abbé Pierre: Cécile Duflot réaffirme l'engagement du Gouvernement dans la lutte contre le mal logement* (31 January 2014).

³¹¹ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

as the 26 August 2012 circular did not capture the many variables impacting the work of civil servants applying policy measures on the ground. Another official claimed that ‘la politique souvent menée localement par nos Préfets sur le terrain est de combattre ces campements de Roms. Ces campements sont combattus non pas parce qu’ils sont Roms. S’ils étaient belges ce serait pareils’.³¹² This official had no problem referring to the Roma directly but argued that the issue was illegal camps irrespective of the community residing in them. Although the official used universalist ideas to justify evacuations, his use of the term ‘Roms’ betrayed this universalist idea, revealing an entrenched stereotype that illegal camps were inhabited by Roma. This official tried to defend the implementation of government policies as universalist, but by linking ‘campements illicites’ and ‘Roms’ he unconsciously fell victim to the discriminatory approach he sought to oppose.

A similar situation emerged in a Dihal report on the ‘Application de la circulaire interministérielle du 26 août 2012’.³¹³ Published in March 2014, this report reviewed the experience of local officials implementing ‘anticipation’ measures specified in the national government circular. The aim was to equip Prefects and officials with a manual and set of best practices on which to base the management and delivery of ‘diagnostics’ before evacuations. The report stated ‘le terme “[R]oms” renvoie à une notion inopérante en droit français. Mais dans la mesure où l’Union Européenne interroge régulièrement les Etats membres, dont la France, sur les mesures qu’ils prennent pour soutenir l’intégration des Roms, le choix est fait dans ce document d’utiliser ce terme pour désigner les personnes se revendiquant de cette communauté.’³¹⁴ Although the Dihal report noted that ethnic categories do not exist in French law, it did not take issue with using the term ‘Roms’ in a public policy document. In doing so, its observations on the ‘Roms’ community were more closely aligned with the multiculturalist public philosophy, based on the recognition and protection of ethnic communities than the republican idea of universalism, which axiomatically rejects to recognise ethnic categories. This report highlighted a double standard between high-level texts setting the national direction of government policy, such as the 26 August 2012 circular, and technical documents

³¹² Interview with National Official, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Paris (5 December 2014).

³¹³ Dihal *Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d’un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (18 March 2014), p. 17.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

intended for local experts implementing measures on the ground. A commitment to universalist ideas in appeared to be a priority for only the pinnacle of France's expansive public policy machine. Given the technical nature of the report, it is unsurprising that the mention of 'Roms' did not attract public criticism. However, the direct recognition and assessment of an ethnic community in an official policy document, regardless of its intended audience, undermined the Hollande government's denial of a policy 'à l'égard des Roms'.

An interview with a regional government official revealed a similar gap between the language of policy formulation and policy implementation. Reflecting on their experience, the official said that conducting 'diagnostics sociaux' enabled authorities to identify 'des camps "Rom"' because 'les personnes parlent la langue romani'.³¹⁵ This admission of categorising camps on the basis of ethnicity suggested that the implementation of 'anticipation' measures were not as individualised as the 26 August 2012 circular described. That is not to say that each assessment of 'campements illicites' employed the same logic. In Ile de France, the organisation Groupement d'intérêt public (GIP) conducted a 'diagnostic social' of a camp in Corbeil-Essonnes which made no reference to the ethnicity of camp residents.³¹⁶ This demonstrated that different actors used universalist ideas to different degrees, and the way in which an official or contractor on the ground used universalism different from the way in which a national civil servant or politician used it. The term was the same but its interpretation varied.

The application of the *accompagnement* measures also exposed a gap between a universalist discourse of the Hollande government and the selection of camp residents for state support based on ethnicity. Yet, these measures were not always discriminatory in a pejorative sense; sometimes they were based on the multiculturalist concept of positive discrimination. A national government official stressed that 'en France, le concept de discrimination positive ethnique est une chose très dangereuse pour notre démocratie française et notre république'.³¹⁷ In contrast, a regional government official remarked, 'c'est à la fois contraire, entre guillemets, au principe républicain sur un plan formel et

³¹⁵ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

³¹⁶ GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales, *Opération de diagnostics sociaux mis en oeuvre par le GIP Habitat et interventions Sociales* (May and June 2014).

³¹⁷ ³¹⁷ Interview with National Official 1, DAEI (29 February 2016).

en même temps une logique de discrimination positive en pratique'.³¹⁸ The regional official unpacked this disconnect between official policy and practice:

La notion de discrimination positive, au démarrage, était vue avec une certaine suspicion. Aujourd'hui, je pense néanmoins que dans son quotidien, la politique fonctionne forcément sur une discrimination positive. Si on prend le cas de la politique de la ville, ça consiste à concentrer des moyens supplémentaires sur un territoire et des populations, et donc à avoir finalement un traitement inégal mais non inéquitable. C'est-à-dire qu'on donne plus parce que les populations concernées attendent plus.³¹⁹

The line between the republican idea of universalism and the multiculturalist idea of positive discrimination was less clear than the national official implied. This revealed a divergence between discourse on national policy formation and discourse on policy implementation at a local level.

Similar to the *anticipation* measures, the state support scheme of *accompagnement* for camp inhabitants varied across regions, depending on their available resources and pre-existing programmes. Some municipalities already had comprehensive social housing initiatives that offered residents health care, language training and employment assistance. These were often called 'maîtrise d'œuvre urbaine et sociale' (MOUS). Although MOUS were not necessarily used to accommodate displaced residents of illegal camps, some were mobilised exclusively for this purpose. This was the case in Nice and Bordeaux. As an official from Nice said, 'c'est vrai que des fois on nous reprochait d'en faire plus pour les Roms que pour des gens qui vivaient –si je prends Nice- à l'Ariane ou aux Moulins, des gens qui étaient déjà défavorisés.'³²⁰ A local official from Bordeaux defended affirmative action, maintaining that 'le fait que le mot multiculturalisme est lié au communautarisme est un grand problème'.³²¹ At a local level, universalism hindered rather than helped the *accompagnement* of migrants in practice, and in some cases local officials disregarded universalist principles altogether.

At a regional level, a programme called Andatu exemplified the complex relationship between the republican idea of universalism and the multiculturalist idea of positive discrimination. Andatu was a social housing initiative 'experimentation' led by the Préfet

³¹⁸ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (16 June 2015).

³²¹ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Bordeaux, Bordeaux (19 June 2015).

du Rhône, which was designed specifically in response to ‘la problématique des campements illicites de la région lyonnaise’, containing ‘[e]nviron 1 500 personnes venant essentiellement de Roumanie et se revendiquant de la communauté Rom’.³²² Although Andatu was created in 2011, it was widely championed by members of the Hollande government and Dihal as a model of best practice for its emphasis on accelerated integration and *mixité sociale*. However, Andatu was not strictly universalist. Its first phase of integration called ‘stabilisation’, segregated participants in one discrete building until authorities considered that they were ready to progress to the next phase of integration, which placed individual families into mixed social housing projects led by Adoma. The idea of affirmative action was thus used as a means to achieve universalist ends.

Related to this was the issue of *scolarisation*. On the one hand, the Junior Minister for Education George Pau-Langevin stressed that the French system was based on the idea of ‘l’école pour tous’ and said ‘Il s’agit néanmoins d’une obligation pour notre gouvernement, qui assume en la matière une politique courageuse et volontariste, tendant notamment à assurer l’accès à l’École à des enfants en grande précarité’.³²³ Yet undermining this universalist declaration, regional and municipal authorities implementing the *accompagnement* measures outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular provided Roma children with tailored education programmes. This suggested that officials could frame universalism as a goal to justify positive discrimination policies. As the 2013 interministerial report evaluating *accompagnement* measures stated ‘[c]ertaines situations locales ont parfois conduit à regrouper des élèves, même temporairement, dans des locaux “dédiés” à cette fin. Ceux-ci ne sont en aucune façon adaptés aux besoins de ces élèves ni conformes à ce qui est attendu de l’École de la République (Essonne, Rhône). Ces solutions qui portent en elles le risque de dérives vers des classes à caractère “ethnique” ne sont pas acceptables’.³²⁴ As the report singled out the ‘Rhône’ as an

³²² Préfecture du Rhône, *Bilan du dispositif ANDATU: l’insertion réussie pour des populations roms* (12 December 2014).

³²³ George Pau-Langevin, Ministre de la réussite éducative, *Déclaration sur la communauté rom, notamment la scolarisation et l’accueil des élèves Roms et la langue romani*, Lyon (11 July 2013).

³²⁴ Ministère de l’Intérieur, Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Santé, Ministère de l’Ecologie, du Développement Durable et de l’Energie, Ministère de l’éducation Nationale, Inspection Générale de l’Administration, Conseil Général de l’Environnement et du Développement Durable, Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales, et Inspection Générale de l’Administration de l’Education Nationale et de la Recherche, *Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

example of this perverse approach to universalism, it is likely that the example in question was Andatu. Thus, although the Hollande government's discursive strategy was proactively universalist and its key policy documents made no reference to ethnic categories, the implementation of the policy measures reflected a more pragmatic rather than strictly colour-blind reading of republicanism.

The Limits of a Universalist Discourse

In addition to the gap between political rhetoric and the discourse officials used on the ground, another factor undermined the Sarkozy and Hollande governments' universalist claims: France's obligations as a member of the European Union. The requirement to submit a national strategy on 'Roma inclusion' in January 2012 and provide regular progress reports of its implementation typified this tension. Although each EU member was subject to the same requirements, devising and applying a strategy that overtly provided preferential treatment to an ethnic community was especially problematic for France. The overtly ethnic approach of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies appeared diametrically opposed to France's republican philosophy. As such, this section examines the ways in which the French government managed this challenge to explore the limits of French universalism within the context of the EU. First it investigates the extent to which French civil servants, charged with the design and maintenance of the national 'Roma inclusion' strategy, undermined universalist discourse to comply with EU guidelines. In doing so, it reveals that the French government's defence of *égalité* rested upon a set of discriminatory assumptions about who their policies affected. Second, this section considers whether the EU requirements gave credence to an unofficial targeting of the Roma in France, arguing that the result was a fusion of de jure universalism and de facto discrimination in French political discourse.

French Equality Versus European Equity

French civil servants were faced with the conundrum of designing a strategy to promote 'Roma inclusion' without targeting an ethnic community. Accepting this task was in itself at odds with universalist principles but in spite of this contradiction, the Roma inclusion strategy was not optional. As a French official put it, 'le système français se heurte à un système que promeut la Commission Européenne qui est une politique d'inclusion des

Roms. La France ne peut pas rentrer dans une politique d'inclusion des Roms puisqu'on ne peut pas conduire des politiques juridiquement fondées sur les critères d'appartenance à une communauté ethnique'.³²⁵ To resolve this issue, French civil servants, notably from Dihal and the French *Secrétariat général des affaires européennes* (SGAE), had to find a way to reconcile the republican notion of *égalité* with the European concept of equity. These officials did not accept that 'la stratégie d'inclusion pour les Roms doit [les] amener à remettre en cause les valeurs républicaines qui ne reconnaissant ni race, ni religion'.³²⁶ Instead, they added the title 'une place égale dans la société française' to the top of the strategy paper to emphasise the government's dedication to universalist principles.³²⁷ This was based on the logic that universalist ends justified non-universalist means.

Additionally, the introduction to the strategy included a disclaimer raising two challenges:

Deux problèmes se posent en particulier. Le premier est que [l']assimilation [de diverses populations sous le terme "Roms"] peut venir contredire l'un des objectifs des politiques d'intégration, qui est précisément de reconnaître les cultures et les identités des différents groupes qui composent la société française pour leur permettre d'y trouver toute leur place dans une logique d'égalité des droits. Si l'on ne prend pas le temps de regarder dans le détail les particularités de chacun, on se privera des moyens efficaces pour construire une stratégie.

La deuxième difficulté est que le terme « Roms » renvoie à une notion ethnique qui est inopérante en droit français pour construire des politiques publiques. La tradition républicaine française, qui se traduit par une conception exigeante du principe d'égalité, ne permet pas d'envisager des mesures qui seraient spécifiquement ciblées sur un groupe ethnique. L'article 1er de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 énonce en effet que la République assure l'égalité devant la loi sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion. Le gouvernement français se refuse donc avec une grande vigueur à toute différence des droits fondée sur l'appartenance à une communauté définie par son origine, et continuera de le faire dans le cadre des processus nationaux, communautaires et internationaux.³²⁸

This disclaimer afforded the French government two opportunities. First, by highlighting the ambiguity of the term 'Roms', French officials could devise a strategy that encompassed both foreign migrants residing in illegal camps and French travellers, so-called *gens du voyage* without conflating the communities. This allowed them to present

³²⁵ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

³²⁶ Interview with National Official 2, Dihal, Paris (9 December 2014).

³²⁷ Gouvernement Français, *Une place égale dans la société française: Stratégie du gouvernement français pour l'inclusion des Roms dans le cadre de la communication de la Commission du 5 avril 2011 et des conclusions du Conseil du 19 mai 2011* (6 January 2012).

³²⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

their strategy as ethnically neutral because it applied to two unrelated groups of people. It also meant that they avoided a reproduction of the amalgamation of ‘Roms’ and ‘gens du voyage’ for which the Sarkozy government was heavily criticised. Second, by stating that ‘Roms’ were not recognised as a category in French law and therefore could not be the target of public policy, French officials were able to clearly affirm the government’s commitment to universalism and communicate their policies as broad socio-economic schemes rather than ethnically targeted affirmative action measures.

A declaration of universalism addressed one part of the conundrum, but alone it would not be enough to convince the Commission that the strategy was in fact one of Roma inclusion. To satisfy the Commission’s requirements, French officials decided to refer to the Roma directly but only as an unintended benefactor of its government’s policies and never as the object of a deliberate ethnic targeting. In this sense, French officials used universalist ideas to distract from the fact they framed illegal camps as Roma problem. In other words, officials used universalist language to conceal racial stereotypes. For example, the strategy stated that ‘cette politique bénéficie aux citoyens européens, quelle que soit leur origine’ but then noted ‘cette même année 2010 ont été financés à Bordeaux, 40 chalets en bois pour reloger des populations marginalisées dont des Roms’.³²⁹ The careful choice of words presented the relocation of Roma as the outcome rather than aim of the French government’s policy. Despite the efforts of Dihal and the SGAE to showcase France’s universalist policy, as discussed above, an official from Bordeaux informed me that in practice *accompagnement* was indeed a case of positive discrimination. A confidential presentation given by French officials to the European Commission social housing projects such as this financed by the European fund, FEDER, also directly identified ‘Roms’ under the heading of ‘publics ciblés’, demonstrating that the ethnic minority were in fact a target of the French government’s policies.³³⁰ Nevertheless detaching the aim of France’s policy from its outcome was a clever and creative response to a difficult political, legal and ideological question. It simultaneously allowed the French government to appear loyal to its republican idea of universalism and comply with obligations of its EU membership.

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

³³⁰ Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale (DATAR), *Présentation sur le dispositif de financement des dépenses de logement en faveur des communautés marginalisées par le FEDER sur 2007-2013* (4 April 2013).

The French government replicated this logic in its 2013 progress report to the European Commission by including a ‘rappel de la distinction entre Gens du voyage et migrants et rappel de l’interdiction des discriminations fondées sur l’origine ethnique’ in the introduction’.³³¹ The report referenced Roma in two ways: either to differentiate the French universalist approach from ‘l’approche “ethnique” communément admise en Europe’ or to reiterate the rejection of ethnic categories in French law and public policy.³³² A document outlining the ‘Indicateurs d’évaluation de la stratégie nationale d’intégration des communautés marginalisées’ submitted to the European Commission in February 2015 did not include a single reference to the Roma. It mentioned only ‘Gens du voyage’ or ‘Personnes vivant dans les campements illicites’.

From these documents, it seemed as though the French government’s deployment of universalism had intensified. First it presented Roma as an unintended recipient of French state support, then it mentioned Roma as a European construct with no official significance in France, and finally it removed the term all together. The French government had seemingly done the impossible: by arguing that Roma inclusion should be the outcome not the aim of policy in its initial strategy document, French officials were subsequently able to satisfy the commission’s requirements without any reference to the population in question. This meant that French civil servants used universalist means to achieve non-universalist ends.

The French government’s approach appeared to both deploy and embody universalist ideas. However, a close examination of the logic of dislocating policy aims from outcomes reveals a flaw. The French government’s strategy rested upon the assumption that Roma benefited from colour-blind ‘accompagnement’ measures. For example, a social housing initiative in Saint-Ouen was said to ‘prendre en charge les besoins de personnes, majoritairement des Roms, notamment en termes de scolarité et d’éducation, d’accès aux soins, aux activités économiques et au logement’.³³³ Yet, the strategy also argued that ‘les données ethniques objectives ne peuvent faire l’objet en France d’une

³³¹ Gouvernement Français, *Informations de la part des autorités françaises, Information de la part des Etats Membres sur les progrès dans la mise en oeuvre de leurs stratégies nationales ou ensemble de mesures générales pour soutenir l’intégration des Roms* (January 2013), p. 1.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ ‘Annexe II’, Ibid., p. 24.

collecte à des fins statistiques’.³³⁴ If the collection of ethnic statistics was forbidden, how did French officials know that Roma had in fact benefited from the government’s universalist policies?

Two possible explanations spring to mind. Perhaps the French authorities did possess some form of ethnic data. That is not to say the government collected ethnic data themselves – it may have been passed on from government contractors or NGOs. As chapter five of this thesis reveals, an assessment of a slum in the Alpes-Maritimes conducted by a contractor classed residents as Roma. Perhaps the French authorities did not possess ethnic data but assumed that a proportion of residents living in illegal camps affected by the government’s policies were members of the Roma community. This assumption may have been linked to several indicators, such as language, appearance, nationality, behaviour, the structure of the family unit, health conditions and illiteracy revealed in the ‘diagnostics sociaux’. Yet none of these indicators prove membership of an ethnic community, rather they demonstrated the perverse way in which French officials used the republican idea of universalism to justify the treatment of a group they framed in ethnic terms. An excerpt from SGAE’s application letter for European structural funds exemplified this point:

‘La présence en France de populations issues de communautés marginalisées de pays d’Europe orientale, en particulier de Bulgarie et de Roumanie, amène des collectivités territoriales françaises à développer des partenariats avec les collectivités et territoires de ces pays, notamment pour y favoriser l’inclusion sociale et économique des communautés au niveau local. Conformément à la Recommandation du Conseil du 9 décembre 2013 “relative à des mesures efficaces d’intégration des Roms dans les Etats membres”, les autorités françaises souhaitent développer cette coopération transnationale’.³³⁵

Although these structural funds were reserved for the ‘intégration des Roms’, the French government did not overtly refer to the ethnic community in their application, noting only the nationality of marginalised communities as predominantly Bulgarian and Romanian. The inference was that nationality and ethnicity were related, drawing an implicit causal link between Bulgarians and Romanians in France and the Roma. Despite this allusion there was no evidence to prove whether the marginalised communities in question

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

³³⁵ Anne De Soucy, Conseiller auprès du Secrétaire générale, Secrétariat général des affaires européennes (SGAE) to Vincent Richez, Représentant Permanent de la France auprès de l’Union européenne, *Appui des Fonds européens structurels et d’investissement à la coopération transnationale* (14 January 2015), 03-2015_NAF_coopération transnational.

identified as Roma. Without ethnic data, the French officials requesting the funds could only presume not confirm the ethnic identity of the communities. Thus, as this example demonstrates, the application of universalist principles led to the unintended production of unsubstantiated ethnic stereotypes. An official in the European Commission agreed with this observation, suggesting that ‘if the French government collected ethnic statistics, perhaps they would discover that France might not be as unified as they had assumed’.³³⁶ The French government’s strategic deployment of universalism in its communications with Brussels had therefore given way to a deeply entrenched, sometimes unconscious, perpetuation of ethnic discrimination.

De Jure Universalism and De Facto Discrimination

Officially, the Hollande government discourse remained committed to universalism, but unofficially discrimination against the Roma persisted. Evidence of it could be found in all levels of the French political system: from the discourse of local implementation of policies in French cities, to the national speeches of politicians diverting from the party line, through to the defence of French policies in communications to Brussels. A local government official admitted that ‘même si le mot “Rom” n’existe pas dans les titres, la plupart des habitants dans les camps sont d’origine Rom’.³³⁷ This sentiment was echoed by an adviser to President Hollande who conceded that ‘c’est vrai que parmi les citoyens européens qui peuvent s’installer en France, en collectivité, de manière nombreuse et visible, ce sont les Roms. Il n’y en a pas d’autres. On n’a pas d’italiens qui vont venir s’installer en France de manière illicite’.³³⁸ The official insistence on universalism seemed superficial in light of these off-the-record remarks, which confirmed collective stereotypes about an ethnic community’s way of life.

Some officials were aware of the government’s discursive strategy. Some were conscious of the dichotomy between the use of universalism in official discourses and the often implicit discrimination of the Roma. One local official disclosed that ‘il n’y a pas de rejet national de la population Roms, il n’y a pas de racisme officiel. Vous avez un petit

³³⁶ Interview with European Commission Official, DG REGIO, Brussels (14 March 2016).

³³⁷ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris (4 December 2014).

³³⁸ Interview with Political Adviser, Elysée, Paris (29 February 2016).

racisme ambiant, qui ne se dit pas, ça ne se dit pas'.³³⁹ The comment implied that discrimination was permissible, or at least overlooked, as long as it remained outside the confines of formal public policy documents. In the words of a senior French official, 'même si on ne cible pas les Roms directement, il y a des Roms dans les campements. C'est juste une politique légale'.³⁴⁰ In an earlier interview, the same senior official highlighted the de facto discrimination of Roma in the corridors of l'Elysée, warning that 'il faut reconnaître que nous-mêmes aujourd'hui, au sein de l'Etat, il y a des gens qui parlent de campements Roms'.³⁴¹ The influence of universalist ideas seemed to dissipate at the border between legal text and unofficial discourse.

The French state appeared to systematically deploy universalist ideas in official discourses but did not apply it so rigorously to informal discussions and technical communications, revealing a double standard. One national official ridiculed this double standard:

Souvent en abordant ce problème de campements illicites en France, moi cela me fait penser à un tableau de René Magritte, peintre surréaliste de la première moitié du 20ème siècle...Et alors il a fait un tableau où l'on voyait une pipe et il y a écrit 'Ceci n'est pas une pipe' et il a signé. Et le titre de ce tableau est 'la trahison des images'. Au fond, alors on peut gloser dessus pendant des heures, mais ça dit vraiment qu'il faut se méfier des images et ne pas prendre la chose pour sa représentation. Et une fois j'avais montré une photo où l'on voyait la dame, les petits enfants, et puis le monsieur sur des matelas dans la rue, habillés de toutes les couleurs, disant 'ceci n'est pas un Rom'.

³³⁹ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015).

³⁴⁰ Interview with National Official 2, Dihal, Paris (1 June 2015).

³⁴¹ Interview with National Official 2, Dihal, Paris (9 December 2014).

Illustration 1. René Magritte, The Treachery of Images (1926). (Ceci n'est pas une pipe; "This is not a pipe"). Oil on canvas.



The French government's refusal to recognise 'Roms' as an administrative category in official policy documents and political rhetoric did not prove that there were no Roma living in illegal camps in France. Presuming that camp inhabitants were Roma based on a set of unfounded stereotypes did not confirm their identity either. Instead, it revealed that the French government's use of universalism served more to conceal than remove of structural discrimination against the Roma in France. Yet, despite their close relation to one another, it is important to make an analytical distinction between the aims of universalist and anti-discrimination approaches. Universalism aimed to stop the *communautarisation* of ethnic or religious groups, which threatened a *désintégration* of French society. If the French public sphere was preserved as an ethnically and religiously 'neutral' environment, then universalism had succeeded. In contrast, anti-discrimination, the principle based on the recognition and protection of ethnic communities, intended to prevent the unfair treatment of individuals or groups because of their race. As such, anti-discrimination explicitly targeted ethnic populations to promote their inclusion in society. It is thus not surprising that the French government's strategic deployment of universalist ideas concealed racialised ideas, which facilitated a de facto discrimination of the Roma in France.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates how the French state used the republican idea of universalism to communicate and justify policies that targeted the Roma. First, it reveals that the Sarkozy government's universalist justification of evacuation policies was not originally employed to counter claims of anti-Roma discrimination. Instead, it began as a reluctant response to criticism from Brussels in an attempt to minimise the political and legal cost of a xenophobic policy. Only under the Hollande government did universalism become a proactive discursive strategy to demonstrate commitment to France's republican philosophy despite intensified evacuations of illegal camps. Thus officials employed the same republican term but interpreted it in different ways. Second, the chapter exposes a gap between the Hollande government's universalist discourse and the implementation of its policies, which tended to contain ethnic references to the Roma. Third, the chapter shows that despite the dexterity of French civil servants, who carefully constructed a national strategy of 'Roma inclusion' for the benefit of the European Commission without using language that explicitly targeted Roma, de facto discrimination persisted. A

tacit link between the Roma and peri-urban slums persisted in the discourse of French officials; it was especially present in candid conversations and in technical policy documents with limited readership. The next chapter turns to examine how consecutive French governments used the republican concept of a 'neutral' public sphere to rationalise the evacuation of slums and deportations of some of its residents.

REJECTION: PRESERVING THE PUBLIC SPHERE

‘Je vous le dis: il n’y aura pas de bidonvilles dans notre pays. La France n’est pas un terrain vague.’³⁴²

Brice Hortefeux (30 August 2010)

...

‘Il n’est pas acceptable de laisser s’installer des bidonvilles dans notre villes ou aux portes de nos villes.’³⁴³

Jean-Marc Ayrault (9 July 2013)

Eradicating ‘Roma’ slums was a priority for the Sarkozy and Hollande governments, often featuring in their political discourse. Yet, it is remarkable that a meagre 17,500 slum dwellers amidst France’s population of 66 million, became the target of national public debate.³⁴⁴ Why did successive French governments reject these slums? Many officials framed slums as illegal camps that violated the French constitutional right to property. Some questioned the security of slums, especially in relation to organised crime networks, or public health. Others lamented that slums represented a regression to the *bidonvilles* of postwar France. Although officials presented different rationales, their discourse was underpinned by a common conviction that ‘Roma’ slums were an unwelcome feature of the French public sphere. For them the republican concept of the public sphere was not simply an abstract realm in which individuals could freely exercise civic rights, it was also a physical place where individuals were required to leave behind particularistic attachments in exchange for the common good. Employing this conceptualisation, officials spoke of the public sphere as if it were a neutral place where all individuals could enjoy equal rights. But the public sphere was not neutral. Officials defined neutrality in normative terms, projecting their assumptions of what constituted normal or acceptable living situations and behaviour onto their conceptualisations of a neutral public sphere. In other words, the concept was open to bias that officials could exploit. This chapter examines how officials used the republican concept of a neutral public sphere to communicate and justify policies to eradicate slums in France. First, it

³⁴² Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Conférence de presse sur la mise en oeuvre des mesures d’évacuation des campements illicites* (30 August 2010).

³⁴³ Jean-Marc Ayrault, Premier Ministre, *Déclaration sur les priorités de l’Etat territorial* (9 July 2013).

³⁴⁴ For figures, see: Jean-Baptiste Daubeuf, Hervé Marchal and Thibaut Besozzi, *Idées Reçues sur les Bidonvilles en France* (Paris: Le Cavalier Bleu, 2016), p. 10.

explores the rationales behind their rejection of ‘Roma’ slums in political rhetoric. Second, it studies how this rejection materialised into evacuation policies. Third, it investigates how officials rationalised the state-led removal of some ‘Roma’ residents from France altogether.

Rejecting Roma Slums

The French state’s objection to slums transcended partisan divisions. The message was clear: neither the Sarkozy nor the Hollande government accepted slums on the grounds that they disrupted the neutrality of the public sphere. But what particular feature of slums made them unacceptable to French officials? Fundamentally, the fact that officials racialised slums as a ‘Roma’ problem meant they could position slums as communitarian clusters of ethnic ghettos that threatened the neutrality of the public sphere. This section takes a closer look at the rationale behind the Sarkozy and Hollande governments’ objection to slums. First, it focuses on the crucial role that visibility played in the state-led rejection of these slums, noting that officials did not frame all types of visibility as challenging the neutrality of the public sphere. Second, it untangles explanations officials used to justify the eradication of slums, distinguishing between those focused on protecting the Republic from Roma ghettos and those centred on rescuing these so-called Roma from their own condition.

A Visible Ethnic Threat

In English, the term ‘slum’ conjures up an image of overcrowded shantytowns, often associated with urban settlements in India, favelas in Brazil and townships in South Africa. Slums signal a crisis of housing, inequality and urbanisation. Yet, in French the word *bidonville* has additional connotations. Initially a reference to a makeshift camp of rural migrants in Casablanca called Gadoueville in the 1920s, *bidonvilles* became synonymous with informal settlements of migrant workers in France unable to find affordable housing in the 1950s and 1960s. These settlements were on the outskirts of French cities and their inhabitants were mainly of Algerian and Portuguese descent.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

The ‘suppression des bidonvilles’ outlined in the *loi Debré de 1964*, was one of France’s postwar reconstruction policies under the Fifth Republic.³⁴⁶

Since at least 2010, officials have associated *bidonvilles* with ‘campements illicites’ in political discourse. As conservative Interior Minister Hortefeux stated, ‘il faut que les Français sachent: certains de ces campements illégaux étaient de véritables bidonvilles.’³⁴⁷ The term ‘bidonvilles’ was a pejorative reference indicating that France was regressing back to its debilitated postwar state. This sentiment was echoed in local politics. In the words of a municipal official: ‘les campements étaient le long du périphérique, avec de la pollution, du bruit, des conditions indignes. Donc ça, la France ne l’accepte pas ce type d’installation, parce que ce serait un retour en arrière, pour revenir aux bidonvilles. Même si effectivement on a une pression avec la crise, il y a des nouveaux phénomènes de bidonvilles. Mais il faut y résister.’³⁴⁸ It also transcended the Left-Right divide. As a political adviser exclaimed ‘le fait que ces bidonvilles se reconstruisent, c’est une régression. C’est quelque chose qui ne va pas. Ça veut dire qu’on revient quelque part en arrière dans l’histoire du pays.’³⁴⁹ Thus, these new *bidonvilles* inherited the reputation of their postwar predecessors.

Additionally, as the previous chapter revealed, despite efforts to present policies as universalist, the Sarkozy and Hollande governments tacitly regarded *campements illicites* as *campements de Roms*. This meant that officials did not just frame illegal camps as slums but also as Roma ghettos. The association of *bidonvilles* with the Roma racialised a particular type of living arrangement. Both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments drew this association in public statements, but the latter tended to emphasise it to justify the rejection of slums. For example, when asked ‘est-ce que les Roms ont des modes de vie extrêmement différent des nôtres?’ during a radio interview, Hollande’s Interior Minister Valls replied ‘mais ils vivent dans des campements et dans des situations tout à fait insupportables.’³⁵⁰ Reflecting on this comment, a political adviser to the minister claimed

³⁴⁶ Loi n° 64-1229 du 14 décembre 1964.

³⁴⁷ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Conférence de presse sur la mise en oeuvre des mesures d’évacuation des campements illicites* (30 August 2010).

³⁴⁸ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie du 18^e Arrondissement, Paris (2 December 2014).

³⁴⁹ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Paris (5 June 2015).

³⁵⁰ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Radio Interview à RMC* (25 September 2013).

that ‘les bidonvilles des Roms, c’est un choc de culture pour la plupart des Français’.³⁵¹ These statements demonstrated that officials positioned slums as challenging to neutrality of the public sphere because they assumed the inhabitants were Roma. The racialisation of slums meant that officials could justify clearing slums because through this logic they were clearing ethnic ghettos. The implication was that slums were a part of being Roma, rather than a product of socio-economic circumstance.

Socialist Minister for European Affairs, Thierry Repentin extended this argument in a radio interview with Radio France Inter, by referring to ‘Roms’ as ‘une population étrangère avec un mode de vie qui n’est pas celui choisi par la grande majorité de nos concitoyens’.³⁵² This comment cast Roma as the other, excluding them from French society. It also suggested that this so-called Roma way of life exiled the ethnic community from French society. Regional officials expressed the same sentiment in their political discourse. For example, a regional official contended that ‘les Roms sont ici une population que l’on reconnaît surtout par le fait qu’elles s’installe en général de manière illicite dans la ville, avec souvent une concentration importante de personnes qui causent un trouble à l’ordre public’.³⁵³ By suggesting that it was possible to determine whether a person was Roma because they lived in an illegal slum, the regional official racialised both a specific type of living arrangement and illegal behaviour. This statement revealed a set of negative stereotypes underpinning the French state’s response to slums in France. Thus, at the core of French officials’ rejection of slums was an unfounded bias that residents were members of the Roma community.

The visibility of slums further contributed to their rejection by the French state. Visibility made slums a public problem, which elicited a public response. Although slums were domestic residences, they were not private. The visibility of slums also magnified the differences between the slum residents and local community. As a regional official from Seine-Saint-Denis noted ‘les populations se déplacent de plus en plus sur l’espace public: les autoroutes, les lieux délaissés de route, les lieux un peu vacants, et donc ils deviennent visibles et la population locale les supporte de moins en moins’.³⁵⁴ A report published by

³⁵¹ Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

³⁵² Thierry Repentin, Ministre délégué aux Affaires européennes, *Radio Interview à RFI* (2 October 2013).

³⁵³ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny Denis (12 June 2015).

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme in November 2014 stressed that 'la visibilité de certains bidonvilles insalubres ou les cas de mendicité dans les espaces publics contribuent en effet à faciliter l'association systématique des Roms à la précarité et aux troubles de voisinage'.³⁵⁵ Objections from local communities placed pressure on local politicians. In parts of northern France, for example, officials used their policies on Roma slums as election platforms. One regional official said 'on a très clairement vu qu'aux dernières élections municipales [en 2014], des élus ont perdu leur municipalité à cause justement des questions de populations Roms présentes sur le territoire. A Los, le Maire a perdu parce qu'il a accepté d'accompagner les Roms'.³⁵⁶ Another added 'inversement des maires se sont faits élire sur ce sujet-là en disant "si je viens, il n'y en aura plus"'.³⁵⁷

The concentration of people living in slums was another factor adding to their rejection. A regional official noted 'le problème de la visibilité c'est la concentration, le fait qu'ils soient tous au même endroit'.³⁵⁸ Similarly, a senior national bureaucrat contended 'les bidonvilles cristallise tout ce qui ne va pas dans la société française. Les français ont beaucoup de difficultés à accepter le fait de vivre-ensemble. Les SDF Roms sont clairement identifiés. C'est une population physiquement identifiable. Ils sont visible'.³⁵⁹ Adding to this, a municipal adviser claimed 'ce n'est pas seulement la visibilité des bidonvilles qui pose un problème, mais aussi la vie communautaire'.³⁶⁰ This was echoed in the language of a report published by the Commission des Affaires Européennes, a French parliamentary committee, that maintained 'le logement des Roms doit être inscrit au système de logement de la société dans son ensemble, la ghettoïsation devant être évitée'.³⁶¹ These examples demonstrate that elected and administrative officials at all levels of government, across various geographic locations saw slums as Roma ghettos, and a shared concern of communitarianism underpinned official responses. 'Je pense que la communautarisation est forte pour les Roms' argued another regional official.³⁶² Thus

³⁵⁵ Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme, *Avis sur le respect des droits fondamentaux des populations vivant en bidonvilles* (20 November 2014).

³⁵⁶ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).

³⁵⁷ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).

³⁵⁸ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (16 June 2015).

³⁵⁹ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

³⁶⁰ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015).

³⁶¹ Commission des Affaires Européennes, *Rapport d'information sur l'intégration des populations Rom* (18 September 2013), p. 33.

³⁶² Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

officials did not simply consider Roma slums a nuisance, but a communitarian threat to the Republic's *laïque* and ethnically neutral public sphere. It is important to note not all forms of visibility threatened the Sarkozy and Hollande Governments' conceptualisation of a neutral public sphere. However, in the case of the Roma, it was the visibility of racialisation, poverty and a collective form of living that challenged the neutrality of the public sphere. This was because neutrality was in fact a heteronormative construct that officials could use to justify the rejection of slums. The neutrality of the public sphere was thus imbued with heteronormative bias.

The perception of slums as ethnic ghettos rested on the assumption that residents chose to segregate themselves from French society. Interior Minister Valls stated in an interview with *Le Figaro* on 14 March 2013 'les occupants de campements ne souhaitent pas s'intégrer dans notre pays pour des raisons culturelles ou parce qu'ils sont entre les mains de réseaux versés dans la mendicité ou la prostitution'.³⁶³ The rejection of a community based on living arrangements revealed a bias against the Roma because of the spaces they occupied. Although these so-called Roma lived in relatively closed communities, often spoke the same languages and contributed to the same micro-economies, it is more likely that their living conditions were a product of socio-economic migration after the end of the Cold War than personal preference. This suggests that public officials projected ethnic characteristics onto assumptions about behaviour, language, lifestyle and poverty.

The French state's justification of preserving a neutral public sphere was not distinct to the Roma. Officials also used it to rationalise the 2004 law prohibiting 'conspicuous' religious symbols in state schools and the 2010 law banning the burqa. Yet in both cases, the community in question was religious rather than ethnic. Until the summer of 2010, when President Sarkozy officially began the national campaign to eradicate 'campements des Roms' an ethnic community had scarcely been the target of this type of public objection. By rejecting Roma on the basis that they challenged the neutrality of the public sphere, officials were able to use a republican idea to defend policies that targeted a specific ethnic community. A counterpoint to this claim was that the Sarkozy and Hollande governments targeted slums but not squats. While officials spoke of slums as a

³⁶³ Christophe Cornevin, 'Roms: Manuel Valls affiche sa fermeté', *Le Figaro* (14 March 2013): <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/03/14/01016-20130314ARTFIG00647-roms-le-cri-d-alarme-et-le-message-de-fermete-de-valls.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

communitarian threat, they rarely discussed squats, which often posed similar social, legal and economic risks. This further demonstrated how it was the visibility of this perceived ethnic community that allowed officials to frame them as challenging the neutrality of the public sphere. As a national political adviser said ‘le phénomène de squat existe également dans toutes les grandes villes mais ce n’est pas un problème qui heurte les valeurs républicaines.’³⁶⁴

Another factor adding to the rejection of slums was location. Slums were often in poorer, marginalised urban areas with large migrant populations such as Seine-Saint-Denis. On the northern outskirts of Paris, Seine-Saint-Denis is home to over 130 different nationalities.³⁶⁵ In 2013 it also contained France’s largest concentration of *bidonvilles*. As a regional official stated:

Quand je suis arrivé ici en juin 2013, nous avions à peu près 8000 personnes recensées dans des campements illicites dont la très grande majorité était issue de la population rom, principalement de Roumanie et quelques Roms de Bulgarie. Ça veut dire que la Seine-Saint-Denis avait quasiment le tiers de la population Rom recensée en France... en plus on n’a pas d’accès facile au logement ou à l’hébergement.³⁶⁶

The arrival of these allegedly Roma migrants in Seine-Saint-Denis and other *quartiers populaires* across France placed strain on local budgets and social services, especially demand for subsidised housing. This deepened tensions between local communities and slum residents, competing for access to government support. According to a regional bureaucrat ‘il y a une concurrence des misères. Il y a toujours une hiérarchie. Les Roms sont les arabes des arabes. Les arabes ne vivent pas dans des bidonvilles. Ils vivent peut-être dans un habitat insalubre mais ils ont un toit’.³⁶⁷ This comment revealed the racialisation of exposed living conditions and suggested a connection between ethnicity and hygiene. It also demonstrated that in a private one-on-one interview, the public official did not hesitate to equate the ethnic community with slums. Prejudice against Roma based on the visibility of slums was not just political; it was embedded in the discourse of the French administration and French administrators.

³⁶⁴ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

³⁶⁵ Baudouin Eschapasse, ‘Seine-Saint-Denis : portrait d’un département "sensible"', *Le Point* (31 August 2016): http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/seine-saint-denis-portrait-d-un-departement-sensible-31-08-2016-2064954_23.php (accessed 20 August 2017).

³⁶⁶ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

³⁶⁷ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture des Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille (26 June 2015).

Protecting the Republic or the Roma?

Although the Sarkozy and Hollande governments' language suggested they similarly supported the eradication of slums, two types of justifications emerged. Some officials argued it was a necessary means of protecting French society. The subtext was that slum residents were Roma and these officials saw Roma as outside the norms of French society. Others saw it as a way of rescuing the Roma from unacceptable living conditions. While the former approach framed the Roma as the problem, the latter positioned them as victims. This division was not partisan: it reflected internal tensions between hard-line and humanitarian approaches of how to manage migrants.

Officials offered two reasons why eradicating slums would protect the French society from the Roma. First, they maintained that slums constituted an illegal occupation of land. 'La communauté Rom, la communauté des gens du voyage: ils ne sont pas au-dessus des lois', stated conservative Interior Minister Hortefeux in July 2010.³⁶⁸ The following month, Benoist Apparu, the conservative Secretary of State for Housing added 'à partir du moment où il y a une situation illégale, l'Etat français en tire toutes les conséquences'.³⁶⁹ Similarly, in June 2015 an adviser to socialist Interior Minister Valls insisted 'la situation des occupants des campements illicites est claire. Ce sont les occupants des campements illicites – ils doivent partir. C'est une question de légalité'.³⁷⁰ Regional officials also rejected Roma slums as a violation of republican law. In December 2014 a regional official exclaimed 'il y a des principes de respect de la loi, de l'ordre public, du droit de propriété. Ça fait partie de la Constitution'.³⁷¹

Framing slums as a legal problem allowed French officials to legitimate a national evacuation campaign as a duty bestowed upon the government to protect French citizens. As conservative Prime Minister, François Fillon, argued 'il est du devoir de l'Etat d'assurer le respect de la légalité républicaine'.³⁷² Similarly, the socialist junior education minister, George Pau-Langevin, noted: 'il est de la responsabilité de la puissance publique de faire respecter la loi, y compris en démantelant des campements illicites et

³⁶⁸ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Radio Interview à RTL* (29 July 2010).

³⁶⁹ Benoist Apparu, Secretary of State for Housing, *Radio Interview à Radio France Internationale* (2 August 2010).

³⁷⁰ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

³⁷¹ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris (4 December 2014).

³⁷² François Fillon, Premier Ministre, *Communiqué sur la politique de reconduite dans leur pays d'origine des Roms en situation irrégulière* (24 August 2010).

dangereux.³⁷³ Prefects were charged with implementing this ambitious task. ‘Le rôle de la Préfecture, c’était de faire cesser des situations illégales, qui étaient ces campements et ces présences illégales, il faut le bien le dire, [qu’elles sont] irrégulières sur le territoire français’ asserted a regional official.³⁷⁴ This argument allowed officials to defend their rejection of Roma slums as a republican imperative.

Officials also used this legal argument to justify evacuations on the basis that all individuals have equal rights and responsibilities. Through this logic, allowing one population to illegally occupy land would mean the French state would effectively be treating one population differently to all others. Sarkozy’s Immigration Minister, Besson, summarised this clearly in a radio interview with Europe 1: ‘ce cap républicain, permettez-moi de le rappeler, il est très simple, deux principes: égalité devant la loi, article premier de la Constitution, respect de la propriété et égalité de tous devant la loi, ça veut dire qu’on n’a pas le droit, impunément, d’occuper des terrains privés ou publics, illicitement.’³⁷⁵ The suggestion was that republican law treats all French residents as equal. The fact that Romanian and Bulgarian migrants’ right to remain in France was restricted by EU transitional measures until 1 January 2014 undermined this claim. Yet since then Romanians and Bulgarians fall under the same *droit commun* as French citizens, which meant they were subject to equal treatment under French law.

Another justification officials used to evacuate slums was security. The rationale was that slums brought crime into French neighbourhoods, compromising the safety of French citizens. In a speech to French Prefects, Conservative Interior Minister Hortefeux declared ‘notre mission c’est de protéger les Français de l’insécurité...vous le savez comme moi, ces campements sont, trop souvent, des foyers de délinquance.’³⁷⁶ Hortefeux used the terms ‘Roms’ and ‘Roumains’ interchangeably throughout the speech to quantify the link between Roma camps and delinquency: ‘j’observe que, sur l’année 2009, les actes de délinquance commis par des individus de nationalité roumaine ont augmenté de +138% pour la seule ville de Paris. Ils ont encore augmenté de 51% sur les six premiers

³⁷³ George Pau-Langevin, Ministre de la réussite éducative, *Déclaration sur l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (27 September 2013).

³⁷⁴ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (3 June 2015).

³⁷⁵ Eric Besson, Ministre de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire, *Radio Interview with Europe 1* (15 September 2010).

³⁷⁶ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Intervention lors de la réunion des préfets* (8 July 2010).

mois de l'année 2010 à Paris. En dix-huit mois, cela représente donc une augmentation de +259%.³⁷⁷ Hortefeux's use of statistics on Romanian nationals to prove a point about the ethnic Roma community is misguided, but it revealed the Minister's prejudice towards Romanians in France.

Regional and local officials also employed the security argument to frame Roma they considered to be living in slums as outside the heteronormative norms of French society. One regional official used the same words as Hortefeux, claiming 'les bidonvilles sont quand meme des foyers de délinquance'.³⁷⁸ A local official also told me 'il y avait des phénomènes de vol, de mendicité qui choquait la population, où les mamans faisaient la manche dans le métro, avec des petits bébés. Ce n'est pas possible au 21ème siècle qu'on fasse ça.'³⁷⁹ The focus on *mendicité* is significant because since September 2011, arresting a foreigner, including a EU citizen, for *mendicité aggressive* became grounds for deportation to their country of origin. Consequently, *mendicité aggressive* became one of the ways French officials could expel so-called Roma from France. The French government's hard-line stance on security projected a public message: the French state rejected all crime, regardless of how petty. As committing a crime was a violation of French law, and the rule of law was one of the foundations upon which the French Republic was built, the French state could argue that illegal activities betrayed the republican tradition on which the French state was built. Another regional official echoed this argument : 'la République est incapable d'accepter des zones de non-droit. Si vous regardez des camps de Roms, ils créent un camp fermé à l'intérieur duquel il y a des règles précises. Des règles ne sont pas celles de la République, donc on a quelque chose qui va à l'encontre de la République et des valeurs républicaines.'³⁸⁰ The official employed security-based ideas to protect the republican idea of a neutral public sphere. However, the official's suggestion that the norms inside 'Roma' slums were different from the norms of French society revealed a heteronormative bias in the official's interpretation of neutrality.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris (4 December 2014).

³⁷⁹ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie du 18e Arrondissement, Paris (2 December 2014).

³⁸⁰ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

In contrast to arguments about protecting the public sphere, officials also justified slum evacuations as rescuing the Roma from their own plight. These arguments were not mutually exclusive. The same official could adopt a hard-line or humanitarian position depending on the circumstance. Indeed, the Hollande government overtly highlighted this ‘double objectif de fermeté en matière de sécurité et d’humanité dans la prise en charge des personnes’ in their 26 August 2012 circular on illegal camps.³⁸¹ The humanitarian position prioritised the wellbeing of Roma migrants and presented slums as dangerous domains unfit for human habitation. This was based on two principal issues: public health and exploitation.

Regional and national officials also cited public health concerns as grounds for evacuating Roma slums during interview discussions. One regional official asserted ‘on avait affaire à des gens qui vivent dans des conditions extrêmement insalubres, avec des dangers de toutes natures pour les enfants, pour tous les occupants, les personnes âgées, enfin tout. De toutes manières, ce n’est pas une solution de laisser les campements en l’état.’³⁸² A regional political appointee also affirmed ‘j’allais régulièrement visiter les camps et vous aviez la nuit des gros rats qui se baladaient. Il y a des risques de santé publique, il y a des petits enfants qui vivent là dans ces conditions. C’est insupportable.’³⁸³ These comments shed light on the experience of officials on the ground, especially given the role Prefects and their staff played in leading the implementation of slum evacuations. In their communications, regional officials framed the unhygienic condition of slums as a practical problem.

National officials framed public health as a moral problem for French society. According to Sarkozy’s Interior Minister Hortefeux noted in August 2010 ‘au respect des lois s’ajoute un devoir moral: combattre l’insalubrité et la misère dans lesquelles ces campements illicites ont condamné ces populations entières.’³⁸⁴ Over two years latter, a press release on ‘campements illicites’ from socialist Interior Minister Valls stated ‘Les conditions de vie peuvent y être particulièrement dangereuses et représenter une menace

³⁸¹ Ministère de l’éducation nationale, et al., *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

³⁸² Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris (4 December 2014).

³⁸³ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

³⁸⁴ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Conférence de presse sur la mise en oeuvre des mesures d’évacuation des campements illicites* (30 August 2010).

pour la sécurité et la santé, notamment des plus jeunes.³⁸⁵ The Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme expanded on this argument: 'Placées en situation de grande précarité, ces populations sont contraintes à survivre dans des lieux inadéquats et indignes, tels que des bidonvilles ou des squats insalubres, voire dans la rue, sans accès à l'eau ou à l'électricité, avec des conséquences néfastes pour leur santé et leur sécurité.'³⁸⁶ Thus, from a national point of view, the health problems associated with Roma slums were unacceptable in modern France, which was another way of positioning the Roma as outside the norms of French society.

The second issue officials used to substantiate humanitarian arguments for the evacuation of Roma slums was exploitation. Former conservative Secretary for European Affairs Lellouche raised this issue during a parliamentary question session in 2013:

Depuis l'entrée de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie dans l'Union européenne en 2007, la France connaît une immigration de population rom qui prend des proportions proprement intolérables d'abord pour ces personnes elles-mêmes...ces familles et, souvent, les enfants sont pris en main par des groupes mafieux qui gagnent des centaines de millions d'euros en exploitant ces enfants qui sont prostitués dans les gares parisiennes, qui volent devant les distributeurs de billets et qui détournent les Français qui n'en peuvent plus, et, bien sûr, nos touristes.³⁸⁷

In his response Minister Valls, conceded 'là vous avez raison, il y a une exploitation des êtres humains qui est tout à fait insupportable.'³⁸⁸ This echoed a speech by his predecessor Ayrault who declared 'le gouvernement entend également renforcer la lutte contre les filières d'exploitation de la misère et des personnes (prostitution, mendicité, utilisation d'enfants, etc.), dont sont notamment victimes les mineurs.'³⁸⁹ The emphasis on minors has republican significance. If minors were subject to exploitation, they were unlikely to attend school. As a local official complained 'ces populations doivent aussi comprendre qu'il y a des règles en France, notamment on est très triste de voir que les enfants qui sont dans ces campements ne vont pas à l'école.'³⁹⁰ Since the Jules Ferry laws of 1881 and 1882, compulsory education has been a key component of republican

³⁸⁵ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Communiqué de presse: rapport d'Amnesty International*, Paris (29 November 2012).

³⁸⁶ Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme, *Avis sur le respect des droits fondamentaux des populations vivant en bidonvilles* (20 November 2014).

³⁸⁷ Pierre Lellouche, Député, *Question à Manuel Valls, Séance de questions d'actualité au Gouvernement*, Assemblée nationale, Paris (15 May 2013).

³⁸⁸ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Réponse à Pierre Lellouche, Député, Séance de questions d'actualité au Gouvernement*, Assemblée nationale, Paris (15 May 2013).

³⁸⁹ Jean Marc Ayrault, Premier Ministre, *Communiqué des services* (22 August 2012).

³⁹⁰ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie du 18e Arrondissement, Paris (2 December 2014).

integration. Exploiting minors denied them the right to a republican education and consequently hindered their pathway to integration into French society. The ways in which the French state used the idea of integration to communicate and justify policies to assimilate Roma into French society is the subject of chapter six. But it is nonetheless important to note that French officials could position the exploitation of children as a barrier to integration. Following this logic, officials could justify evacuating slums not only because they protected Roma children from exploitation, but also because evacuations increased the likelihood their integration into French society. French officials rationalised policies of clearing slums as a necessary step in achieving republican integration.

Neutralising the Public Sphere

The French government's rhetorical rejection of Roma slums materialised into a national evacuation policy. 'Il faut que les campements illicites soient systématiquement évacués' ordered the conservative President Sarkozy in July 2010.³⁹¹ This policy continued under the Socialists with Interior Minister Valls as its strongest advocate. On national radio in September 2013, Valls insisted, 'Il faut démanteler tous les campements'.³⁹² Although both Sarkozy and Valls faced criticism from humanitarian advocates inside and outside their parties, the evacuation of Roma camps remained firmly on the agenda of both administrations. Reduced to its simplest form, this national evacuation policy consisted of evicting Roma residents and clearing their slums. Through this policy, officials aimed to restore an allegedly 'neutral' public sphere, free of ethnic and religious communities. This section examines discourses on the evacuation policy in detail. First, it studies the procedures outlined in official documents and legislation, arguing that despite a shift in emphasis towards a humanitarian approach, new measures only affected actions before and after evacuations, not the act of evacuation itself. Second, it explores the challenges officials cited regarding implementing evacuations, revealing the French state's deployment of the concept of a neutral public sphere applied more rigorously to national political rhetoric and policy documents than local government discourse.

³⁹¹ Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, *Communiqué sur la situation des gens du voyage et des Roms en France*, Paris (28 July 2010).

³⁹² Manuel Valls, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Radio Interview à RMC* (25 September 2013).

On 26 August 2012, the Hollande government issued Prefects with a new circular specifying ‘le cadre de l’action de l’Etat dans le cas d’évacuations de campements illicites’.³⁹³ Contrary to this specification, the document did not refer to the act of evacuating illegal camps itself. Instead, it presented new measures governing state actions before and after evacuations ‘relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites’.³⁹⁴ These new measures reflected a shift towards a more humanitarian approach, and likely allowed regional actors, and judges, to make more informed decisions, but they did not alter the evacuation procedure. Ironically, this new circular added new measures but did not reform existing ones. It is thus not surprising that the Hollande government’s policy rested upon principles similar to that of its predecessor.

A policy report on the ‘application de circulaire interministérielle du 26 août 2012’ indicated the following principles:

- Le droit de propriété, qui découle de normes internes (article 17 de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789 et jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel) et européennes (article 1er du 1^{er} protocole additionnel à la CEDH, article 17 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne);
- Les impératifs d’ordre public, qui commandent à l’autorité publique d’assurer, dans le respect des principes fondateurs de la République, la préservation de la sécurité des personnes et des biens;
- La bonne utilisation du domaine public. Le domaine public constitue un outil permettant aux personnes publiques de s’acquitter des missions qui leur incombent, et notamment l’exécution des missions de service public. Il peut également être affecté à l’usage direct du public. L’occupation sans titre de biens appartenant au domaine public est susceptible de compromettre ces fonctions essentielles du domaine public.³⁹⁵

The Sarkozy government outlined a similar list of principles on 24 June 2010 in a circular on the ‘Lutte contre les campements illicites’:

³⁹³ Ministère de l’éducation nationale, Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé, Ministère de l’égalité des territoires et du logement, Ministère de l’intérieur, and Ministère du travail, de l’emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social, *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ Dihal, *Vade-mecum à l’usage des correspondant ‘points de contact départementaux’ de la mission relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (version 24 July 2014).

Le Gouvernement entend lutter contre le développement de campements illicites, notamment dans les grandes agglomérations. Ces campements, en effet, font naître une triple préoccupation : ils portent atteinte au droit de propriété ; les conditions de vie de leurs occupants sont inacceptables sur le plan de la sécurité et de la salubrité, et incompatibles avec tout projet crédible d'intégration ; enfin, ces campements peuvent abriter des activités délictueuses.³⁹⁶

In their respective discourses, both administrations emphasised the right to property, the preservation of security and the wellbeing of camp residents. However, the Hollande government also drew attention to 'la bonne utilisation du domaine public'. This added a normative dimension to the government's policy because it suggested that in the eyes of the state the installation of illegal camps did not qualify as a satisfactory use of public land. Instead, it implied that camps were ethnic ghettos, compromising the function of the 'domaine public'. The Sarkozy government hinted at this argument insofar as it claimed illegal camps were 'incompatible avec tout projet crédible d'intégration', but the Hollande government's overt reference to the 'domaine public' cemented the idea of an ethnically neutral public sphere in official policy documents.

Although each administration employed slightly different language, both followed the same legal procedure of evacuating illegal Roma camps. The key consistency was that all evacuations required a court order. Sarkozy attempted to bypass this step in July 2010 by proposing a legislative amendment to grant Prefects unrestricted authority to clear camps that they deemed unsafe or insalubrious, but it was not adopted.³⁹⁷ The legal procedure for evicting Roma thus remained unchanged. The specific course of legal action depended on three factors: whether the property was publicly or privately owned, the type of property occupied, and whether the plaintiff launched civil or criminal proceedings.

If a property was publicly owned and classed as a 'domaine public', the state or a municipality could file a case in the administrative court under article L.531-3 of the *code de justice administrative*.³⁹⁸ This is because the competence of French courts is based on the status of the parties involved. Legal conflicts between public persons, and between public and private persons occupying public land is reserved for administrative courts. If

³⁹⁶ Ministère de l'intérieur, *Circulaire sur la lutte contre les campements illicites* (24 June 2010), IOC/K/1016329/J.

³⁹⁷ Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, *Communiqué sur la situation des gens du voyage et des Roms en France* (28 July 2010).

³⁹⁸ See case law TA Melun, 13 July 2011, 1104798/10 for an example of an illegal camp eviction from public property.

a property was privately owned, the landlord could file a case to evict illegal occupants in the civil court under articles L.221-6, R.221-5 or R.221-41 of the *code de l'organisation judiciaire*.

In cases regarding a ‘domaine privée’, the type of property determined the level of civil court. The Tribunal d’Instance was responsible for matters concerning the illegal occupation of buildings and residential housing, whereas the Tribunal de Grande Instance dealt with conflicts on the occupation of land (*terrain*). Cases regarding the occupation of ‘la voirie routière’ (e.g. car parks) were referred to the Tribunal de Grande Instance. If a judge granted an order, it normally included a two-month delay until the eviction could take place as specified under article L.412-1 of the *code des procédures civiles d’exécution*. However, if a judge did not explicitly state that a delay would occur or provide the date of evacuation, as was often the case for *résidences de type bidonville*, an eviction could proceed immediately.

Additionally, both public and private landlords could file a complaint (*plainte avec constitution de partie civile*) against illegal occupants to the police or Procureur de la République under article 322-4-1 of the *code penal*. For Prefects, the advantages of treating the illegal occupation of land as a criminal matter was that it permitted urgent, expedited evictions in the event of a security or health risk. It also carried a penalty of six months imprisonment and a fine of €3750. This was particularly problematic for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals living in illegal camps because a criminal status could lead to their deportation under EU law.

While both the Hollande and Sarkozy administrations used the criminal route of action, the latter overtly encouraged it in their policy documents:

...cette incrimination pénale présente pourtant plusieurs avantages: un intérêt dissuasif, par la perspective de voir sanctionné ce type de comportement par des peines d’amende et d’emprisonnement; un intérêt administratif: en vue de la saisine de l’autorité judiciaire, il est loisible de procéder aux contrôles d’identité des occupants.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁹ Ministère de l’intérieur, *Circulaire sur la lutte contre les campements illicites* (24 June 2010), IOC/K/1016329/J.

The ‘intérêt administratif’ was a nod to the Sarkozy government’s immigration quotas, which included Bulgarian and Romanian migrants. Although the Hollande government tried to differentiate itself from its predecessor’s hard-line stance on immigration, the 26 August 2012 circular reminded Prefects of the criminal route of prosecution: ‘Il est rappelé au préalable que, dans certains cas, la situation au regard de la sécurité des personnes, y compris d’un point de vue sanitaire, peut imposer une action immédiate.’⁴⁰⁰ This suggested that the new *anticipation* and *accompagnement* measures masked the continuation of an existing evacuation policy. Both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments thus drew upon the same assortment of legal tools to evacuate Roma camps. As a national adviser noted, ‘la loi ne change pas mais la jurisprudence évolue’.⁴⁰¹

Regardless of the type of legal procedure adopted, Prefects held a powerful position in the implementation of eviction policies. If the state owned the occupied property, the Prefect was responsible for launching legal proceedings. If a municipality owned the property, the Prefect played a supporting role. If the property was privately owned, the Prefect acted as a hustler, placing pressure on private landlords to take illegal occupants to court. Furthermore, once an eviction order was granted, Prefects decided when exactly to evacuate an illegal camp (if the judge had not specified a date). This meant that Prefects could time the evacuation around a specific event, such as an election to reduce conflict. Prefects could also choose how to evacuate a camp. For example, Prefects could consider how much warning to give residents before an eviction or whether to evacuate a camp incrementally or all at once. Following the 26 August 2012 circular, Prefects were also charged with managing the new *anticipation* and *accompagnement* measures. This gave Prefects the responsibility to select private contractors to conduct *diagnostics sociaux* and consider alternative housing options, which afforded considerable scope for ingenuity. One Prefect told me that he found alternative housing for Roma residents in a neighbouring department through a private contractor but did not inform the Prefect of that department until the day of evacuation.⁴⁰² His strategy, which ultimately succeeded, was to defer resistance to the plan until it was too late to undo.

⁴⁰⁰ Ministère de l’éducation nationale, et. al., *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

⁴⁰¹ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

⁴⁰² Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

These functions reveal the authority of Prefects but also the power of politics over law in the French system. The impetus for evacuations relied considerably on the will of Prefects, especially insofar as they could grant or reject local politicians' requests for evacuation. Both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments recognised this as a potential opportunity to increase political power. Each attempted to boost the mandate of Prefects in different ways. The Sarkozy government tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to amend legislation requiring Prefects to obtain a court order before evacuating an illegal camp. The Hollande government left the law untouched but institutionalised the pivotal role of Prefects in the 26 August 2012 circular: 'En premier lieu le respect des décisions de justice ne saurait être mis en question. Il revient au préfet d'exécuter celles-ci, lorsqu'il est ordonné par le juge qu'il soit mis fin, au besoin avec le concours de la force publique, aux occupations illicites de terrains.'⁴⁰³ The document did not specify the terms of execution, leaving much interpretation up to the Prefect. This is interesting because Prefects are appointed rather than democratically elected officials, rarely in the public eye. Prefects could therefore execute difficult decisions without shouldering the political cost. Conversely, some Prefects lamented their recently ratified position because it allowed municipalities to eschew responsibility. Nevertheless, the flexibility of the language in the 26 August 2012 circular meant that the national policy of evacuating illegal Roma camps was far from uniform.

Challenges in Practice

Although the Hollande government pledged to preserve 'la bonne utilisation du domaine public' in their policy documents, officials said that implementing the policy posed significant challenges in practice.⁴⁰⁴ As a national government official stated, 'la politique [outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular] ne fonctionne pas. Ce n'est pas suivi à la lettre. Il faut être pragmatique'.⁴⁰⁵ In practice, and under certain circumstances, officials adopted pragmatic workarounds that did not necessarily reflect the republican ideas their

⁴⁰³ Ministère de l'éducation nationale, Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé, Ministère de l'égalité des territoires et du logement, Ministère de l'intérieur, and Ministère du travail, de l'emploi, de la formation professionnelle et du dialogue social, *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

⁴⁰⁴ Dihal, *Vade-mecum à l'usage des correspondant 'points de contact départementaux' de la mission relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (version 24 July 2014).

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

government had used to justify the policies in the first place. The idea of a *laïque* and ethnically neutral public sphere was no exception. The idea of a neutral public sphere was therefore an ideal that officials formulating policies used to communicate and justify policy proposals, while officials implementing policies on the ground did not deploy the idea to the same degree of rigour. Three key challenges emerged from their experience.

First, evacuating illegal Roma camps was costly. A senior national official asserted ‘j’ai fait des évaluations sur le coût d’une évacuation qui étaient évaluées entre 200,000 et 300,000 Euros. On en a fait plusieurs centaines depuis l’arrivée de la Gauche au pouvoir, c’était trois fois plus que sous la période de Sarkozy.’⁴⁰⁶ This cost included the ‘mobilisation des forces de police, démolition, remise en état’ and cleaning expenses.⁴⁰⁷ It did not cover the *anticipation* and *accompagnement* measures. The principal recipients of these sums were private contractors, social workers and social housing associations. In some cases, the high price of evacuations led to disputes between municipalities and the national government over who would pay. ‘Quand il y a des endroits qui sont dans des situations d’insalubrité forte, nous permettons de retrouver un terrain qui fonctionne normalement. C’est en général le propriétaire qui prend cela à sa charge, mais pas toujours, et c’est assez coûteux’ noted a regional official.⁴⁰⁸

As a consequence, officials sometimes deferred evacuations, occasionally even leaving slums in place. As one municipal advisor stated:

On a choisi de ne pas demander l’expulsion d’un campement illicite parce qu’il y a 100 personnes qui sont là à un moment. Si on les expulse, ça va être très coûteux et désagréable pour tout le monde, et en plus on va se retrouver avec 100 personnes qui vont se répandre dans la ville et reconstituer un squat ailleurs.⁴⁰⁹

According to this official, evacuating slums was too expensive to justify. The cost of evacuations also raised questions about the legitimacy of spending public money on non-French citizens. This was a problem for Dihal, the national government body responsible for coordinating and managing the implementation of policies affecting ‘campements

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

⁴⁰⁷ Haute Comité pour le Logement des Personnes Défavorisées, *Avis sur la situation des populations des campements en France Métropolitain* (July 2014).

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

⁴⁰⁹ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015).

illicites’, because it had a modest budget compared to most other national agencies. In July 2014 a report from la Haute Comité pour le Logement des Personnes Défavorisées underscored this point, arguing ‘Il faut également souligner que la Dihal ne dispose pas des moyens humains et budgétaires suffisants pour mener à bien sa mission’.⁴¹⁰ The French government was spending too much money to justify, yet at the same time it was not spending enough to achieve even a small portion of its objectives.

Linked to the problem of cost, officials on the ground who worked on implementing evacuation policies encountered a new problem of what to do with the evacuated residents afterwards. Finding alternative housing was not straightforward. In the immediate aftermath of an evacuation, the state provided evicted residents with hotel rooms. This was only temporary, lasting for a couple of nights, and it was expensive. A regional official complained that in one department ‘il y a 7500 personnes qui sont mises à l’hôtel toutes les nuits...le prix d’une chambre est entre 50 et 100 Euros par nuit’.⁴¹¹ The Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’Homme claimed that putting evicted residents in hotels also created social problems because ‘il est souvent proposé de séparer les familles en hébergeant prioritairement les femmes et les enfants.’⁴¹² In general slum residents could not afford to pay for rent-controlled housing (*logement*) such as Habitation à Loyer Modéré (HLM). Even if they could, there were large waiting lists that did not prioritise evicted camp residents over other applicants already in the queue. In June 2015, a local official from the *region Parisienne* said the region had a waiting list of over 100,000 people.⁴¹³ The remaining option was fully subsidised social housing (*hébergement*) that included a comprehensive package of *accompagnement*. The aim was to equip residents with the necessary skills for autonomous life in France, that is a life that was not dependent on state support. Yet, as the subsequent chapters expose, *hébergement* was not always available or appropriately set up for extended families, highlighting the official’s bias towards heteronormative values. More fundamentally, beneficiaries were subjected to a rigid selection procedure, which only accepted a very small minority.

⁴¹⁰ Haute Comité pour le Logement des Personnes Défavorisées, *Avis sur la situation des populations des campements en France Métropolitain* (July 2014).

⁴¹¹ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

⁴¹² Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’Homme, *Avis sur le respect des droits fondamentaux des populations vivant en bidonvilles* (20 November 2014).

⁴¹³ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Paris, Paris (1 June 2015).

These difficulties meant that some evacuations proceeded without alternative housing solutions, contrary to the instructions of the 26 August 2012 circular. For example, ‘L’évacuation le 21 octobre 2014 du bidonville dit des Coquetiers, à Bobigny...s'est fait dans une précipitation qui a rendu inopérante les propositions de relogement faites à certaines familles et a laissé d'autres sans solution, au mépris du caractère inconditionnel du droit à l'hébergement.’⁴¹⁴ Evacuation policies therefore took precedence over integration measures. This also included existing integration projects, such as the enrolment of children from illegal camps in local schools. Evacuations, during the school term, could disrupt the learning progress of Roma children. La Haute Comité pour le Logement des Personnes Défavorisées maintained that following an evacuation ‘[L]es lieux d'accueil peuvent être situés loin des sites de campements et des lieux de scolarisations des enfants.’⁴¹⁵ The fact that evacuations took priority over education exposed a tension between two core French republican principles: the preservation of a *laïque* and ethnically neutral public sphere and the integration of foreigners into French society. Prefects were forced to weigh up these two principles each time a judge granted an evacuation order, juggling competing demands from mayors and discontented constituents with a responsibility to protect the wellbeing of illegal camp residents inside their jurisdiction.

Officials on the ground also complained that evacuating one slum did not prevent another from developing. This was partially because the lack of alternative housing left some residents stranded, but also because other residents preempted government action by vacating the premises before an evacuation took place. The crux of the problem for French officials was that over the course of time the size of illegal Roma camps diminished but the total number of people living in such camps throughout France remained roughly the same. As a national official exclaimed, ‘aujourd’hui, on n’a malheureusement, en termes de chiffres et à travers ce recensement, pas d’évolution démographique, j’entends à la baisse, de personnes vivant en campements illicites et bidonvilles. On a vraiment une stagnation.’⁴¹⁶ This implied that evacuations pushed

⁴¹⁴ Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’Homme, Avis sur le respect des droits fondamentaux des populations vivant en bidonvilles (20 November 2014).

⁴¹⁵ Haute Comité pour le Logement des Personnes Défavorisées, *Avis sur la situation des populations des campements en France Métropolitain* (July 2014).

⁴¹⁶ Interview with National Official 2, Dihal, Paris (9 December 2014).

residents from one jurisdiction to another. In Seine-Saint-Denis, for example, the population of illegal camp residents dropped by over a third within two years. A regional official recounted that ‘en juin 2013 nous avons à peu près 8000 personnes recensées dans des campements illicites dont la très grande majorité étaient issues de la population Rom. Aujourd’hui [en juin 2015] on est passés à moins de 2500.’⁴¹⁷ Although Seine-Saint-Denis no longer had to contend with France’s largest proportion of illegal camps, statistics suggested that the camps had reconfigured elsewhere, albeit not necessarily with the same residents.

However the discourse of French officials suggested that the fragmentation of slums had administrative advantages. A joint ministerial report⁴¹⁸ contended ‘une taille inférieure à cent personnes permet d’installer suffisamment en amont le travail de diagnostic demandé par la circulaire du 26 août 2012 et de prévoir des mesures relais qui facilitent, voire évitent l’évacuation (accord avec les collectivités pour une installation temporaire sur un autre terrain, prise en charge des enfants et des personnes vulnérables, accès aux soins et à l’école...).’⁴¹⁹ The fact that illegal camps had dispersed across metropolitan France meant the costs associated with evacuation, *anticipation* and *accompagnement* measures were more evenly spread across départements and thus better aligned with the allocation of government resources. Yet, fragmentation did not dissolve illegal Roma camps altogether. Instead, it distributed camps into smaller clusters. Thus, in practice the French government’s national policy of evacuation was more of an exercise in reorganising slums rather than a means of removing slums from the public sphere.

Removing the Public Threat from France

As well as attempts to clear the public sphere through evacuations, the Sarkozy and Hollande governments sought to remove certain residents from France altogether. Responding to a question about France’s *bidonvilles* on national television the former Interior Minister to Sarkozy, Claude Guéant argued ‘il n’y a qu’une seule solution:

⁴¹⁷ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

⁴¹⁸ It is interesting to note that all ministries of the seven signatories of the 26 August 2012 circular contributed to this report except one. The Ministry of Housing, led by Cécile Duflot, was conspicuously absent, which might have been due to tensions with the then Interior Minister Manuel Valls.

⁴¹⁹ Ministère de l’Intérieur, et. al., *Évaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

dissuader la venue de ces personnes et les renvoyer chez elles.’⁴²⁰ From this perspective, removing the Roma from France was the ultimate way of clearing slums from the public sphere. Indeed, it was the issue of collective deportation that catalysed the public dispute between European Commissioner Viviane Reding and President Sarkozy in 2010. However, collective deportation was not the only way French officials could remove the Roma from France. French and EU law enabled the expulsion of individuals from other EU member states based on criteria with which so-called Roma migrants often conformed. In addition, French officials introduced policy measures to incentivise exit, encouraging migrants to abandon their projects in France and return to their countries of origin. These measures offered different means to the same end. This section examines how French officials used strategies of coercion and inducement to remove the Roma from France.

Coercion and Deportations

For the Sarkozy government, evacuating camps was an opportunity to deport illegal migrants. The 24 June 2010 circular on the ‘lutte contre les campements illicites’ instructed Prefects, to ‘prendre, chaque fois que cela vous paraît pertinent, des mesures d’éloignement des occupants des campements illicites, lorsque ceux-ci n’ont pas la nationalité française et qu’ils se trouvent en situation irrégulière sur notre territoire.’⁴²¹ Administratively, this measure allowed officials to include deportations of illegal camp residents in the government’s immigration quotas, which comprised both EU and non-EU citizens. Politically, it gave ministers and other elected officials the chance to instrumentalise the Roma question in their speeches and public addresses as a way of pandering to the far-right. On 30 August 2010, Interior Minister Hortefeux reported that ‘977 Roms présents sur notre territoire ont été raccompagnés dans leur pays d’origine, essentiellement en Roumanie, sous la responsabilité du ministre de l’immigration, Eric Besson’.⁴²² He added ‘pour une minorité de ces départs – 151 retours forcés – des procédures ont été diligentées, sous le contrôle du juge, dans le cadre de la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière... La France poursuit, ainsi, ses efforts de maîtrise des flux

⁴²⁰ Claude Guéant, Ancien Ministre de l’intérieur, *Télévision Interview à Canal Plus* (13 September 2012).

⁴²¹ Ministère de l’intérieur, *Circulaire sur la lutte contre les campements illicites* (24 June 2010), IOC/K/1016329/J.

⁴²² Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Conférence de presse sur la mise en oeuvre des mesures d’évacuation des campements illicites* (30 August 2010).

migratoires.⁴²³ By citing the deportation of Roma as proof of effective law enforcement, Hortefeux framed ethnic communities as a threat to his heteronormative conceptualisation of a ‘neutral’ public sphere.

The association of Roma with the disruption of *l’ordre public* was a prominent theme in public debate. In a radio interview on 29 July 2010, Hortefeux claimed ‘quand un Rom sera reconduit chez lui, il y aura – dans les cas naturellement où il est en situation illégale, qu’il y a trouble à l’ordre public et ainsi de suite – il y aura une prise d’empreintes digitales.’⁴²⁴ Although the minister sought to dispel fears about France’s porous borders, his comment implied that ethnicity posed a threat to public order rather than illegal behaviour. He also maintained that ‘je dis simplement pour les Roms, et ceux qui sont en situation illégale, ceux qui portent atteinte à l’ordre public: ils seront reconduits en Roumanie et Bulgarie’.⁴²⁵ This exposed the assumption that Roma were necessarily Romanian or Bulgarian citizens. Indeed, illegal camp residents may have been Romanian or Bulgarian nationals but without ethnic statistics, Hortefeux’s argument appeared conjectural. The comment thus revealed more about the prejudice and opportunism of the minister than the population to which he referred.

The term *l’ordre public* had a legal significance as well. Under article L 511-1 of the code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA), the act of being a ‘menace à l’ordre public’ was grounds for an ‘arrêté de reconduite à la frontière’, more commonly known as an ‘obligation de quitter la France’ (OQTF). Exactly what constituted a ‘menace à l’ordre public’ was unclear. Nor was it the only foundation for an OQTF. On 16 June 2011, the French Senate and National Assembly passed a new law on immigration, integration and nationality, which addressed these two points.⁴²⁶ First, it defined a ‘menace à l’ordre public’ as ‘une menace réelle, actuelle et suffisamment grave pour un intérêt fondamental de la société française’.⁴²⁷ The definition suggested that only serious criminal acts could be regarded as a ‘menace à l’ordre public’, but the distinction

⁴²³ Ibid

⁴²⁴ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l’intérieur, Radio Interview with RTL (29 July 2010).

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Loi n° 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 relative à l’immigration, à l’intégration et à la nationalité, IOCK1003689L.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

between petty and serious crime remained ambiguous. Second, the new law combined the different grounds for deporting EU citizens under article 39. It stated three main reasons:

1. Qu'il ne justifie plus d'aucun droit au séjour tel que prévu par les articles L. 121-1, L. 121-3 ou L. 121-4-1;
2. Ou que son séjour est constitutif d'un abus de droit. Constitue un abus de droit le fait de renouveler des séjours de moins de trois mois dans le but de se maintenir sur le territoire alors que les conditions requises pour un séjour d'une durée supérieure à trois mois ne sont pas remplies. Constitue également un abus de droit le séjour en France dans le but essentiel de bénéficier du système d'assistance sociale;
3. Ou que, pendant la période de trois mois à compter de son entrée en France, son comportement personnel constitue une menace réelle, actuelle et suffisamment grave pour un intérêt fondamental de la société française.⁴²⁸

The third reason presented the extended definition of 'menace à l'ordre public', but the second was also relevant to the case of the Roma because it indicated that poverty could be grounds for deportation. Under this logic, officials could deport slum inhabitants whom they considered an unreasonable burden on the French welfare system. In theory, this appeared to enable deportations of all inhabitants living under the poverty line. Yet, in practice this was not the case. Although slum residents were destitute, they often relied on support from informal avenues instead of government assistance, especially before an evacuation took place. Following an evacuation, only a select few received state support, which as the next chapter discusses was not unconditional. This meant that the French state could not deport a person for placing strain on the public purse if an official had already decided that the person in question qualified for government support. Despite this issue, a national official ensured me that French officials did issue OQTF to 'Roms' because they lacked the 'moyens suffisants de vivre en France'.⁴²⁹ Thus, this new legislation highlighted how the French government's deportation policies not only discriminated against an ethnic community but also a socio-economic one.

Although the new legislation was in place well before 1 January 2014, the end of transitional restrictions on the free movement of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens did not have a significant impact on the French government's deportation policies. It did however reduce the French government's control over Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in France. For example, Romanians and Bulgarians no longer required work permits and the

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ Interview with National Official 2, SGAE, Paris (7 September 2015).

types of jobs available to them were no longer circumscribed by the state. In fact, the Hollande government pre-emptively expanded the list of jobs on 22 August 2012, which reflected their shift towards a more humanitarian approach to the Roma.

In spite of this change in tone, the Hollande government continued to deport these so-called Roma using the same legislation as its predecessor. Yet, the emphasis on deportations in public discourses and policy documents diminished. This was in part because the Hollande government opposed EU migrant quotas, which meant that officials no longer used the deportations of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals to reduce their numbers. A national political adviser insisted that ‘il y a un volet de la politique qui a existé et qui n’existe plus, c’est que les citoyens roumains et bulgares ont été utilisés pour gonfler les chiffres matières d’éloignement.’⁴³⁰ A national civil servant confirmed the implementation of this change, stating that ‘depuis l’élection de François Hollande... on ne donne plus, c’est-à-dire le Ministère et la Direction, au Préfet d’objectif quantitatif, chiffré vis-à-vis des reconduites à la frontière. Or les Roms comptaient dans les chiffres de chaque Préfet. C’est assez récent, c’était assez précis et ça permettait au Préfet de faire du chiffre, pour parler vulgairement.’⁴³¹ Furthermore, another national official said that ‘il y a beaucoup d’OQTF mais ils ne sont pas toujours exécutés. Ils ne sont pas appliqués. C’est un moyen de dire qu’on a fait quelque chose.’⁴³² This was a revealing comment because it implied that, at least in the case of the Sarkozy government, deportation was not only a policy instrument to physically remove Roma from France but also a discursive strategy to give an impression of protecting the neutrality of the French public sphere and preserving the heteronormative norms implicit in the term ‘neutrality’.

Inducement and Incentives for Exit

In addition to removing Roma from the Republic, the Sarkozy and Hollande governments provided incentives for Roma to leave of their own accord. First, the Sarkozy government introduced an *aide au retour* policy, which was a financial inducement for Romanian and Bulgarian migrants to return to their countries of origin. This included the provision of administrative and physical support to prepare for the return journey, a reimbursement of

⁴³⁰ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

⁴³¹ Interview with National Official, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Paris (5 December 2014)

⁴³² Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

transport costs and an allowance of 300 euros per adult and 50 euros per child. The measure was outlined in a government circular on 7 December 2006 in anticipation of Romania and Bulgaria's accession to the EU the following month. In an interview with radio station France Inter, Immigration Minister Eric Besson stated 'c'est simple, les personnes signent un accord par lequel elles sont d'accord pour retourner dans leur pays d'origine, moyennant une compensation – l'aide au retour volontaire humanitaire'.⁴³³

Yet, in practice the *aide au retour* was not as simple as the minister claimed. In fact, the policy was perverse: the allowance of 300 euros was far greater than 60-euro average price of a bus ticket from Bucharest to Paris, encouraging migrants to volunteer for repatriation with the knowledge that they could return the next day. Consequently, the *aide au retour* policy became excessively popular and costly. According to the French Immigration Office (OFII) Annual Report, 10,608 people including 8,567 adults and 2,041 children were recipients of this policy. It also specified that 'Les Roumains (7 284 personnes) et les Bulgares (1 429 personnes) sont les principaux bénéficiaires de cette aide. Il s'agit principalement de personnes qui séjournent sur des sites ou campements illicites.'⁴³⁴ Underlying these figures was the assumption that Romanian and Bulgarian residents of illegal camps were Roma. A regional official confirmed this by exclaiming 'en 2011 il y a eu plus de 10,000 Roms qui ont pu bénéficier de l'aide au retour. C'est énorme!'⁴³⁵ A Senate report criticising the *aide au retour* policy added 'La France dépenserait entre 5 millions et 10 millions d'euros par an pour ces rapatriements.'⁴³⁶

Although Interior Minister Hortefeux insisted 'cette aide financière n'est valable qu'une seule fois',⁴³⁷ he failed to consider the logistical difficulties of prohibiting repatriated Romanian and Bulgarian migrants return to France. As the Senate report argued, 'Même si un contrôle est désormais opéré sur la base du fichier OSCAR de manière à s'assurer que les bénéficiaires ne puissent se voir octroyés l'aide plus d'une fois, on constate que ce

⁴³³ Eric Besson, Ministre de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du développement solidaire, *Radio Interview à France Inter* (23 August 2010).

⁴³⁴ Office Français de l'immigration et de l'intégration, *Rapport d'activité pour l'année 2011* (2011), p. 30.

⁴³⁵ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris (4 December 2014).

⁴³⁶ Sénat, *Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires européennes sur l'intégration des Roms* (6 December 2012).

⁴³⁷ Brice Hortefeux, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Conférence de presse sur la mise en oeuvre des mesures d'évacuation des campements illicites* (30 August 2010).

dispositif d'aide au retour a créé un véritable appel d'air.⁴³⁸ The fact that France was in the Schengen zone meant that its multiple land-locked borders were porous and mostly uncontrolled, allowing repatriated Roma to surreptitiously re-enter France. The *aide au retour* policy therefore led to *une migration pendulaire* instead of a one-directional removal of Roma from France.

After the 2012 presidential election, the new Hollande government decided to reform the *aide au retour* policy. Yet, inertia prevailed until 16 January 2013 when Interior Minister Manuel Valls issued an 'arrêté relatif à l'aide au retour'.⁴³⁹ The key change was a reduction in the financial allowance from 300 to 50 euros per adult, and 50 to 30 euros per child. Defending the reform during a press conference, Valls argued 'Je le dis clairement : le problème des campements illicites a été amplifié par les aides au retour pour les ressortissants de l'Union européenne qui ont été attirés en France par cette prime inédite en Europe. Réduire ces aides, démanteler les campements illicites dans le respect de la loi et de la circulaire du 26 août 2012, comme je l'ai fait, c'est commencer à résoudre une partie du problème.'⁴⁴⁰ An adviser to Interior Minister Valls shared this view, claiming that 'on a radicalement diminué cette aide pour que ce soit juste un petit pécule. La somme maintenant n'est plus du tout attractive.'⁴⁴¹ Thus, although the socialists did not withdraw the policy, they removed the impetus behind the 'allers-retours'.

The second incentive was the deepening of bilateral relations between France and Romanian and Bulgarian governments to improve for Roma integration in their countries of origin. On 25 August 2010, Interior Minister Hortefeux, Immigration Minister Besson and Secretary for European Affairs Pierre Lellouche, met with their Romanian counterparts to establish a 'travail de coopération'.⁴⁴² Following the meeting, Lellouche said:

⁴³⁸ Sénat, *Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires européennes sur l'intégration des Roms* (6 December 2012).

⁴³⁹ Ministère de l'intérieur, *Arrêté relatif à l'aide au retour* (16 January 2013), INTV1300844A.

⁴⁴⁰ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Conférence de presse sur la politique d'immigration 2013-2014: bilan et perspectives*, Paris (4 February 2014).

⁴⁴¹ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

⁴⁴² Pierre Lellouche, Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires européennes, 'Comment on ministerial meeting' in 'Roms : début de la réunion entre ministres roumains, Hortefeux et Besson', *Le Parisien* (25 August 2010): <http://www.leparisien.fr/lyon-69000/roms-debut-de-la-reunion-entre-ministres-roumains-hortefeux-et-besson-25-08-2010-1042806.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

J'ai demandé à nos collègues roumains de mettre en place un plan d'urgence et un plan à moyen terme d'intégration de ces populations qui vivent en grande déshérence. Cela commence par la scolarisation, le logement, la santé et bien sûr la formation professionnelle, région par région, avec des objectifs en termes de dates. J'ai dit, au nom de la France que notre pays est prêt à apporter toute l'assistance pour la préparation de ce plan. J'ai demandé à Mme Reding de bien vouloir mobiliser l'ensemble des moyens de la Commission pour que nous ayons, nous les gouvernements concernés, à commencer par le gouvernement roumain, la possibilité de mettre au point ces plans, de sorte que cet argent, qui est là, aille aux populations qui en ont le plus besoin.⁴⁴³

Although the Sarkozy government did not offer financial aid from the French purse, they lobbied the European Commission to allocate funds for Roma integration. The rationale was that by addressing the integration of Roma in their countries of origin, the French state could prevent them from leaving in the first place, thereby reducing the number of 'Roma' slums in France. As Lellouche maintained 'on considère que la solution à long terme est de traiter ce problème à la base, dans les pays d'origine, en se demandant comment les moyens de l'Union peuvent aider ces pays à intégrer ces personnes qui, parfois, comme en Roumanie, représentent 10% de la population.'⁴⁴⁴

The Hollande government took this initiative one step further. On 12 September 2012 the OFII and the Romanian government signed a bilateral agreement dedicated to 'la mise en place et au suivi de 80 projets concrets de réinsertion à destination des personnes rentrées de France'.⁴⁴⁵ Reflecting on the agreement, Interior Minister Valls said 'je me suis rendu en Roumanie pour souligner combien il est important que les populations Roms soient mieux intégrées dans leur pays d'origine.'⁴⁴⁶ Prime Minister Ayrault relayed this sentiment in a speech to the Romanian Prime Minister in Bucharest the following year stating, 'On a trop souvent voulu résumer ces derniers mois les relations entre la France et la Roumanie au problème rom. Bien sûr qu'il y a un problème rom et d'ailleurs vous êtes le premier chef de gouvernement, monsieur le Premier ministre, à l'avoir abordé aussi franchement et avoir dit : "La communauté Rom a vocation à vivre dans son pays et pour

⁴⁴³ Pierre Lellouche, Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires européennes, *Conférence de presse e suite à la réunion de travail à la commission européenne*, Brussels (31 August 2010).

⁴⁴⁴ Pierre Lellouche, Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires européennes, *Déclaration à l'Assemblée Nationale*, Paris (2 October 2010).

⁴⁴⁵ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Communiqué de presse: rapport d'Amnesty International*, Paris (29 November 2012).

⁴⁴⁶ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l'intérieur, *Déclaration au Congrès de l'Union syndicale des magistrats (USM)*, Colmar (19 October 2012).

ça il faut s'en donner les moyens'''⁴⁴⁷ Although the aim of this initiative was to improve the 'home' from which Roma came, it assumed that Roma wanted to return 'home' and that their migration to France was a form of escaping. It also raised questions about how the Romanian government allocated the money and whether it improved the integration of Roma in practice. A sceptic might even argue that donating aid afforded the French government leverage over the Romanian government that they would not have otherwise had. Nevertheless, bilateral initiatives shifted the responsibility of integrating Roma back to the countries of origin in an effort to draw them away from France. The assumption embedded in the discourse of French officials was that Roma were not welcome in France because they threatened the neutrality of the public sphere.

Alongside national incentive policies, municipalities led local projects to promote the inclusion of Roma called 'villes jumelles'. These were distinct from the Hollande government's bilateral co-operation with the Romanian government, sometimes preceding them. Similarly to national bilateral partnerships, the aim of local projects was to 'favouriser la réintégration dans les pays d'origine avec l'aide du pays d'accueil'.⁴⁴⁸ One example, which gathered considerable media attention, was the 'coopération décentralisée' between Le Grand Lyon and Tinca, a village in the north-western department of Bihor, Romania.⁴⁴⁹ In November 2011 the city of Lyon invested 300,000 euros into the socio-economic development of Tinca to help reintegrate 60 Roma families living in Lyon into their hometown. The project aimed to:

- mettre en œuvre un projet d'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations défavorisées et notamment des Roms sur le territoire roumain,
- renforcer la solidarité entre la France et la Roumanie à travers la coopération décentralisée entre collectivités pour favoriser l'inclusion des Roms dans leur pays,
- sensibiliser l'opinion roumaine aux possibilités d'inclusion de cette minorité,
- sensibiliser la population lyonnaise à la situation de ces populations dans leur pays d'origine et lutter ainsi contre les discriminations dont elles sont victimes.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁷ Jean-Marc Ayrault, Premier Ministre, *Déclaration sur les relations bilatérales entre la France et la Roumanie, Bucharest (12 July 2013)*.

⁴⁴⁸ Commission des Affaires Européennes, *Rapport d'information sur l'intégration des populations Rom* (18 September 2013).

⁴⁴⁹ 'Reportage à Tinca, village d'origine des Roms de Lyon', *Le Monde* (10 October 2013):

http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/portfolio/2013/10/10/reportage-a-tinca-village-d-origine-des-roms-de-lyon_3492740_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁴⁵⁰ Grand Lyon, *Siteweb sur Relations internationales Lyon – Tinca*:

<http://www.economie.grandlyon.com/partenariats-internationaux-villes/tinca-19.html> (accessed 20 August 2017).

The fact that the project was localised and tailored for a specific population from a designated village in Romania made it easy to track its results. Not only did it provide electricity to a proportion of the village populated by Roma, but in 2014, the project built a multifunctional centre with basic hygiene services, day care and after school activities. In 2015, it also established an employment-training scheme for young people with the help of the Fondation Abbé Pierre.

Although the local project shared the same goal of encouraging Roma to leave France as national bilateral partnerships, the results indicated a genuine improvement the standard of living of Roma from Tinca. It appeared that *la coopération décentralisée* was a pragmatic, albeit localised, solution to a difficult political problem. As Olivier Brachet, Vice President of Le Grand Lyon in charge of social housing stated, ‘Nous sommes tous partagés entre la révolte de voir les conditions de vie des Roms en France et la réalité. On ne peut pas leur offrir des avantages sociaux qu'on arrive plus à fournir aux Français’.⁴⁵¹ His colleague Hubert Julien-Lafferrière, the Vice President in charge of international cooperation and solidarity added, ‘le problème c’est qu’à Lyon comme à Tinca, les Roms restent une minorité très mal intégrée, voire ghettoïsée, n’ayant accès ni travail ni au minimum vital’.⁴⁵² The reference to Roma ghettos highlighted the official’s framing of the ethnic community as a threat to the neutrality of the French public sphere. His language implied that the population living in slums were Roma, that each slum represented an ethnic cluster of segregated Roma, and their standard of living was both poor and visible to the public eye. This is what some officials referred to as the *phénomène clanique*. It was this type of visibility – of ethnic concentration and poverty – that the official framed as challenging to the neutrality of the French public sphere. But again, it is important to remember that neutrality was not objective; the term had an arguably hetero-normative, classist and crypto-Christian bias. In other words, by framing the Roma as challenging the neutrality of the public sphere, the official essentially positioned the Roma as a threat to heteronormative, classist and crypto-Christian norms.

⁴⁵¹ Olivier Brachet, Vice-président du Grand Lyon en charge de l’habitat, du logement et de la politique de la ville, cited in Alice Turlon, ‘Roms: le Grand Lyon dresse un premier bilan de sa coopération décentralisée’, *Lyon Capitale* (25 September 2012): <http://www.lyoncapitale.fr/Journal/Lyon/Actualite/Actualites/Immigration/Roms-le-Grand-Lyon-dresse-un-premier-bilan-de-sa-cooperation-decentralisee> (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁴⁵² Hubert Julien-Lafferrière, Vice-président du Grand Lyon, délégué à la coopération et à la solidarité internationale, Ibid.

Thus, even at a local level of politics, officials used the republican idea of a neutral public sphere to justify ethnically targeted policies.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated how French officials used the republican idea of a neutral public sphere to communicate and justify evacuation and deportation policies targeting the Roma. Officials were able to exploit the heteronormative bias embedded in the concept of neutrality, and consequently frame ‘Roma’ slums as an unacceptable deviation from these heteronormative values. The chapter also illustrated how the visibility of slums made them a public problem that French officials felt compelled to resolve. This was apparent in the distinction officials drew between slums and squats. Although squats comprised similar populations, who faced similar socio-economic challenges and also illegally occupied property, the French state did not have a policy for evacuating squats nor did officials express strong concerns about squats in their political discourse. In contrast, for the Sarkozy and Hollande governments eradicating slums was a national priority. The French state’s objection to slums was so severe that evacuations tended to take precedence over finding alternative housing, displacing residents and leaving them homeless.

The strategies of coercion and inducement officials used to remove the Roma from France altogether also exemplified the lengths the French state was willing to take to eradicate slums, even though French history suggests that *aide au retour* policies were futile. In the 1970s and 1980s President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing discovered in his efforts to reduce the number of Algerian migrants living in French slums by 500,000 over five years through his own *aide au retour* policy, slum residents were more enticed by a life in France than by financial incentives to leave. Between 1977 and 1981 roughly 60,000 migrants accepted the *aide au retour*, but only 4% of them were Algerian.⁴⁵³ It is puzzling to think that the Sarkozy government believed that reproducing such a policy to draw Romanians and Bulgarians out of France would yield better results. Perhaps it suggests that stereotypes of the Roma were so deeply ingrained in official minds that they

⁴⁵³ Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers, l’aventure d’une politique d’immigration* (1938-1991) (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1991).

failed to recognise the perversion of their policies. And more fundamentally, perhaps it reveals that these stereotypes allowed officials to legitimise deportation and evacuation policies by arguing they would remove an ethnic 'Roma' problem from the French public sphere.

SELECTION: CHOOSING THE ‘WORTHY’ FEW

‘Je ne reprendrai pas la célèbre phrase de Michel Rocard dans laquelle je me retrouve:
“La France ne peut accueillir toute la misère du monde”. Je dis simplement, c’est un
constat lucide.’⁴⁵⁴

Nicolas Sarkozy (30 July 2010)

...

‘La France, comme d’autres pays d’Europe, doit prendre sa part – et nous prenons notre
part – dans l’accueil de cette misère et de ces problèmes-là, mais nous n’avons pas
vocation à accueillir toute la misère du monde.’⁴⁵⁵

Manuel Valls (25 September 2013)

The idea that France has an inherently inclusive immigration system is a great republican myth. Public intellectuals and politicians alike have praised the French Republic for integrating foreigners into a community of citizens.⁴⁵⁶ The case of the Roma in France is no exception. As an adviser to the Hollande government asserted in June 2015 ‘ce qui est républicain, c’est d’abord d’essayer d’intégrer tout le monde, y compris les Roms’.⁴⁵⁷ Yet, even a cursory glance at France’s history of immigration, such as the internment of the *harkis* in the late twentieth century, reveals that in practice the French state considers some individuals as more equal than others.⁴⁵⁸ A logic of selection, rather than inclusion, has characterised the French state’s response to immigration. France was and remains an exclusive nation, the boundaries of which have shifted over time. The question is not so much whether the French state is selective, but whom it selects and on what basis. This chapter examines how the French state used a logic of selection to determine which evicted Roma to support. Focusing on the *anticipation* measures outlined in the Hollande government’s 26 August 2012 circular, it explores how officials justified their assessments of Roma for state support on the grounds that they were individualised assessments of slum residents rather than an exercise in ethnic profiling. Instead of

⁴⁵⁴ Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, *Communiqué sur la situation des gens du voyage et des Roms en France*, Paris (28 July 2010).

⁴⁵⁵ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Télévision Interview à BFMTV* (25 September 2013).

⁴⁵⁶ For a quintessential analysis defending republican integration see: Dominique Schnapper, *La Communauté des Citoyens* (Paris, 1994).

⁴⁵⁷ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Education, Paris (3 June 2015).

⁴⁵⁸ For a study on the French government’s alienation of Harkis see Jeanette E. Miller, ‘A Camp or Foreigners and “Aliens”: The Harkis’ Exile at the Rivesaltes Camp (1962-1964), *French Politics, Culture & Society*, 31(3) (2013), pp. 21-44.

fostering inclusion, these assessments allowed officials to select Roma ‘worthy’ of state support based on the subjective criteria of a *volonté d’intégrer*. As such, this chapter traces how the idea of selection became ingrained in national policy, analyses how the criteria of *volonté d’intégrer* determined which residents were worthy of state support, and asks who was responsible for making these decisions. In doing so, it reveals the extensive role of independent contractors and raises ethical concerns about outsourcing public policy.

A National Policy of Selection

On 26 August 2012, the Hollande government issued a circular ‘relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites.’⁴⁵⁹

Anticipation implied a desire for preparedness but it also highlighted a new consideration for those who stood to be evicted. The Hollande government’s policy was not solely geared towards deporting evicted Roma; it also accepted that some Roma could integrate into French society and offered these select few alternative social housing. This was a marked change from the previous administration. Under Sarkozy, there was no suggestion of integrating Roma in national policy documents or political rhetoric. Discrete *villages d’insertion* existed to assimilate select Roma but these were local initiatives, the first of which were established by communist mayors in the northern suburbs of Paris, known as the red belt. The Hollande government’s anticipation measures were evidence of a new institutionalisation of the idea of administrative selection in a national public policy document. This section dissects the policy of *anticipation* outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular to demonstrate two points. First, although the Hollande government attempted to enforce the selection of Roma by requiring officials to establish *diagnostics* before an evacuation took place, they did not specify precisely what these should entail. This allowed for considerable scope for interpretation in practice, allowing officials to exploit bias about what constituted normal and acceptable behaviour. Second, although *diagnostics* were intended to deliver fair and individualised assessments of slum residents, more often than not they excluded Roma from state-support and sometimes provided evidence for deportations.

⁴⁵⁹ Ministère de l’éducation nationale, et. al., *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

Establishing Diagnostics

The Hollande government's 26 August 2012 circular ordered prefects, France's chief regional officials, to establish a *diagnostic* of illegal camps in advance of an evacuation. It stated:

Vous veillerez à faire établir aussi rapidement que possible un diagnostic de la situation de chacune des familles ou personnes isolées. Il devra être global pour prendre en compte l'ensemble des problématiques (situation administrative, état de santé, logement, emploi, scolarisation,...) et individualisé afin de prendre en compte les spécificités de chacune des familles et de leur projet.⁴⁶⁰

This instruction designated *diagnostics* as the key policy instrument to select Roma for state support, termed in French as *accompagnement*. *Diagnostics* were essentially inventories to take stock of camp inhabitants as well as assessments to evaluate their suitability for *accompagnement*. The use of the word *diagnostic* was significant because it attributed connotations of sickness and disease to illegal camps, and implied that *accompagnement* was its treatment. But *accompagnement* was limited and therefore selective, only accepting some of the Roma living in illegal camps. The purpose of *diagnostics* was thus to help determine which Roma to take. A *diagnostic* of a camp in 2013 given to me by a regional government official stated its objective as a 'détermination des familles susceptibles d'être insérées et suivi individualisé de ces familles'.⁴⁶¹ The implication was that a person needed to be capable of assimilating into French society in order to gain access to *accompagnement*. A government contractor working on a *diagnostic* reiterated this point, claiming that 'ça [le diagnostic] c'est pour être à peu près sûr qu'on sélectionne des gens qui ont une volonté d'intégrer'.⁴⁶² Yet, it was unclear what this 'volonté d'intégrer' was or how it would be measured.


In fact, the Hollande government's 26 August 2012 circular gave no indication of what a *diagnostic* should include. In particular, it did not specify any markers against which eligible Roma could be considered. It was therefore up to government contractors, ranging from independently governed *opérateurs* to charitable *associations*, to decide on

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, 'Diagnostic' appended to *Dossier de demande de subvention pour la mise en oeuvre de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites dans le département des Alpes-Maritimes* (9 April 2013).

⁴⁶² Interview with Government Consultant 1, Adoma, Paris (2 June 2015).

a methodology for the *diagnostic* and set the parameters of evaluation. As contractors often varied between regions and sometimes multiple contractors competed within the same region, there was large scope for variation. A centralised national policy of anticipation did not mean there was a national model of *diagnostic*. For example, a collection of *diagnostics* undertaken by the GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales in May and June 2014 highlighted three *indicateurs d'intégration* of *emploi, langue et scolarité* and displayed the results in a bar graph.⁴⁶³ The values on the graph correspond to the contractor's assessment of how individuals scored in each *indicateur*.



Source: GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales

In contrast, Adoma, another government contractor, used different categories to measure the 'degré d'intégration': 'personnes domiciliées administrativement, enfants scolarisés et personnes bénéficiant d'une couverture médicale', rating these categories by percentage.⁴⁶⁴ For example, the 'taux de domiciliation' in one camp was recorded as 5.47%.⁴⁶⁵ Both contractors highlighted the *scolarisation* of children as an indicator of integration, which suggested that they regarded *l'école républicain* as the melting pot within which children could assimilate. However, while GIP emphasised employment and language skills, Adoma focused on domiciliation and registration in the French medical system. This divergence revealed that determining a person's 'volonté d'intégration' was a highly subjective process, which placed great responsibility on the

⁴⁶³ GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales, *Opération de diagnostics sociaux mis en oeuvre par le GIP Habitat et interventions Sociales* (May and June 2014).

⁴⁶⁴ Adoma, *Mission nationale d'appui à la résorption des bidonvilles, mars 2014 – décembre 2016 : Rapport d'activité 2014* (24 March 2015).

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

contractors undertaking the assessment. Hypothetically, if these two government contractors were to examine the same sample of people using their own method of assessment, it is likely that they would produce considerably different results.⁴⁶⁶

Dihal, the central government agency responsible for overseeing and coordinating measures outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular, recognised this issue. In a report dated 10 December 2013 Dihal provided a checklist of key factors that a *diagnostic* should cover:⁴⁶⁷

Le diagnostic comportera notamment des informations sur les éléments suivants:

Concernant la cellule familiale:

- Composition familiale
- Evaluation du niveau de ressources
- Conditions de vie dans le bidonville (type d'hébergement)
- Accompagnement et suivi social

Concernant chaque individu:

- Parcours de scolarisation et niveau pour chaque enfant (6 à 16 ans)
- Pour les mineurs isolés, leur situation au regard de l'Aide Sociale à l'Enfance
- Emploi, expériences et savoirs professionnels, formation de chaque adulte
- Niveau scolaire, langues parlées, niveau de français
- Date d'installation dans le campement, temps de présence et parcours en France, titre d'identité, droit au séjour
- Santé, couverture médicale

This list provided regional officials with a basic framework for a *diagnostic*, but it did not offer any guidelines as to which elements could be used to determine a person's level of assimilability. On 18 March 2014 Dihal published a report entitled 'Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d'un campement illicite'.⁴⁶⁸ This report was a technical policy document, providing regional officials with a reference guide to help them carry out *diagnostics*. Based on an analysis of 92 different *diagnostics*, the report offered recommendations on how to assess five areas: 'le parcours migratoire', 'le degré de scolarisation et les problèmes spécifiques aux mineurs vivant en campements', 'les

⁴⁶⁶ I should note that I was exceptionally fortunate to access the two examples mentioned above as *diagnostic* reports are classified, tightly-held and scarce. Obtaining additional examples would require more interviews with political officials and contractors, and would depend on the will of these interviewees to share hard copies of these politically sensitive reports with me. This was beyond the scope and resources of my doctoral project.

⁴⁶⁷ Dihal, *Vade-mecum à l'usage des correspondant 'points de contact départementaux' de la mission relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (version 10 December 2013).

⁴⁶⁸ Dihal, *Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d'un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (18 March 2014).

fragilités liées à la santé et à la couverture maladie’, ‘l’accès à l’emploi’ and ‘les capacités à intégrer un logement autonome et les besoins de mise à l’abri’.⁴⁶⁹ Although the final point appeared to offer recommendations about how to assess a ‘capacités à intégrer’, it did not specify what this meant or provide clear indicators for how to measure it. Instead the report gave the following advice:⁴⁷⁰

- Concevoir le diagnostic comme un instrument d’aide à la décision. Il doit, pour cela, comporter des propositions individualisées en termes de logement ou d’hébergement.
- Approfondir les entretiens avec ceux qui expriment le souhait d’accéder à un logement autonome et proposer le cas échéant la mise en place un accompagnement social.

The first suggestion reinforced the link between the principle of selection and public policy while the second revealed that the selection of Roma for state support depended on their propensity for autonomous living, a factor discussed in detail later in the chapter. Yet, although these suggestions offered a rough guideline around which regional officials could structure *diagnostics*, officials were not responsible for undertaking the assessments themselves. Instead they hired contractors to conduct the *diagnostics*, who were able to exercise a considerable amount of discretion to design their own format for assessing Roma so long as they included the list of elements in their evaluation. This meant that in practice, *diagnostics* were not standardised because they reflected each contractor’s style. Furthermore, as contractors had their own preconceived methodologies to measure the suitability of camp residents for state support, *diagnostics* were not individually tailored to each resident. Rather these preconceived methodologies tended to marginalise the majority of Roma rather than fostering their equal, individualised treatment. This revealed that in practice the Hollande government’s policy of *anticipation* was not as fair as the 26 August 2012 circular suggested.

Disqualifying Factors

Despite the Hollande government’s focus on integration, not all Roma were eligible for state support in the first place. Some of these so-called Roma exhibited illegal behaviour, which jeopardised their residency in France. The French state could not logically offer evicted camp inhabitants medium to long-term *accompagnement* if they were not

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

permitted to remain in France. Conscious of this issue, government contractors considered the eligibility of inhabitants to reside in France before assessing their suitability for integration. *Diagnostics* were therefore not only a tool for selecting Roma but also an implicit instrument for disqualifying them. If a government contractor considered certain camp inhabitants as ineligible, they would notify regional officials of this development in their *diagnostic* report. Officials could then choose to use the information as grounds for deportation. This meant that – albeit indirectly – *diagnostics* allowed the Hollande government to continue a policy of deporting migrants they perceived as Roma from France without appearing as hard-line as its predecessor. A policy the Hollande government claimed was geared towards ‘une logique d’insertion et d’intégration’⁴⁷¹ could in fact lead to the rejection of Roma.

Three principal factors appeared to disqualify Roma from state support. The first of these was their immigration status. Although many residents living in illegal camps were nationals of EU member states, their citizenship did not grant them the unconditional right to reside in France indefinitely. For example, if a person had already been deported or had benefited from an ‘aide au retour’, their return into France was restricted. These people were essentially illegal aliens. As a regional official exclaimed, ‘les gens qui ne sont pas en situation régulière, vous devrez en tirer toutes les conséquences’.⁴⁷² This is why Dihal identified ‘Date d’installation dans le campement, temps de présence et parcours en France, titre d’identité, droit au séjour’ in their list of key information that a *diagnostic* should include.⁴⁷³ An excerpt from a *diagnostic* in the Alpes-Maritimes undertaken in 2013 comprised the following elements:⁴⁷⁴

Lieu de naissance	Dernière date d’entrée en France	Info DRLP	Info OFII
Urziceni, Roumanie	2,5 mois	OQT exécutée 19/05/2009 OQT non placée 17/11/2010 Possibilité établissement nouvelle OQT dès 3 mois de présence en France	A bénéficié AR le 26/03/2008

⁴⁷¹ Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al., *Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁴⁷² Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (16 June 2015).

⁴⁷³ Dihal, *Vade-mecum à l’usage des correspondant ‘points de contact départementaux’ de la mission relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (version 10 December 2013).

⁴⁷⁴ Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, *Recensement Antibes* (14 January 2013).

The first column provided details of where the person was born, which was often, but not always, an indication of nationality. It also documented whether any children had been born in France. The second column recorded the date the person entered France, which allowed officials to determine whether they had overstayed the period of grace. As this *diagnostic* was carried out while transitional restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian nationals were still in place, the period of grace was three months. The third column was a list of information from *la Direction de la réglementation et des libertés publiques* (DRLP). As a function of the Préfecture, the DRLP was responsible for managing immigration and residency disputes through its *Bureau du contentieux du séjour et de l'éloignement*. It could therefore provide records of whether the French state had previously issued a person with an *Ordre de Quitter la Territoire* (OQT), whether the order had been executed and whether the person was eligible for an OQT in the future. The fourth column included data from the *Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration* (OFII) specifying whether a person had benefited from the 'aide au retour' scheme (AR), prohibiting their long-term residence in France for up to three years.

Together, these elements of information presented government officials with a comprehensive picture of a person's immigration status. The reason this was so significant was that normally officials required a court order to conduct identity checks in the event of an evacuation. As participation in *diagnostics* was voluntary and required the consent of the Roma, government officials could sidestep this administrative hurdle and access the personal information necessary to verify their right to residency in France. By partaking in a *diagnostic*, a person wishing to gain *accompagnement* could consequently end up being deported instead.

The second factor disqualifying Roma from state support was criminal history. This was because a person's criminal history could be used as evidence of *menace à l'ordre public* to justify their deportation. A national official in Paris reflected this argument:

Il y a une condition préalable, un critère négatif. C'est toutes les personnes qui ont été condamnés – les casiers judiciaires. Il y en a beaucoup. Ces personnes-là, on ne leur propose pas de rester dans la société française. On peut comprendre que quelqu'un peut faire de la mendicité mais dès lors que vous avez des faits condamnés sérieux on ne rentre pas dans le processus d'insertion.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

Yet regional officials in Lyon argued that begging and other petty crime did in fact disqualify Roma from obtaining *accompagnement*. When talking about a regional insertion initiative in Lyon exclusively for Roma called Andatu, an official stated ‘dans le programme Andatu on n’admet pas ceux qui se livrent à la mendicité’.⁴⁷⁶ Another noted ‘on a exclu des familles pour des vols effectivement et pour des délits pénaux aussi’.⁴⁷⁷ This raised an interesting point. If Roma were excluded from *accompagnement* but their petty crime did not constitute grounds for deportation, an evacuation would render them homeless without any prospect of alternative housing. As a regional official from Nice admitted ‘il faut souligner qu’en règle générale les Roms ne posent pas de vraies difficultés en termes d’ordre public.’⁴⁷⁸ These Roma condemned of petty crime did not necessarily leave France, deciding to establish informal settlements elsewhere in the region or further afield. From this perspective, the disqualification of certain Roma from state support contributed to the fact that the total number of residents living in illegal camps in France remained relatively stable.

The third disqualifying factor was a lack of financial resources. This was because the French state could cite insufficient resources as proof that a citizen from another EU member state posed an unnecessary burden on the French welfare state. Dihal clearly stated this point in a report on 10 December 2013:

Le citoyen européen ou suisse peut venir en France pour y rechercher un emploi, pendant une période de 6 mois. Il doit s’inscrire dès son arrivée comme demandeur d’emploi. S’il n’a jamais exercé d’activité professionnelle ou s’il ne peut plus bénéficier du maintien de droit en tant que travailleur, le citoyen bulgare ou roumain doit, comme tout autre citoyen de l’Union Européenne, justifier de la possession de ressources suffisantes et d’une assurance maladie.⁴⁷⁹

This meant that Romanian and Bulgarian citizens whom French officials considered to be Roma could be deported after six months if their reliance on the French welfare state was seen as disproportionate to their economic contribution. Before 1 January 2014 these Roma could be deported after three months in line with the EU’s transitional restrictions on the movement of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. To test this phenomenon,

⁴⁷⁶ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁴⁷⁷ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁴⁷⁸ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁴⁷⁹ Dihal, *Vade-mecum à l’usage des correspondant ‘points de contact départementaux’ de la mission relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (version 10 December 2013).

diagnostics assessed how Roma earned their living, whether they had registered for employment in France, whether they had benefited from medical assistance or social services. Below is an example of a *diagnostic* from an illegal camp in Ile-de-France conducted by GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales on 15 May 2014:⁴⁸⁰

Resources		Prestations (AME/CAF) oui/non/en cours
Activité pro FR	Inscription pôle emploi oui/non/freins	
Récupération des déchets informels, récupération des métaux	non	en cours

The first column detailed how a person made their living, the second documented whether they had registered for work, and the third listed whether they had received benefits either in the form of an *Aide Médicale de l'Etat* (AME) or *Caisse des Allocations Familiales* (CAF). This information helped French officials to determine whether a Roma benefited more from the French welfare state than they contributed and decide whether they constituted an unreasonable burden on the French public purse. Once again, *diagnostics* could provide officials with evidence to support the deportation Roma as well as integrating a select few. As the next section of this chapter reveals, *diagnostics* also included the ability to secure a job or employability as a selection criteria.

The message was clear: integration was conditional. As socialist Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault declared to the French National Assembly on 1 October 2013 ‘l’intégration est possible quand on respecte les lois de la République.’⁴⁸¹ Laurent Fabius, the Minister of Foreign Affairs supported this comment during the same parliamentary debate, adding ‘en ce qui concerne l’intégration...il faut que les Roms, comme tous ceux qui sont en France, respectent les règles. S’ils respectent les lois de la République, très bien. S’ils ne les respectent pas, ils doivent être sanctionnés’.⁴⁸² The Finance Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve summed up his colleagues’ arguments in a radio interview that day, asserting ‘la République, c’est un espace de droits et devoirs.’⁴⁸³ These assertions demonstrated that the Hollande government’s message was tightly aligned. To be eligible let alone

⁴⁸⁰ GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales, *Opération de diagnostics sociaux mis en oeuvre par le GIP Habitat et interventions Sociales* (May and June 2014).

⁴⁸¹ Jean-Marc Ayrault, Premier Ministre, *Réponse à une question sur la ligne politique adoptée par le gouvernement envers les Roms, à l'Assemblée nationale*, Paris (1 October 2013).

⁴⁸² Laurent Fabius, Ministre des affaires étrangères, *Déclaration en réponse à une question sur la Roumanie et l'Espace Schengen*, l'Assemblée nationale (1 October 2013).

⁴⁸³ Bernard Cazeneuve, Ministre du Budget, *Radio Interview à RMC* (1 October 2013).

selected for *accompagnement*, Roma had to respect the laws of the Republic. Thus, Roma who applied for state support were not only subject to a process of selection – they also required prerequisite qualifications to apply the first place.

Selection Criteria

Having disqualified ineligible Roma from the race for *accompagnement*, government contractors then assessed the remaining applicants. Their decision hinged upon an evaluation of candidates' 'volonté d'intégrer'.⁴⁸⁴ Although the Hollande government did not explicitly define what this term meant in the 26 August 2012 circular, two criteria against which to test the assimilability of Roma emerged in technical policy reports, *diagnostics* and my own interviews. The first was a demonstrated desire to immigrate to France on a long-term basis and build a *projet de vie*. The second was a willingness to live autonomously rather than as members of an extended Roma family, thereby leaving behind the communitarian clan. This section examines these two criteria in detail to expose how the French state selected the 'worthy' few deemed suitable for state support.

Immigration versus Migration

The perception of Roma as an inherently nomadic people is an ill-founded stereotype. Illegal camp residents tended to move pre-emptively or as a consequence of an eviction, and their arrival in France was more likely a product of economic and social aspirations rather than a longing for spontaneous movement. Nevertheless, not all camp residents wished to settle permanently in France. Those who were EU citizens could capitalise on their right to free movement by gathering resources in France to take home to their countries of origin. As *accompagnement* was a medium to long-term commitment, the French state did not accept camp residents who lacked prospects of establishing a life in France. An inter-departmental report led by the Interior Ministry limited 'l'insertion des populations concernées' to those 'qui ont un projet de vie en France'.⁴⁸⁵ A local official reflected this view, claiming 'on essaie d'accompagner ceux qui ont vraiment envie de s'intégrer. C'est quand-même important de pouvoir compter sur le fait qu'ils ont un projet

⁴⁸⁴ Interview with Government Consultant 1, Adoma, Paris (2 June 2015).

⁴⁸⁵ Ministère de l'Intérieur, et. al, *Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

de vie en France’.⁴⁸⁶ A regional official also claimed ‘moi je sais qu’il y en a certains qui ne veulent pas s’intégrer, qui viennent en France pour profiter du système, mais il y en a aussi certains qui veulent s’intégrer, et dans la durée’.⁴⁸⁷ A long-term project in France was thus evidence of assimilability.

The notion of a *projet de vie* rested upon four key indicators. The first, as a local official described, was a ‘volonté de sédentarisation’.⁴⁸⁸ This meant that Roma had to exhibit a desire for long-term settlement and justify this by having a relatively uninterrupted record of residency in France instead of a pattern of regular movement back and forth to their country of origin. A regional official from the Bouches-du-Rhône expressed this view:

Une condition, c’est de ne pas faire d’aller-retour. Il faut avoir un projet de vie en France. Tout simplement. Après ils peuvent partir en Roumanie, comme les portugais qui retourne au Portugal, les Espagnols repartent en Espagne, les Italiens repartent chez eux pendant les vacances. Mais ce n’est pas choquant ça. Ce qui est choquant c’est les allers-retours réguliers, tous les 15 jours.⁴⁸⁹

A government contractor from Adoma adopted this logic of selection while undertaking *diagnostics*:

Pour la plateforme Ile-de-France sur laquelle on a été missionnés, on a eu des personnes qui ont dit ‘ah c’est un accompagnement de 12 à 18 mois...il faut que je passe six mois en Roumanie cette année’ ou bien ‘je veux construire ma maison en Roumanie, ma migration a pour objectif essentiellement de gagner le maximum d’argent pour le renvoyer en Roumanie, dans trois ans je repars’. Donc, je ne les accepte pas. Enfin je ne les intègre pas dans le dispositif.⁴⁹⁰

These comments revealed a paradox. Although the right to free movement allowed Roma from other EU member states to enter France, selection for *accompagnement* was contingent upon limited movement. Contrary to the EU’s vision of European integration, which promoted the fluid movement of citizens and goods, the French republican model of integration was based on immigration rather than migration. This restriction on movement continued once a Roma had been chosen for state support as well. As a regional official from the Rhône revealed, ‘on a eu le cas où la personne suivie par le dispositif Andatu est rentrée chez elle pendant quelques mois en Roumanie. C’est la

⁴⁸⁶ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Bordeaux, Bordeaux (19 June 2015).

⁴⁸⁷ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁴⁸⁸ Interview with Municipal Official, Marie de Lille, Lille (2 June 2015).

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture des Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille (26 June 2015).

⁴⁹⁰ Interview with Government Consultant 2, Adoma, Paris (2 June 2015).

migration pendulaire. Elle a été exclue du dispositif Andatu.⁴⁹¹ Thus, both selection for and participation in *accompagnement* challenged the right of EU citizens to move freely. It appeared that a *projet de vie* in France could occlude opportunities for residency elsewhere.

The second indicator of a *projet de vie* was the education of children in French schools. The focus on education is highly symbolic given the importance of *l'école républicaine* as the principal institution of integration in French republican mythology. As a local official maintained 'le premier critère c'est la scolarisation des enfants qui est fondamentale. S'il n'y a pas de scolarisation des enfants, déjà on considère qu'il n'y a pas de volonté d'intégration'.⁴⁹² A regional official echoed this view, arguing that 'les critères d'insertion sont très clairs. D'abord la scolarisation des enfants est très claire. Il faut s'engager à scolariser son enfant et à suivre leur scolarité. C'est une règle de la République française, jusqu'au moins 16 ans. A mon avis, ça c'est le premier critère, le fait de suivre la scolarité des enfants'.⁴⁹³ Ensuring the consistent education of Roma children up to the age of 16 was both a condition of *accompagnement* and as well as a legal requirement.

However, in practice *scolarisation* was not always easy to achieve. Sometimes administrative barriers hindered the enrolment of children from illegal camps in schools. Conscious of these difficulties, Dihal reported that 'le manque de place dans les établissements, l'absence de domiciliation ou d'état-civil des enfants [et] l'absence de vaccination de l'enfant' could prevent enrolment.⁴⁹⁴ Dihal highlighted four other obstacles to enrolment:

- le fait de n'avoir jamais été scolarisé auparavant,
- les évacuations des campements qui entraînent des ruptures de scolarisation,
- les tests d'évaluation linguistique qui retardent l'entrée dans le processus scolaire
- les refus explicites ou implicites d'inscription par certaines communes.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹¹ Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁴⁹² Interview with Municipal Official, Marie de Lille, Lille (2 June 2015).

⁴⁹³ Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁴⁹⁴ Dihal, *Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d'un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (18 March 2014), p. 22.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

The first and third obstacle revealed that although *l'école républicaine* was compulsory, in some cases prior education and French language skills were necessary prerequisites. The second obstacle shed light on the tension between the republican value of integration and the state-led evacuation of illegal camps. The final obstacle implied that in some cases, local French officials chose to betray the idea of *scolarisation* for bureaucratic or political purposes. Despite the emphasis French officials placed on the responsibility of Roma to ensure their children were educated in French schools, sometimes a lack of *scolarisation* was the fault of impediments inside the French system.

The third indicator of a *projet de vie* was the employability of adult Roma. This did not mean that camp residents had to show evidence of a permanent employment contract, but it did require them to prove they had taken steps towards 'une démarche d'insertion professionnelle'.⁴⁹⁶ As a regional official said, 'il faut avoir une certaine employabilité...même s'ils avaient un niveau d'instruction parfois très faible, ils pouvaient avoir des compétences en jardinage, métiers du bâtiment etc.'⁴⁹⁷ The official also claimed that in his experience 'il y avait des problèmes d'alphabétisation mais pas pour les personnes d'un certain âge parce qu'en fait, ceux qui avaient été scolarisés sous Ceausescu savaient bien lire et écrire'.⁴⁹⁸ From this perspective, those educated under Romania's Communist regime had a high level of literacy and therefore a better chance at securing employment than the younger generation. Dihal also drew attention to 'insertion professionnelle' as an indicator of integration by specifying that 'l'employabilité des personnes doit être mesurée par: la connaissance du français, les savoir-faire [et] les expériences professionnelles, les compétences développées tant dans le pays d'origine qu'en France'.⁴⁹⁹ Thus, if illegal camp residents exhibited skills for a trade or profession, government contractors could count them as evidence of a capacity to integrate into French society.

⁴⁹⁶ Interview with Municipal Official, Marie de Lille, Lille (2 June 2015).

⁴⁹⁷ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Dihal, *Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d'un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (18 March 2014), p. 28.

Yet others were not so optimistic. A regional official argued that ‘le projet de vie des Roms est de survivre et de ramasser un peu d’argent. Peu d’entre eux formulent directement l’idée de dire: je veux travailler.’⁵⁰⁰ From the regional official’s point of view, the problem was not that Roma lacked the skills to work in France but that they had no desire to work at all. The official added ‘certains Roms étaient là depuis 8 ans, ils vivaient au même endroit, entre temps ils n’ont pas trouvé de travail ni de logement. Même en France où la situation est un peu difficile, il faut vraiment faire exprès de ne pas trouver un travail’.⁵⁰¹ These comments exposed a prejudice that certain Roma did not want to integrate into French society that was independent from the information collected in *diagnostics*. Another regional official reflected this view, arguing ‘vous ne pouvez pas héberger tout le monde, c’est cher et quelques-uns ne sont pas vraiment insérables’.⁵⁰² Even before a *diagnostic* was conducted, certain officials had already decided that some so-called Roma were not worthy of state support.

The fourth indicator of a *projet de vie* in France was French language. This was linked to the *scolarisation* of Roma children and the employment prospects of their parents. A local official insisted ‘il faut qu’ils respectent nos règles et qu’ils maîtrisent ou aient envie de maîtriser les fondamentaux de notre langue pour entrer en interaction avec les autres, de faire société’.⁵⁰³ A regional official in Lyon claimed that French language skills were a condition of *accompagnement*: ‘le fait de chercher activement à apprendre le français est un critère qui détermine l’entrée d’une famille dans le programme Andatu’.⁵⁰⁴ Roma who demonstrated an ability or expressed a desire to learn French were deemed assimilable. A government contractor shared this logic, contending ‘Avec des diagnostics, on a des critères clairs et précis. Et on lance un message fort aux personnes: “si des efforts sont faits, il y a des possibilités d’intégration.”’⁵⁰⁵ This implied that if Roma attempted to integrate on their own, the French state would help them achieve it.

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).

⁵⁰³ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Bordeaux, Bordeaux (19 June 2015).

⁵⁰⁴ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁵⁰⁵ Nicolas Ledeuil, Coordinator of Saint-Benoit Labré cited in David Prochasson, ‘Roms: le rôle et la pratique des travailleurs sociaux mis en cause’, *Le Canard Social* (9 April 2013): <http://www.lecanardsocial.com/ArticleFil.aspx?i=1153> (accessed 17 August 2017).

Reflecting on the French government's policy, an EU official stated 'cette politique elle vise à donner une chance à des gens qui ne sont pas la majorité, qui ont une réelle volonté et une capacité d'intégration. Je pense que l'approche française aide l'intégration des Roms qui sont intégrables.'⁵⁰⁶

Autonomous versus Communal Living

In addition to a *projet de vie* in France, evidence of a desire to abandon the *vie collective* and adopt a *vie autonome* was another criteria government contractors employed to select assimilable Roma. A regional official from the Bouches-du Rhône endorsed this reasoning, arguing that 'par contre sur d'autres critères, la décohabitation, c'est un critère important pour moi. En France on ne vit pas en famille élargie, sauf peut-être dans certains villages où ça peut se faire encore et où il y a une solidarité intergénérationnelle, mais en mode de vie urbain ça n'existe plus.'⁵⁰⁷ Underpinning this argument was the perception that the structure of a Roma family was different to the French norm. A local official maintained 'les Roms sont les seuls à s'installer comme ça, en groupe, dans les bidonvilles et en ayant un positionnement qui a suscité un regard très spécifique'.⁵⁰⁸ This critique echoed the accusations French civil servants made in relation to North Africans living in *bidonvilles* in the 1950s and 60s. In both cases, the implicit message was that the idea of a *vie collective* was not acceptable in France because communal living was considered to hinder the integration of immigrants.

A regional official from the Nord addressed the point directly, affirming that 'ce n'est pas une famille nucléaire comme nous. C'est communautaire comme mode de fonctionnement. Donc quand vous vouliez déplacer quelqu'un vous aviez dix personnes. Par contre, nous on ne fabrique pas des habitations pour dix personnes'.⁵⁰⁹ Similarly, the government contractor, Adoma also reported that 'la majorité des...ménages sont composés d'un couple avec deux enfants', suggesting that their model of alternative housing was designed for nuclear families.⁵¹⁰ From this perspective, the problem with a

⁵⁰⁶ Interview with European Commission Official, DG JUST, Brussels (14 March 2016).

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture des Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille (26 June 2015).

⁵⁰⁸ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Bordeaux, Bordeaux (19 June 2015).

⁵⁰⁹ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (3 June 2015).

⁵¹⁰ Adoma, *Mission nationale d'appui à la résorption des bidonvilles, mars 2014 – décembre 2016 : Rapport d'activité 2014* (24 March 2015).

vie collective was practical because French social housing was built for nuclear families rather than extended ones. A regional official from the Alpes-Maritimes extended this claim by stating that ‘la vie collective pose un problème parce que d’abord on est dans un système de prestations sociales qui est adossé à la notion de famille nucléaire, ou d’individu. Ensuite, on est dans une relation avec les services, qu’il s’agisse de l’Etat ou de l’assurance-maladie, ou des services quels qu’ils soient – qui gèrent leur relation avec une famille, avec des enfants, bien sûr – mais une famille ou avec des individus.’⁵¹¹ A regional official from Seine-Saint-Denis criticised communal living on different grounds, affirming that ‘les Roms n’ont pas le même concept de famille nucléaire. C’est compliqué de les mettre avec les autres’.⁵¹² Through this official’s eyes, *la vie collective* alienated Roma from the majority of French society, and was a barrier to integration.

But not all of these so-called Roma were willing to give up extended family life for state support. A regional official from the Alpes-Maritimes asserted that some Roma opted out of the contest for *accompagnement* for this reason: ‘la plupart des Roms sont dans une logique de vouloir garder leur communautarisme. Ils ne sont pas désireux de s’inscrire dans un processus d’intégration’.⁵¹³ A regional official from the Direction départementale de la cohésion sociale (DDCS) in the Nord echoed this view, recounting that ‘sur certaines évacuations de camps, on a des refus d’hébergement puisque les personnes sont mises sur des hébergements de 5 à 6 personnes ce qui est impossible. Souvent les familles refusent le logement qui leur est proposé pour ne pas qu’il y ait un éclatement de la famille’.⁵¹⁴ The fact that only a minority of camp residents were willing to abandon their extended families aided the selection process for government contractors because it helped to reduce the number of applicants.

However, limited resources meant that selection was still necessary. Accordingly, government contractors employed two indicators to gauge whether the remaining camp residents were prepared to live autonomously. The first was a willingness to separate their immediate family from extended relatives and the broader community. This was because the French state and its contractors saw communal living as an obstacle of integration.

⁵¹¹ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁵¹² Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (7 September 2015).

⁵¹³ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁵¹⁴ Interview with Regional Official, DDCS, Lille (8 June 2015).

The government contractor GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales noted that ‘la volonté de rester avec le groupe peut constituer un frein dans les démarches d’insertion via le logement’.⁵¹⁵ Yet, conversely, for those who were happy to abandon their community, integration was possible. According to a local official ‘il y a une petite minorité de gens qui ont dit “nous on veut rompre avec la communauté Roms, on veut s’installer en France et s’intégrer” et on leur a proposé un accompagnement.’⁵¹⁶ A regional official also exclaimed ‘dans les campements j’observe qu’il y a deux catégories: il y en a qui sont très contents d’être mis à l’écart et il y a ceux qui ne veulent pas quitter le clan’.⁵¹⁷ The implication was that expressing a desire to leave behind the *vie collective* signified a rejection of communitarianism and an acceptance of the republican model of integration. Thus, agreeing to separate from one’s extended family was seen as evidence of detaching from the ethnic Roma community.

The second indicator of a *vie autonome* was whether camp residents were willing to relocate. As Dihal noted ‘Concernant le logement ou l’hébergement des personnes, il faudrait tenir en compte...des désirs ou non de ces personnes de quitter la région où elles sont présentes’.⁵¹⁸ Relocation was an important consideration for government contractors because it allowed them to sidestep the issue of housing and budgetary shortages in one region by offering *accompagnement* in another. For example, a diagnostic undertaken by the GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales on 6 May 2014 stated in bold print ‘concernant la localisation des solutions qui pourraient être proposées 7 ménages sont prêts à accepter une solution hors Ile-de-France et 7 ménages se disent prêts à quitter le groupe.’⁵¹⁹ Relocation was disruptive, especially if it occurred in the middle of a school year. Yet the fact that government contractors considered it a measure of assimilability highlighted that the provision of *accompagnement* was at the mercy of elected local politicians.

The Hollande government’s policy of *anticipation* therefore bred tensions between the administrative and political branches of the French government. An inter-ministerial

⁵¹⁵ GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales, *Opération de diagnostics sociaux mis en oeuvre par le GIP Habitat et interventions Sociales* (May and June 2014).

⁵¹⁶ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie du 18^e Arrondissement, Paris (2 December 2014).

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de la Gironde, Bordeaux (18 June 2015).

⁵¹⁸ Dihal, *Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d’un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (18 March 2014), p. 34.

⁵¹⁹ GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales, *Opération de diagnostics sociaux mis en oeuvre par le GIP Habitat et interventions Sociales* (May and June 2014).

policy report raised this concern, stating ‘la réticence prégnante de certaines collectivités locales à travailler avec l’Etat sur la question d’hébergement ou du logement temporaire des occupants des campements’ as a challenge to the *anticipation* policy.⁵²⁰ It added that ‘cette réticence va jusqu’au refus clairement exprimé en termes politiques par des interlocuteurs rencontrés par la mission qui déclarent que la population Rom est indésirable sur le territoire de leur commune’.⁵²¹ The unwillingness of local politicians to accommodate evicted camp residents, especially in the run up to the 2014 municipal elections, demonstrated that barriers to integration did not necessarily stem from the residents themselves and their allegedly communitarian way of life. Local French elites could also block the integration of Roma for political purposes.

Despite their differences, civil servants and politicians shared the assumption that *la vie collective* was an inherent component of Roma culture. An adviser to a local politician claimed ‘il ne faut pas vouloir à tout prix intégrer. Les Roms ont une manière de vivre communautaire et une culture différente, c’est compliqué de les mettre dans un moule’.⁵²² Similarly, a national civil servant exclaimed ‘il me semble que culturellement, les Roms sont beaucoup plus éloignés de l’intégration et l’insertion en France qu’un africain d’origine francophone, bien qu’ils soient européens.’⁵²³ These comments framed the *vie collective* – and by association the Roma – as culturally incompatible with the republican system of integration, which aimed to assimilate individuals and small families into French society. This meant that although government contractors and officials believed that some camp residents could break away from their *vie collective*, even before a *diagnostic* took place the odds were already prejudiced against them.

Outsourcing Selection

The selection of assimilable camp residents was a rigorous process, but the question of who was responsible for selecting residents deserves closer attention. Although regional government officials were in charge of establishing *diagnostics*, they did not carry out the assessment themselves. Instead, they outsourced this sensitive task to non-government

⁵²⁰ Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al., *Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Nice, Nice (22 June 2015).

⁵²³ Interview with National Official, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Paris (5 December 2014).

contractors, who presented them with a report of findings to guide the course of action for evacuating illegal camps and providing alternative housing to some of the evicted residents. As such, the duty of deciding which of the so-called Roma were worthy of state support relied heavily on the discretion of contractors rather than government officials. This section examines the role that these contractors played in selecting camp residents they deemed assimilable and therefore suitable for state support, and raises ethical concerns about outsourcing public policy.

From Prefects to Independent Contractors

The Hollande government's 26 August 2012 circular stated that:

Pour établir ce diagnostic, vous vous appuyerez sur les services de l'Etat et de ses opérateurs et rechercherez, en fonction des besoins et du contexte local, le concours des services de collectivités territoriales (conseil général, centre communal d'action social – CCAS –, aide sociale à l'enfance – ASE...). Ce diagnostic pourra également être confié à une association.⁵²⁴

The last sentence is particularly telling because it gave prefects direct authorisation to outsource *diagnostics* to *associations*.⁵²⁵ This highlighted that Prefects could hire both *associations* (charitable non-government organisations) and *opérateurs* (social enterprises that received partial public funding but had independent governance structures). Although the circular suggested that Prefects could also rely on the 'services de l'Etat', this was supplementary at least and incidental at most. In practice, non-government organisations implemented *diagnostics* at the request of the state. This meant that independent professionals assessed whether Roma were assimilable and consequently evaluated whether these Roma were worthy of the French government's support. A local official explained to me that 'une fois qu'on a la décision de justice et avant de décider la date d'évacuation, on appelle une association pour commencer le diagnostic social. Pour faire ce diagnostic, les associations vont passer une ou plusieurs journées différentes.'⁵²⁶ This suggested that the act of undertaking a *diagnostic* was relatively swift, especially given that some camps could contain up to several thousand people. Yet, it demonstrated

⁵²⁴ Ministère de l'éducation nationale, et. al., *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

⁵²⁵ Some of these agencies were partially government owned but they were independently managed.

⁵²⁶ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie du 18e Arrondissement, Paris (2 December 2014).

that independent contractors – not government officials – led the assessment of Roma on the ground.

A regional official reiterated this point, maintaining that ‘il y a un ensemble de critères qui sont examinés par l’association, elle sélectionne des familles’.⁵²⁷ But the official then recognised the ethical issues associated with outsourcing the decision of allocating public funds, let alone to non-French nationals, and subsequently tried to downplay the role of non-government organisations. The regional official added ‘une fois que l’association a fait une sélection, elle se tourne vers la Préfecture pour demander s’il n’y a pas d’opposition. Ensuite si les familles sont validées par la Préfecture, elle se retourne aussi vers les communes qui accueillent les villages d’insertion.’⁵²⁸ Despite the official’s insistence that the state validated independent contractors’ decisions, the fact remained that the state was not involved in the selection process itself and their level of oversight was also unclear. Additionally, a national official from Dihal clarified that with regards to *diagnostics*, the key responsibility of the French state was to hire contractors: ‘ce sont les préfets qui choisissent les associations soit par des appels à projet, des appels à opérateurs, soit dans le cadre de conventions souvent avec des associations.’⁵²⁹ It therefore appeared that the role of the French state could be reduced to providing a rubber stamp of approval on predetermined results rather actively evaluating who was suitable for government support.

Some criticised the relationship between the French state and contractors as a way of shifting the ‘dirty work’ outside of government. In an article in the paper, *Le Canard Social*, an employee of the association Arta vs Om hyperbolised this relationship stating ‘Nous assistons à un jeu de télé-réalité où l’on sélectionne des candidats les plus résistants, les plus dociles, les plus photogéniques, les plus favorisés’ and claimed ‘Ce “racisme d’Etat”...les travailleurs sociaux le relaient sans s’interroger sur leurs pratiques’.⁵³⁰ However, in some cases contractors possessed skills that the French state lacked. As a regional official from la Gironde asserted ‘le principe c’est que l’association

⁵²⁷ Interview with Regional Official, DDCS, Lille (8 June 2015).

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ Interview with National Official 3, Dihal, Paris (1 June 2015).

⁵³⁰ Aurélia Becuwe, representative of Arta vs Om cited in David Prochasson, ‘Roms: le rôle et la pratique des travailleurs sociaux mis en cause’, *Le Canard Social* (9 April 2013): <http://www.lecanardsocial.com/ArticleFil.aspx?i=1153> (accessed 20 August 2017).

a différents employés, chacun est spécialisé. Il y a notamment des personnes qui font un travail social. Il y en a deux qui sont de nationalité bulgare donc il n'y a pas la barrière de la langue justement pour faire les diagnostics.⁵³¹ This was significant because in la Gironde, the majority of so-called Roma living in illegal camps were Bulgarian, which suggests that contractors unlocked a channel of communication between the French state and the Roma that would not have otherwise existed.

The relationship between the French state and independent contractors was institutionalised in 'la mission nationale d'appui à la résorption des bidonvilles' signed by Adoma and the French Ministry of Housing on 10 March 2014.⁵³² This mission spanned three years and comprised two core functions:

Une intervention en ingénierie sociale: il s'agit de coordonner l'action des acteurs locaux (services de l'État, collectivités territoriales, associations), afin d'actualiser les diagnostics sociaux et de mobiliser les différentes ressources d'hébergement et de logement existantes sur un territoire : centres d'hébergement, logements familiaux dans le diffus (secteur du logement social dans les zones détendues), patrimoine immobilier de l'État, des collectivités territoriales ou de certains établissements publics (hôpitaux, La Poste, SNCF, RFF...), foncier public disponible à la construction, places en hôtel. Dans ce cadre, la société Adoma sera aussi chargée de s'assurer de l'accès effectif des personnes aux dispositifs de droit commun : couverture santé, prévention et soins, aides sociales, aide alimentaire, scolarisation des enfants.

Une intervention en tant qu'opérateur de logement très social: autre volet sur lequel les préfets peuvent recourir à Adoma : la mobilisation de l'ensemble de son parc qui compte environ 70 000 logements, répartis sur tout le territoire et dont un certain nombre son vacants.⁵³³

The first function, related to the Hollande government's policy of *anticipation* discussed in this chapter, and the second referred to *accompagnement* measures, addressed in the next chapter. Part of the first function was the implementation of *diagnostics*. The fact that Adoma had a dual mission could benefit French officials. Employing the same contractor to conduct *diagnostics* of Roma and supply *accompagnement* could minimise duplication and help align the assessment with the end result. It also reinforced the positive link between *diagnostics* and integration that the Hollande government had tried to establish. Yet, the national mission did not mean that Adoma had a monopoly on the

⁵³¹ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de la Gironde, Bordeaux (18 June 2015).

⁵³² See the homepage of Adoma for more details: <http://www.adoma.fr/adoma/L-entreprise/p-537-La-mission-nationale-d-appui-a-la-resorption-des-bidonvilles.htm> (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁵³³ Ministère de la cohésion des territoires, 'En finir avec les bidonvilles: le Gouvernement confie une mission à Adoma' (11 March 2014): <http://www.cohesion-territoires.gouv.fr/en-finir-avec-les-bidonvilles-le-gouvernement-confie-une-mission-a-adoma> (accessed 20 August 2017).

French state's business. Prefectures employed various other contractors – with local, regional and national footprints – to undertake *diagnostics*. As a municipal official exclaimed 'il y a plusieurs associations qui sont mandatées par la préfecture pour faire les diagnostics'.⁵³⁴ What the mission did signify was that from March 2014 Adoma became the national contractor of choice to assist with *anticipation* measures.

Yet, Adoma was by no means a novice at evaluating and integrating 'foreigners' in France. In fact, Adoma was created in 1956 under the name of Sonacotral (Société Nationale de Construction de logements pour les Travailleurs Algériens) to provide temporary social housing and support to Algerian workers in France, helping them transition out of *bidonvilles* and into autonomous housing. After the Algerian War, Sonacotral changed its name to Sonacotra. Perhaps most significantly, following the 1964 *loi Debré* and the 1970 *loi Vivien*, the French state commissioned Sonacotra to 'résorber les bidonvilles', which consisted predominantly of Algerian workers helping to reconstruct postwar France.⁵³⁵ This meant contractors from Adoma could draw upon the organisation's institutional memory of postwar experience to shape its contemporary mission. Although the population in question had shifted from Algerians to Roma, Adoma had a long history of working on the 'résorption des bidonvilles' and was familiar with the laws and types of policies the French state employed to select and integrate assimilable candidates eligible for state support. Thus, the 2014 'mission nationale d'appui à la résorption des bidonvilles' was not a new creation; it revived a postwar legacy that shaped the Fifth Republic's response to immigration. In line with Vivien Schmidt's theory of discursive institutionalism, this revealed how the French state's previous programmes of eradicating slums set precedents for contemporary practices.

⁵³⁴ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Nice, Nice (22 June 2015).

⁵³⁵ For the full reference of the Loi Débre see: Loi n° 64-1229 du 14 décembre 1964 tendant à faciliter aux fins de reconstruction ou d'aménagement, l'expropriation des terrains sur lesquels sont édifiés des locaux d'habitation insalubres et irrécupérables, communément appelés "bidonvilles". For the full reference of the Loi Vivien see: Loi n° 70-612 du 10 juillet 1970 tendant à faciliter la suppression de l'habitat insalubre. For a history of Sonacotra see Marc Benadot, 'Chronique d'une institution: la "Sonacotra" (1956-1957)', *Sociétés Contemporaines*, 33(1) (1999), pp. 39-58. For a comprehensive study of the way in which Sonacotra implemented the French republican idea of civilising mission see Amelia Lyons, *The Civilising Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonisation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

The fact that contractors decided which camp residents were eligible for state support raised ethical concerns. Not only were non-government agencies in charge of allocating public resources, but these resources were also directed towards non-French citizens. In addition, contractors were responsible for making critically sensitive choices that could dramatically alter the lives of illegal camp residents on a personal level but also on a legal and administrative level. As demonstrated above, a contractor's assessment of illegal camp residents could disrupt education and employment through relocation and could even lead to the deportation of camp residents from the French territory altogether. Outsourcing the selection of camp residents also tested the boundaries of the French republican ideology government officials defended, which rested upon the foundation of political order through representative institutions.

By transferring the responsibility of selecting assimilable residents from the state to non-government agencies, three key issues emerged. The first related to legitimacy. Although hired by the state, contractors were not representatives of the state, which called into question the grounds upon which contractors were qualified to make sensitive decisions about public policy. For example, a *diagnostic* report of illegal camps in the Hauts-de-Seine Department conducted by Adoma included a table outlining 'les ménages "potentiellement insérables" rencontrés au départ de la mission' and listed the number of 'ménages avec critères d'insertion'.⁵³⁶ It also highlighted that 'les résultats des entretiens présentés dans ce rapport se basent sur les 13 ménages (parmi les 20 auparavant identifiés par le GIP) susceptibles d'entrer dans le champ de la circulaire du 26 août 2016'.⁵³⁷ This demonstrated two points: non-government associations such as GIP and Adoma sometimes worked together to provide complementary services for *anticipation* and *accompagnement*, and these non-government bodies were responsible for deciding which camp residents were capable of integrating into French society.

Unsurprisingly, deciding which residents were assimilable was not straightforward. Dihal stated that 'les diagnostics doivent conjuguer: des informations quantitatives sur les

⁵³⁶ Adoma, *Mission nationale de résorption des bidonvilles – territoire des Hauts de Seine – Chatenay-Malarbry: Bilan Final* (31 October 2014).

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

personnes présentes (tableaux de recensement) [et] des informations qualitatives sur leurs parcours (rapports et entretien détaillés)’.⁵³⁸ This qualitative aspect meant that conducting *diagnostics* required contractors to exercise their discretion to determine results. As a contractor exclaimed ‘c’est un travail très subjectif’.⁵³⁹ This raises questions about the potential bias of contractors. A regional official told me that NGOs criticised contractors for using a logic of rejection to validate evictions and deportations of Roma rather than supporting their integration. The regional official said that the NGO Rom Europe asked to ‘laissez ces diagnostics. Ce sont des recensements de police qui servent au préfet pour s’assurer qu’il ne va pas y avoir de problème quand il va y avoir l’évacuation.’⁵⁴⁰ Thus, NGOs questioned the motives of non-government agencies and consequently disapproved of *diagnostics*.

The second issue that outsourcing *diagnostics* raised was anonymity. In their guide for establishing *diagnostics*, Dihal stated ‘Les diagnostics posent la question de l’anonymisation et de la confidentialité des informations...les diagnostics communiqués au préfet qui est le maître d’ouvrage ne doivent comporter que les informations nominatives indispensables pour la recherche de solutions personnalisées. Les informations à caractère médical, cependant doivent rester confidentielles.’⁵⁴¹ However, despite Dihal’s insistence on maintaining confidentiality of Roma participants, this was betrayed in practice. For example, a regional official presented me with a detailed spreadsheet, which displayed the results of three diagnostics undertaken in the Alpes-Maritimes Department. In each case, the table listed the names of the participants involved as well as a column entitled ‘Info Sociale/Sanitaire’, which revealed key elements of medical history such as ‘problèmes de spasmophilie’.⁵⁴² This example demonstrated that a non-government agency had done exactly what Dihal asked them not to do.

⁵³⁸ Dihal, *Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d’un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (18 March 2014), p. 32.

⁵³⁹ Interview with Government Consultant 1, Adoma, Paris (2 June 2015).

⁵⁴⁰ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁵⁴¹ Dihal, *Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d’un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission relative à l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (18 March 2014), p. 33.

⁵⁴² Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, *Tableau Recensement Roms* (14 May 2013).

However, not all contractors exposed the identity of participants in their *diagnostics*. GIP, for instance, did not specify the names but did provide a brief health assessment of participants in their diagnostics for the Ile-de-France Region in May and June 2014.⁵⁴³ Nevertheless, despite respecting the anonymity of participants, the inclusion of their medical information still undermined Dihal's recommendations. The fact that contractors shared the confidential data of Roma with prefects exposed a lack of government oversight, which suggested that in practice French officials were passive recipients of *diagnostics* rather than active decision makers. It also reflected a disregard for the privacy of illegal camp residents in France. Hypothetically, if it were found out that prefects possessed an inventory of the names and medical history of French citizens in the Department, it would likely generate outrage. Perhaps, government officials and contractors assumed that privacy was not of particular value to illegal camp residents because of the conspicuous nature of the dwellings in which they lived. In any case, the lack of confidentiality indicated a double standard.

The third issue associated with outsourcing *diagnostics* was resources. It is not uncommon for governments to subcontract work to independent bodies to save time and money. Yet, in the case of *diagnostics*, this had adverse effects. In September 2013, Amnesty International published a report criticising *diagnostics*, stating:

One of the procedural safeguards intended to prevent forced evictions is that those affected should be genuinely consulted in advance so that they can inform themselves about the operation envisaged. Establishing a genuine dialogue with them is essential in order to respect the obligation to provide adequate alternative housing and to limit the use of force 40. The “social assessment” (“diagnostic social”) prescribed in the 26 August circular does not amount to the kind of genuine consultation laid down in international law and such assessments are not systematically carried out prior to evictions.⁵⁴⁴

The implication was that *diagnostics* were not thorough or accurate enough to genuinely help to provide camp residents with alternative housing in the event of an evacuation. But this issue was not entirely the fault of contractors; it was compounded by the fact that some camp residents opted out of the process. According to a regional official, ‘souvent les associations ont des difficultés à faire les diagnostics car quand ils passent le

⁵⁴³ GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales, *Opération de diagnostics sociaux mis en oeuvre par le GIP Habitat et interventions Sociales* (May and June 2014).

⁵⁴⁴ Amnesty International, *Told to move on: forced evictions of Roma in France* (Amnesty International Publications: London, September 2013): http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/PressReleases/EUR_21_007_2013_Told_to_Move_On_-_Forced_Evictions_of_Roma_in_France.pdf (accessed 20 August 2017).

lendemain ce ne sont pas les mêmes occupants. Il y a beaucoup de mouvements, de gens qui repartent au pays, qui reviennent, et donc c'est très difficile de figer un diagnostic précis'.⁵⁴⁵

The other part of the challenge was money. In 2013 the Hollande government dedicated four million euros to 'des actions d'anticipation et d'accompagnement des évacuations de campements illicites. Parmi celles-ci figurait l'élaboration de diagnostics'.⁵⁴⁶ This was a large sum of money for what Amnesty International had argued was an impotent and superficial resource. Regional officials also criticised *diagnostics* but for quite different reasons from Amnesty International. A document given to me by an official in Seine-Saint-Denis stated that 'il est à noter que les échéances de plus en plus éloignées de réalisation de diagnostics conduisent d'une part à ralentir le rythme des évacuations et, d'autre part, à favoriser l'extension des campements'.⁵⁴⁷ From this perspective, *diagnostics* provided poor value for money.

In a similar vein, another regional official confessed that 'on a été des très bons élèves, pendant un an et demi on a respecté la circulaire à la lettre, mais maintenant on ne va plus faire des diagnostics parce qu'ils sont trop chers'.⁵⁴⁸ In spite of the Hollande government's orders, regional officials came to view the outsourcing of *diagnostics* to non-government contractors as an unnecessary public expense. The fact that regional officials decided to discontinue this measure exemplified how issues associated with outsourcing *diagnostics* led regional officials to go against the national policy of *anticipation* outlined in the Hollande government's 26 August 2012 circular. Thus, the process of selecting camp residents for state support generated internal rifts within different levels of the French administration.

⁵⁴⁵ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁵⁴⁶ Dihal, *Etablir le diagnostic global et individualisé d'un campement illicite dans le cadre de la mission relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (18 March 2014), p. 11.

⁵⁴⁷ Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Direction de la sécurité et des services du Cabinet, *Campements illicites dans la département de la Seine-Saint-Denis: Situation au 12 juin 2015* (12 June 2015).

⁵⁴⁸ Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).

Conclusion

This chapter argued that despite the universalist language in the 26 August 2012 circular, the Hollande government employed a logic of selection to determine which Roma were worthy of state support. Although French officials prioritised the republican idea of universalism in their discourses justifying *anticipation* policies, their universalist language concealed a logic of selection based on a heteronormative conceptualisation of assimilability. By examining the assessment of these Roma living in slums in the *diagnostic* reports, this chapter revealed that the basis for choosing Roma depended on a subjective perception of their *volonté d'intégrer* in French society, which was contingent upon evidence of a *projet de vie* in France and a desire to detach from the alleged *vie collective* and *communautaire* of illegal camps. Additionally, this chapter exposed how the Hollande government were able to use *diagnostics* as grounds for deporting camp residents while maintaining an appearance of humanitarianism. This exemplified the ways in which officials could use the republican idea of preserving the neutrality of the public sphere to justify deportation policies. Perhaps most strikingly however, this chapter uncovered that non-government agencies were responsible for conducting *diagnostics*. It maintained that by outsourcing the selection of Roma to independent contractors, the French state stretched ethical boundaries, an issue of which French officials were well aware. In the words of a local official, 'concernant les diagnostics, c'est effectivement difficile de trouver la limite de ce qui est acceptable est de ce qui n'est pas acceptable.'⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁹ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Nice, Nice (22 June 2015).

INTEGRATION: A MODERN CIVILISING MISSION

‘Les solutions d’intégration ne sont pas toujours évidentes’.⁵⁵⁰
Manuel Valls (13 July 2012)

...

‘Intégration est possible quand on respecte les lois de la République’.⁵⁵¹
Jean-Marc Ayrault (1 October 2013)

The French state selected a minority of evicted Roma to remain in France and provided them with social and financial assistance to ease their integration into French society. Yet, government assistance was conditional. Evicted Roma were subject to a process of state-led integration akin to a modern ‘civilising mission’. As a political adviser put it, ‘l’intégration c’est la rencontre entre la capacité de la République à donner à des étrangers la possibilité de parler la langue française, de s’insérer dans l’emploi, de construire sa vie en France et le désir de quelqu’un de vivre en France dans le respect des valeurs de la République.’⁵⁵²

For the Roma, integration had added conditions. According to an official from the Rhône, ‘l’intégration pour les Roms c’est très particulier. On leur demande de se séparer du phénomène clanique. Le but est de les amener à entrer dans le droit commun, et à vivre en autonomie en appartement’.⁵⁵³ The assumption was that Roma were not sufficiently civilised to live autonomously and that the French state needed to intervene with *accompagnement* policies to guide Roma towards financial and social independence. The discourse of this official was paternalistic and it contained classist, heteronormative and crypto-Christian bias. Like many others, the official assumed that the population living in slums were Roma, that their way of life was *clanique* and at odds with the middle-class, heteronormative and crypto-Christian idea of a nuclear family, and that their behaviour was uncivilised insofar as they were incapable of living autonomously without

⁵⁵⁰ Manuel Valls, Ministre de l’intérieur, *Déclaration sur la mise en place des zones de sécurité prioritaires, les campements de Roms, la réforme de l’administration territoriale, notamment les sous-préfectures, et la politique de l’immigration*, Paris (31 July 2012).

⁵⁵¹ Jean-Marc Ayrault, Premier Ministre, *Déclaration en réponse à une question sur la ligne politique adoptée par le gouvernement envers les Roms*, l’Assemblée Nationale, Paris (1 October 2013).

⁵⁵² Interview with Political Adviser, Elysée, Paris (29 February 2016).

⁵⁵³ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

accompagnement from the state. The official implied that Roma could not integrate into French society alone.

Yet *accompagnement* did not begin as a top-down policy, designed by national officials. It first appeared in 2007 as part of the Mayor of Aubervilliers' *village d'insertion* project and was reproduced in municipal and regional initiatives across France. Integration projects occurred under the Sarkozy and Hollande administrations but only materialised into national policy in the Hollande government's 26 August 2012 circular and remained largely decentralised in practice. This chapter explores how French officials used the republican idea of integration to communicate and justify *accompagnement* policies tailored to the Roma in France. Yet, it is important to note that officials did not interpret integration uniformly. With this in mind, this chapter seeks to answer three questions. What different models of integration did officials employ? What did the process of integration entail? And did the *accompagnement* policies succeed in integrating Roma into French society?

Models of Integration

Since 2007, French officials have employed a range of *solutions d'insertion* to help evicted Roma integrate into French society.⁵⁵⁴ Each *solution d'insertion* provided a programme of *accompagnement*, including alternative subsidised housing. In doing so, they shared a common aim: to absorb evicted Roma and guide them towards autonomous life in France. As an inter-ministerial report in May 2013 stated 'Qu'il s'agisse de terrains d'accueil temporaires viabilisés ou de "villages" d'insertion, les initiatives des collectivités locales et de l'Etat permettent de résoudre la question des campements en offrant une alternative à l'hébergement d'urgence...Différents dans leurs modalités, ces types d'expériences ont pour objectif l'insertion et la construction d'un projet de vie pour les personnes sorties des campements.'⁵⁵⁵ A regional official echoed this point two years

⁵⁵⁴ Centre d'études et d'expertise sur les risques, l'environnement, la mobilité et l'aménagement (Cerema), *Rapport d'enquête sur l'application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions* (November 2016), p. 31. This report was commissioned by the Dihal.

⁵⁵⁵ Ministère de l'Intérieur et. al., *Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

later, claiming that ‘l’objectif c’est de créer la capacité d’être autonome, donc de subvenir seul à ses besoins’.⁵⁵⁶

The French state’s discourse of integration aimed to guide evicted Roma towards autonomous life in France. However, local and regional officials interpreted the idea of integration in different ways, which was reflected in their *dispositifs*. Two models of integration emerged. The first was to place evicted Roma in segregated communities often termed *villages d’insertion*, with targeted *accompagnement* programmes, to prepare them for self-sufficient life in France. These were meant to be temporary, ideally lasting between three to five years, and although the French state covered the cost of rent for that period (*hébergement*), it did not promise rent controlled social housing (*logement*) afterwards. Instead it expected Roma to use the skills gained through *accompagnement* to secure accommodation afterwards. In contrast, the second model was that of *mixité* rather than segregation. The main example was an initiative called Andatu in the Rhône. Instead of making Roma qualify for *logement*, the Prefecture of the Rhône came to an agreement with the association Forum Réfugiés and the local social housing organisation to pre-emptively secure Roma direct access to rent controlled apartments scattered across Lyon. Andatu still included a period of intensive *accompagnement*, which housed participants in the same building, but this was transitional, lasting between six to twelve months. This section takes a closer look at the two models that underpinned the French state’s discourses on integrating Roma.

Segregated Insertion

The *village d’insertion* established in 2007 by Jacques Salvator, the socialist Mayor of Aubervilliers in Seine-Saint-Denis was the first of its kind. Yet, the model of integration was not new. Salvator drew inspiration from the *cités de transit* of the 1960s and 70s, which housed dislodged guest workers often of Algerian origin, who had previously occupied France’s postwar *bidonvilles*.⁵⁵⁷ Nevertheless, it was the first state-led *solution d’insertion* specifically designed to assimilate Roma and it provided a prototype for subsequent initiatives in the Seine-Saint-Denis Department and more broadly throughout

⁵⁵⁶ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de la Gironde, Bordeaux (18 June 2015).

⁵⁵⁷ Marc Bernardot, *Loger les immigrés: La Sonacotra 1956-2006* (Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Editions du Croquant, 2008).

France. *Villages d'insertions* were confined physical structures that supplied residents with *hébergement* and *accompagnement*. As there was no official or legal definition of a *village d'insertion*, their composition varied. They ranged from repurposed buildings, to modular prefabs, bungalows and caravans. Most provided independent lodgings for nuclear families as well as communal areas and amenities, while a small number could accomodate extended relatives such as grandparents.⁵⁵⁸ Additionally, some sites belonged to local municipalities or *préfectures*, while others were the property of non-profit *associations* such as Adoma. In some cases, *associations* defined the programme of *accompagnement*, while others conformed to the guidelines of a *maîtrise d'oeuvre urbaine et sociale* (MOUS), a policy instrument for aiding the social and professional integration of disadvantaged populations in France.⁵⁵⁹ All *villages d'insertion* were secure compounds but some environments were more strict than others, with high walls, curfews and restricted visiting rights.

A defining feature of *villages d'insertion* was their location. They were usually situated on the periphery of urban centres, with relatively low population density and few public transport links.⁵⁶⁰ As a regional official from the Alpes Maritimes said, 'les villages d'insertion étaient relativement à l'écart, je ne dis pas éloigné mais en tout cas pas en plein cœur de la ville, pour permettre d'éviter de donner à la population de susciter éventuellement des réactions d'antagonisme.'⁵⁶¹ This meant that *villages d'insertion* were essentially invisible. By segregating evicted Roma from French society in *villages d'insertion*, the French state shifted them out of the public eye and under public control.

The isolation and firm restrictions on Roma in *villages d'insertion* generated considerable criticism from politicians, pundits and activists, who called for a more humanitarian approach to integration. A Senate report on the integration of Roma in 2012 stated that 'Le danger de ces villages est en effet de maintenir une forme de ségrégation entre leurs habitants et le reste de la société...En aucun cas, ils ne doivent être un moyen d'isoler "le

⁵⁵⁸ Interview with Government Consultant 1, Adoma, Paris (2 June 2015).

⁵⁵⁹ Ministère du logement et de l'habitat durable, *Circulaire relative aux MOUS pour l'accès au logement des personnes défavorisées* (2 August 1995), LOGC 9510118C.

⁵⁶⁰ For a spatial analysis of *villages d'insertion* see Magali Bessone, Milena Doytcheva, Jean-Baptiste Duez, Charles Girard and Sophie Guérard de Latour, 'Integrating or Segregating Roma Migrants in France in the Name of Respect: A Spatial Analysis of the Villages d'Insertion', *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 36(2) (2013), pp. 182-196.

⁵⁶¹ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

problème rom” du reste de la société.’⁵⁶² A political adviser to the Hollande administration reflected this sentiment, arguing that ‘les villages d’insertion sont très communautaristes. C’était l’idée de recréer un campement illicite dans un cadre licite. Une caricature un peu. Ce n’est pas vraiment le cœur de notre politique.’⁵⁶³

A regional official extended this argument, claiming ‘les villages d’insertion ne se conforment pas aux valeurs républicaines. Si on rassemble tous les membres d’une même communauté au même endroit, pour moi ça s’appelle un ghetto.’⁵⁶⁴ The official implied that all residents of *villages d’insertion* belonged to the same community and that the community’s behaviour challenged republican values. In doing so, the official framed *villages d’insertion* as a reproduction of communitarianism that isolated rather than integrated residents. Not all officials shared this view. For example, the Vice President of the Plaine Commune in Seine-Saint-Denis maintained that the French state did not intend *villages d’insertion* to be mono-ethnic. Ethnic uniformity, he argued, was unintentional, due to the fact that Roma had previously chosen to live together in illegal camps.⁵⁶⁵ Through this logic, *villages d’insertion* simply absorbed evicted residents, irrespective of their ethnicity. Nevertheless, the official still assumed that slum residents were Roma, exposing an ethnic bias in the official’s discourse.

Despite this attempt to rationalise *villages d’insertion*, the stigma lingered. Some officials tried to distance their projects from *villages d’insertion* by using different names such as ‘sites aménagés gérés’ despite adopting the same basic approach. For example, in April 2013 the Préfecture des Alpes Maritimes called their programme of segregated *hébergement* and *accompagnement* designated solely for evicted Roma from illegal camps an ‘opération de maîtrise d’ouvrage urbaine et sociale (MOUS) dans le cadre d’un programme d’accès au logement, à l’éducation, à l’insertion des familles très

⁵⁶² Sénat, *Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des affaires européennes sur l’intégration des Roms* (6 December 2012).

⁵⁶³ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

⁵⁶⁴ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture des Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille (26 June 2015).

⁵⁶⁵ Vice Président de Plaine Commune, Seine-Saint-Denis, cited in Magali Bessone, Milena Doytcheva, Jean-Baptiste Duez, Charles Girard and Sophie Guérard de Latour, ‘Integrating or Segregating Roma Migrants in France in the Name of Respect: A Spatial Analysis of the Villages d’Insertion’, *Journal of Urban Affairs* 36(2) (2013), pp. 182-196.

précairisées'.⁵⁶⁶ The use of the term MOUS emphasised *accompagnement*, drawing attention away from the segregated nature of the project. Criticism of *villages d'insertion* also appeared at a national level. Although *villages d'insertion* were locally instigated and managed and the first of which was created by a Socialist mayor, Socialist politicians sought to instrumentalise the fact that *villages d'insertion* emerged and proliferated under the watch of conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy. As a Socialist political adviser contended in June 2015 'On est plutôt sur l'idée de mixité que celle de village d'insertion.'⁵⁶⁷ The suggestion was that the idea of a *village d'insertion* was a conservative construct, when in fact it originated from the initiative of a socialist mayor.

Not all officials were concerned by the title of *village d'insertion*, often employing it as a specific administrative term. In June 2015, a regional official from the Nord noted 'on a encore sept villages d'insertion, dont six sont constitués de mobil home et un en dur dans un bâtiment. Nos villages d'insertion sont uniquement pour les Roms.'⁵⁶⁸ During this conversation, another regional official interjected to clarify that 'les villages d'insertion ne sont pas permanent. L'insertion, c'est une étape. Avec la scolarisation des enfants, l'apprentissage de la langue français par les adultes, et l'accès à l'emploi pour les adultes, les Roms pourront éventuellement accéder à un logement lambda.'⁵⁶⁹ From this point of view, segregated insertion was a necessary step to propel Roma towards autonomous life in France. Paradoxically, these officials framed exclusion as a prerequisite of republican integration.

Andatu and Mixité Sociale

In autumn 2011, the Prefect of the Rhône, Jean-François Carencu, took a different approach to integrating evicted Roma by founding the programme 'Andatu' in partnership with the association, Forum Réfugiés.⁵⁷⁰ The name 'Andatu' was deliberate, which translated as 'for you' in Romani, signifying that the initiative was designed to

⁵⁶⁶ Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, *Dossier de demande de subvention pour la mise en oeuvre de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites dans le département des Alpes-Maritimes* (9 April 2013).

⁵⁶⁷ Interview with Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

⁵⁶⁸ Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).

⁵⁶⁹ Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).

⁵⁷⁰ Préfecture du Rhône, *Bilan du dispositif ANDATU: l'insertion réussie pour des populations roms* (12 December 2014).

assist Roma rather than reject them. Notably, Andatu began before the election of a Socialist government, and therefore predated the 26 August 2012 circular.⁵⁷¹ Nevertheless, Socialist officials endorsed Andatu as ‘un des programmes les plus développé et les plus républicain’ and ‘un dispositif positif qui est fondé sur les valeurs républicaines’.⁵⁷² Andatu was explicitly communicated as a policy that embodied republican values. It was also striking that a Prefect – an appointed rather than elected official – took on the responsibility of integrating Roma as the task was previously the preserve of municipalities.

Based on the programme ‘Accelair’ for assimilating refugees founded in 2002, Andatu aimed to accelerate integration based on the neo-republican idea of *mixité sociale*.⁵⁷³ That is, the idea of creating a social housing system in which families from diverse backgrounds could live side-by-side.⁵⁷⁴ As a regional official, who had previously managed Andatu, stated, ‘c’était un dispositif très ambitieux, vouloir comme ça amener un parcours d’intégration accéléré et global’.⁵⁷⁵ Andatu was an all-inclusive programme, but entry was selective. In fact, despite its emphasis on *mixité sociale*, a postwar urban planning scheme reflecting the republican model of integration, Andatu’s selection process was based on affirmative action, which was contrary to the republican idea of universalism discussed in chapter three of this thesis. Nevertheless, Andatu took roughly 400 participants in three rounds: 100 people in autumn 2011, 150 people in winter 2012 and another 150 people in spring 2013.⁵⁷⁶ This was a relatively large population, considering that residents incurred no costs.

⁵⁷¹ Ministère de l’éducation nationale, et. al., *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l’anticipation et à l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

⁵⁷² Respectively, the citations were drawn from: Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015); and Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Intérieur, Paris (3 December 2014).

⁵⁷³ Forum Réfugiés, Mission: Programme d’intégration des réfugiés – Accelair (26 July 2015): <http://www.forumrefugies.org/missions/missions-aupres-des-refugies/programme-d-integration-des-refugies-accelair> (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁵⁷⁴ Beth Epstein, *Collective Terms: Race, Culture and Community in a State-Planned City in France* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), p. 13.

⁵⁷⁵ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

⁵⁷⁶ The number of Roma was not stable as over time some chose to leave the programme and a few individuals were expelled. Cerema provided an estimation of the residents, see: *Rapport d’enquête sur l’application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions* (November 2016), p. 40.

Officials in the Rhône used ideas of *mixité sociale* and accelerated integration to communicate two key provisions. This distinguished Andatu from *villages d'insertion*. First, Andatu gave residents immediate access to *droit commun*, such as residency rights, health cover, and social services. The contract binding residents of Andatu specified the following points:

Les Autorités de l'Etat et du Conseil général du Rhône ouvrent les droits suivants:

- Attribution du titre de séjour d'un an, assorti de l'autorisation de travailler;
- Attribution de la couverture santé (CMU);
- Versement des allocations sociales (AF, RSA) sur présentation du titre du séjour;
- Scolarisation des enfants.⁵⁷⁷

By providing these rights, authorities of the Rhône granted evicted camp residents access to assistance they may not have otherwise received, and especially not so quickly. As a regional official from the Rhône noted:

La différence, c'est très simple. Le village d'insertion vous mettez des personnes dans un hébergement provisoire et vous travaillez uniquement sur le droit commun à partir du moment où elles ont accès à l'emploi et éventuellement elles vont au logement. Les droits sont acquis petit à petit. Alors que dans Andatu les droits sont acquis tout de suite.⁵⁷⁸

A regional official formerly responsible for Andatu added that 'les personnes qui entraient dans le dispositif d'Andatu ont reçu une carte de séjour. Ils étaient donc soumis au code d'entrée de séjour des étrangers'.⁵⁷⁹ This was significant because the first intake of participants into Andatu predated the Hollande government's measures to aid the employment of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in France on 22 August 2012, as well as the end of transition restrictions on Romania and Bulgaria enacted on 1 January 2014. The fact that these participants were allowed to reside in France for one year meant that they were not subject to the same social and economic limitations as other Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in France.

Second, Andatu guaranteed its members access to a rent-controlled apartment by pre-emptively securing an agreement with Forum Réfugiés and the public housing association

⁵⁷⁷ Forum Réfugiés, 'Contrat de parcours et d'engagement visant l'intégration en région lyonnaise' in Deplhine Roucaute, 'A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms', *Le Monde* (23 May 2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁵⁷⁸ Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁵⁷⁹ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

ABC-HLM. This was linked to the first provision because under normal circumstances eligibility for obtaining a rent-controlled apartment depended upon proof of a residency permit and access to Revenu de solidarité active (RSA), which the conseil général had already granted. Notably, the apartments that Andatu offered were not clustered in the same building designated solely for Roma as *villages d'insertion* were. Instead they were dispersed throughout Lyon's various suburbs in *logement social diffus*. As an interministerial report highlighted:

Le dispositif "ANDATU" se différencie des approches des autres sites d'insertion par un objectif d'accès direct des bénéficiaires au logement social diffus. En accord avec les partenaires bailleurs sollicités pour l'opération, les familles sélectionnées se voient proposer des solutions de logement réparties sur l'ensemble du parc HLM mobilisable, sur différentes communes. Il n'y a donc pas, à proprement parler, de site "ANDATU".⁵⁸⁰

In a report commissioned by Dihal, the Centre d'études et d'expertise sur les risques, l'environnement, la mobilité et l'aménagement (Cerema) also stated that 'Le principe du dispositif s'appuie par ailleurs sur un travail en partenariat avec l'association des bailleurs sociaux du Rhône...d'autant plus nécessaire que la demande porte sur une typologie plus difficile à mobiliser (grands logements de type T3 à T5).'⁵⁸¹ It added that 'Des solutions d'hébergement transitoires ont aussi été proposées dans des foyers Adoma et Aralis, ainsi que dans des anciennes casernes appartenant à l'Etat'.⁵⁸² This revealed that Andatu did in fact have some designated sites, but unlike *villages d'insertion* they were a much shorter transitional phase that accommodated Roma before they received their promised rent-controlled apartment. Additionally, by securing an agreement in advance, Andatu permitted Roma to bypass the city's waiting list for *logement* that comprised of French citizens and other EU and non-EU immigrants who had already registered their interest. As a regional official said 'la population bénéficiait d'un avantage, c'est qu'elle avait un logement immédiatement, sans rentrer dans l'attente. On est sur un dispositif qui permet d'aller très vite'.⁵⁸³ As all of its entrants were Romanian or Bulgarian, Andatu thus placed the integration of non-French citizens ahead of the needs of French citizens.

⁵⁸⁰ Ministère de l'Intérieur et. al, *Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁵⁸¹ Cerema, l'environnement, la mobilité et l'aménagement (Cerema), *Rapport d'enquête sur l'application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions* (November 2016), p. 40.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

Andatu's system of integrating Roma was a three-stage process. The first stage was *stabilisation*, where Roma were placed in transitional *hébergement* before receiving their guaranteed *logement social en diffus*. In the words of a national official from Dihal, 'le dispositif de droit commun vers le logement n'a pas exclu des phases temporaires de stabilisation'.⁵⁸⁴ A regional official who previously managed Andatu maintained that *stabilisation* was a necessary phase of integration for Roma who had previously lived in *bidonvilles*:

On a mis en place un dispositif pendant 6 mois. Les personnes étaient placées dans des appartements, qui étaient captées qu'ils ne payaient pas, c'était la période de stabilisation. Donc, elles apprenaient à vivre en appartement. Ce qui n'est pas forcément évident pour elles puisqu'à la base elles ne vivent pas du tout dans des structures fixes, donc il y a tout un apprentissage de la vie en appartement.⁵⁸⁵

This comment implied that the regional official framed *stabilisation* as a means of civilising evicted camp residents on the grounds that these so-called Roma were primitive and unqualified for modern life in France. Responding to a question on the implementation of Andatu in practice, the official admitted that although *stabilisation* was temporary, the limit of six months was not always observed:

La stabilisation de six mois, c'était ce qu'il y avait sur le papier. Mais parfois cela durait un peu plus longtemps parce qu'il y avait des difficultés à capter des appartements, des logements sur les bailleurs sociaux. Et la stabilisation durait donc un peu plus longtemps mais de toute façon les travailleurs sociaux avaient un énorme travail à faire.

Although shorter than the duration of *villages d'insertion*, the *stabilisation* phase of Andatu still ran over its expected time frame.

The second stage of integration was the placement of Roma families into rent-controlled apartments. As the regional official claimed 'La phase trois c'était de capter des logements sur les bailleurs publics qui acceptaient qu'un certain pourcentage des logements mis à disposition pour des logements sociaux soient captés par le préfet pour permettre à ces populations de passer du stade de stabilisation au stade d'insertion.'⁵⁸⁶ Yet, although Roma lived in these rent-controlled apartments, and were not segregated from the rest of society, they did not pay their own rent. 'C'était du logement accompagné par l'association pour être sûr que les loyers sont payés. C'était Forum

⁵⁸⁴ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

⁵⁸⁵ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

⁵⁸⁶ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

Réfugiés qui garantissait le paiement des loyers. C'est-à-dire, les personnes qui sont entrées en logement en mai 2013 ont été aidées jusqu'en mai 2014' claimed another regional official from the Rhône.⁵⁸⁷ As the Prefecture du Rhône hired Forum Réfugiés to run Andatu, it was the state that indirectly covered the rent. This meant that *logement social en diffus* was really *hébergement* in disguise.

The third and final stage of integration was independent *logement*, which shifted the responsibility of paying rent from Forum Réfugiés to the participants of Andatu themselves. As the regional official who formerly managed Andatu stated 'la troisième phase, c'était l'entrée dans le droit commun. C'était la fin de l'insertion. Vous n'êtes plus identifié comme étant dans le dispositif Andatu et vous avez accès à l'emploi et au logement comme n'importe quel ressortissant français.'⁵⁸⁸ The official added that 'le droit commun, c'est pouvoir en autonomie, assurer sa propre existence. Ça veut dire pouvoir dans le cadre des règles républicaines assurer son existence. C'est-à-dire le logement, la nourriture, et avoir un travail. Ça c'est le droit commun.'⁵⁸⁹ This comment highlighted how the official used the republican idea of integration to justify Andatu in spite of its overt process of ethnic selection. The rationale was that as long as participants became autonomous, it did not matter that the French state had selected them from the same community. In other words, the official used autonomy to rationalise racialised forms of selecting participants for Andatu.

The Process of Integration

Irrespective of whether officials employed a model of segregated insertion or *mixité sociale*, integration was a mutually constitutive process. As a senior national adviser asserted, 'pour moi l'intégration est simplement la capacité de tout individu dans la société d'exercer ses droits et ses devoirs à l'égard des autres et donc de trouver une place légitime dans la société'.⁵⁹⁰ Integration entailed both rights and responsibilities for the select Roma in question. This meant that the French state provided *accompagnement* on the condition that these so-called Roma pulled their weight by satisfying the requirements

⁵⁸⁷ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁵⁸⁸ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁰ Interview with Senior Political Adviser, Cabinet du Ministre de l'Education, Paris (3 June 2015).

of the project, often outlined in a contract of engagement. Participants were obliged to engage actively in integration; they were not simply passive recipients of government support. In addition to meeting selection criteria to gain access to state support, Roma had to adhere to a set of standards while they were receiving it. This section examines the process of integration that ‘Roma’ had to undertake in exchange for state support.

Accompagnement

To assimilate selected Roma into French society and guide them towards autonomy, local and regional initiatives included a programme of *accompagnement*. The English translation of *accompagnement* is support, a nebulous word that has no precise political meaning. Yet, in the context of immigration policy, the French term refers to the provision of social services. As a regional official explained, ‘accompagnement, c’est le fait d’avoir un suivi social qui puisse permettre de gérer progressivement une appropriation des codes de la population française’.⁵⁹¹ The official’s definition associated *accompagnement* with integration, implying a link between the welfare state and the French republican public philosophy. The relationship between welfare state and republicanism was not a given as republicanism overwhelmingly focused on political rather than social rights. However, the two have become entangled in the last thirty years as officials have used (neo-)republican ideas to safeguard the *modèle social français*.

As *dispositifs* were not nationally centralised, the social services officials offered varied. This depended on factors such as the methods used by the association employed to run the *dispositif*, the resources available, the sort of policy instrument adopted by the local or regional authority (e.g. whether the *dispositif* qualified as a MOUS), and the particularities of the recipient population (e.g. level of education and literacy, existing health conditions etc.). Nevertheless, most *dispositifs* provided participants with four types of support. The first was alternative housing to the *bidonville* from which the Roma had been evicted. As the first section of this chapter suggested, local and regional authorities offered different structures of accommodation, ranging from portable blocks and caravans to established buildings.

⁵⁹¹ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

In both *villages d'insertion* and the *stabilisation* phase of Andatu, the site of accommodation operated as a forum within which Roma could be socialised. With the exception of a 'campement autorisé' experiment in the Nord department, which afforded residents basic amenities and healthcare in exchange for their participation in professional training schemes, *hébergement* was the foundation of integration that preceded all other forms of assistance.⁵⁹² In most cases, officials considered it essential to provide participants a legal and clean place of residence before extending any other type of support. Some even viewed *hébergement* as separate from *accompagnement*. As the socialist Junior Minister for Education George Pau-Langevin declared in a speech to parliamentarians on 27 September 2013, 'à travers des "villages d'insertion" de véritables sites de transition ont été créés. En plus d'un logement, ils apportent un accompagnement social et professionnel aux familles'.⁵⁹³

The second type of support was the *scolarisation* of Roma children. The fact that the French state insisted migrant children attend school may not seem especially linked to the neo-republican public philosophy; in 2016 at least 135 countries had compulsory schooling for children albeit with varying age limits.⁵⁹⁴ Yet, the public provision of education to all children residing in France through *l'école républicaine* is historically and ideologically significant. Whether alluding to the schooling of rural 'peasants' in the Third Republic or second-generation migrants in the postwar period, public officials have tended to depict the French school as the prime institution of republican integration. In the words of Minister Pau-Langevin, 'la République doit [offrir] protection à tout enfant quelle que soit son mode de vie ou sa nationalité et qu'ils doivent, avec l'aide des recteurs assurer la scolarisation de tous les enfants et faire respecter la légalité républicaine dans toutes les municipalités'.⁵⁹⁵ Furthermore, the fact that Dihal estimated that 'plus de 4300 enfants vivant dans ces campements (environ 28% des personnes concernées)' meant the education of Roma children in the French school system was a high priority of

⁵⁹² A regional official shared the example of a 'campement autorisé' experiment in Dunkerque. Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).

⁵⁹³ George Pau-Langevin, Ministre de la réussite éducative, *Déclaration sur l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (27 September 2013).

⁵⁹⁴ UNESCO Institute for Statistics, *Compulsory Education, Duration* (24 October 2016): http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNESCO&f=series%3ACEDUR_1 (accessed 17 December 2017).

⁵⁹⁵ George Pau-Langevin, Ministre de la réussite éducative, *Déclaration sur l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (27 September 2013).

dispositifs.⁵⁹⁶ Accordingly, the *dispositifs* included various services to facilitate *scolarisation*, such as helping with enrolment, providing transport to school, subsidising children's lunches at the canteen, and offering extra tutoring and French language classes. Associations also worked closely with the schools to monitor Roma children's progress. For example, according to a report reviewing a MOUS in Montreuil:

Un point est fait tous les deux mois par un travailleur social et une médiatrice de l'équipe avec chaque directeur d'école. Des rencontres régulières organisées en 2012 par la Direction de l'éducation avec les différentes écoles concernées, les opérateurs et l'inspection académique ont permis un suivi régulier des résultats, des actions engagées.⁵⁹⁷

In Bordeaux, local officials took the integration of Roma children in schools to another level. A local informed me that:

On a travaillé avec l'inspection académique parce qu'il y avait des classes mais à un moment ils étaient tellement nombreux qu'ils se mettaient entre eux et que ça devenait, bon ils restaient entre eux au sein de l'école donc on a travaillé avec l'inspection académique pour voir comment ils pouvaient être dispersés dans plusieurs écoles et pouvoir aider les mamans à comprendre comment prendre le transport en commun pour échanger d'école. Le but c'était d'arrêter les effets de groupe.⁵⁹⁸

This example demonstrates how officials used the idea of countering communitarianism to justify the implementation of integration policies inside the classroom. The school was not only the place where Roma were made to assimilate through education, it also actively ensured that their integration into French society was not impeded. At a national level, Minister Pau-Langevin introduced three new circulars to facilitate the integration of Roma children in French schools on 20 October 2012. These circulars related to *la scolarité des élèves allophones nouvellement arrivés*, *scolarisation et scolarité des enfants issus de familles itinérantes et de voyageurs*, and the *organisation des Casnav*.⁵⁹⁹ As the minister put it, 'le cas des enfants Roms est souvent à l'intersection de ces trois situations'. These measures helped local officials ensure the *scolarisation* of Roma. In Nantes for example, the *Centre Académique pour la Scolarisation des élèves allophones*

⁵⁹⁶ Dihal, *Journée nationale d'échanges l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites: point d'étape* (27 September 2013).

⁵⁹⁷ Ministère de l'Intérieur et. al., 'Annexes III: Opérations d'insertion in Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements', *Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁵⁹⁸ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Bordeaux, Bordeaux (19 June 2015).

⁵⁹⁹ Ministère de l'éducation nationale, *Circulaire n° 2012-141 relative à la scolarité des élèves allophones nouvellement arrivés* (2 October 2012), REDE1236612C; *Circulaire n° 2012-142 relative à la scolarité des enfants issus de familles itinérantes et de voyageurs* (2 October 2012), REDE1236611C; and *Circulaire n° 2012-143 relative à l'organisation des Casnav* (2 October 2012), REDE1236614C.

(CASNAV) established measures specifically for Roma children:

[E]lle coordonne les actions pédagogiques déployées par les enseignants, forme les enseignants, évalue les enfants, attribue des livrets d'évaluation des compétences... Les services académiques affectent les enfants en classe ordinaire ou en unités pédagogiques pour élèves allophones nouvellement arrivés (UPE2A), en fonction du degré de maîtrise du français et du niveau général des élèves.⁶⁰⁰

The priority of schooling Roma children was thus upgraded from local and national *dispositifs* to national public policy.

The third type of support was healthcare. This included access to medical assistance and insurance for children and adults. For instance, a MOUS in Montreuil offered a comprehensive programme of healthcare to its residents, affording la Protection maternelle et infantile (PMI) to 23 children and regular medical and dental care. Through PMI, it assisted 7 women through pregnancy and supplied 18 women with family planning support, such as ‘[séances d’]information, la prescription d’un mode de contraception, un suivi gynécologique’.⁶⁰¹ The *bilan* report of the MOUS argued that stable housing allowed Roma to receive more demanding or longer-term care for chronic illnesses, including treatments for diabetes, cholesterol and heart disease.⁶⁰² By partnering with the Ville de Montreuil, the *dispositif* also granted 33 Roma families with Aide Médicale d’Etat (AME).⁶⁰³ On 27 September 2013, Dihal also reported that ‘des campagnes de vaccination ont été mises en oeuvre par des associations dans plusieurs territoires’.⁶⁰⁴ Yet, despite these measures, barriers to healthcare provisions affected many Roma even when inside these *dispositifs*, due to difficulties of attaining domiciliation.

⁶⁰⁰ Prune Helfter-Noah, Stagiare ENA, *Rapport à l’attention de Monsieur le préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis: Experiences d’insertion menées à l’égard des occupants de campements illicites et propositions de politiques publiques* (December 2014). For more information on CASNAV: <http://www.pedagogie.ac-nantes.fr/eleves-allophones-enfants-du-voyage/le-casnav-de-l-academie-de-nantes-583926.kjsp?RH=1333439293856&RF=1160415471265> (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁶⁰¹ Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al., ‘Annexes III: Opérations d’insertion in Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements’, *Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁶⁰² Ibid.

⁶⁰³ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁴ Dihal, *Journée nationale d’échanges l’anticipation et l’accompagnement des opérations d’évacuation des campements illicites: point d’étape* (27 September 2013).

The fourth type of support was *insertion professionnelle*, comprising employment and language training. For example, the contract for Andatu, adopted in autumn 2011, stipulated that as part of the *dispositif*, the association Forum Réfugiés would run ‘séances de formation à l’apprentissage du français’ and ‘Ateliers “emploi” et des passages en entreprise’.⁶⁰⁵ Similarly, A *village d’insertion* in Ile-de-France introduced a job dating scheme to facilitate employment opportunities for adult Roma. A regional official recounted that ‘pour ramener les Roms vers l’emploi, le Conseil général a convoqué tous les opérateurs et les gens du village d’insertion dans une salle. C’était un système de job dating. C’est-à-dire qu’ils avaient un quart d’heure, chacun tournait et après, au bout de la demi-journée, ils faisaient le point.’⁶⁰⁶

Additionally, A MOUS in Montreuil, which opened in January 2010, offered three language workshops for adults: ‘un atelier recherche d’emploi, un atelier “prépa permis”, un atelier “les temps des femmes”’.⁶⁰⁷ These workshops aimed to equip participants with the key vocabulary to help them navigate day-to-day life and prepare them for work in France. The first of these, which focused on ‘recherche d’emploi’, was tailored to each participant’s level of language, and helped participants to design a curriculum vitae.⁶⁰⁸ The second workshop on ‘prépa permis’ prepared participants for the French driving examination. As a driving licence could be a job requirement, the skills gleaned from the workshop could ultimately help participants gain employment. The workshop on ‘les temps des femmes’ focused mainly on cooking to teach participants who had allegedly ‘confirmer [un] choix de travailler en restauration’.⁶⁰⁹ Complementing the efforts of local and regional *dispositifs*, the measures outlined in the Hollande government’s expansion of the list of jobs available to Romanians and Bulgarians in France and removal taxes on employers hiring Romanian and Bulgarian workers on 22 August 2012, further enabled employment for Roma in France.

⁶⁰⁵ Forum Réfugiés, ‘Contrat de parcours et d’engagement visant l’intégration en région lyonnaise’ in Delphine Roucaute, ‘A Lyon, un contrat d’intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms’, *Le Monde* (23 May 2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁶⁰⁶ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris (4 December 2014).

⁶⁰⁷ Ministère de l’Intérieur et. al., ‘Annexes III: Opérations d’insertion in Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements’, *Evaluation des dispositifs d’accompagnement des personnes présents dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

Echoing these four types of support that local and regional *dispositifs* provided, the Hollande government's 26 August 2012 circular instructed Prefects to 'mettre en place un accompagnement':

Après l'établissement du diagnostic, qui pourra être plus ou moins complet en fonction du temps et des ressources disponibles, vous identifierez les dispositifs d'insertion à organiser, en mobilisant prioritairement les moyens de droit commun. Vous veillerez également à la continuité de l'accès aux droits des personnes, notamment en matière de prise en charge scolaire et de parcours de soins, afin de maintenir, autant que possible, un suivi des actions collectives et individuelles d'insertion des personnes.⁶¹⁰

It then listed four areas of *accompagnement* for officials to provide:

- Scolarisation
- Sanitaire
- Hébergement et d'accueil
- insertion professionnelle⁶¹¹

These areas not only reflected the types of support already incorporated into local and regional *dispositifs*, but they also aligned the Hollande government's policy with the European Commission's requirements for a national strategy of 'Roma inclusion'.⁶¹² In a technical report dated 10 December 2010, Dihal also gave detailed recommendations as to what these areas of *accompagnement* outlined in the 26 August 2012 circular should contain.⁶¹³ The list of advice was extensive, but it was not all that dissimilar from the sorts of services already provided by local and regional *dispositifs*.

The 26 August 2012 circular and Dihal's subsequent technical reports marked the institutionalisation of *accompagnement* in national public policy documents. Even so, it is important to recall that national policymakers did not create the types of support specified in the circular. National policymakers drew upon the experience of local and regional *dispositifs* to devise a framework for prefects and mayors to follow. In November 2016, a report published by Cerema acknowledged this point, claiming that the 26 August 2012

⁶¹⁰ Ministère de l'éducation nationale, et. al., *Circulaire interministérielle relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (26 August 2012), INTK1233053C.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions National Roma Integration Strategies: A First Step in The Implementation of the EU Framework* (26 February 2012), COM/2012/0226 final.

⁶¹³ Dihal, *Vade-mecum à l'usage des correspondant 'points de contact départementaux' de la mission relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (version 10 December 2013).

circular was ‘une circulaire qui vient se greffer sur des pratiques existantes’ and ‘une circulaire qui légitime l’action de l’Etat’.⁶¹⁴ *Accompagnement* was incorporated into national public policy, but its local and regional roots meant that its application remained largely decentralised and varied. As a tailor-made approach to integration appeared to result in the assimilation of more ‘Roma’, it is not surprising that the French state gave local and regional officials the responsibility to design and implement their own insertion initiatives as long as they aligned with the Hollande government’s agenda.

Conditions

Although the French state offered *accompagnement* to some evicted Roma, it was not unconditional. As a local official maintained, ‘avec le corollaire de cette politique d’accueil, c’est aussi une fermeté à l’encontre de ceux qui ne respectent pas les règles. S’il n’y a pas de respect des lois et des valeurs républicaines, elles sortent du dispositif, et elles sont évacuées et reconduites dans leurs pays d’origine.’⁶¹⁵ The message was clear: Roma had to conform to republican norms or they risked expulsion. These conditions turned into a contract that participants were obliged to sign upon entering a *dispositif*. As the former manager of Andatu declared, ‘c’est pour ça qu’on contractualisait avec les personnes un dispositif Andatu puisqu’elles s’engageaient à terme à respecter les valeurs républicaines et à intégrer dans la société française’.⁶¹⁶ Indeed, the contract for Andatu included a section entitled ‘les obligations du bénéficiaire contractant’, which detailed the following checklist:

Dans le cadre du Contrat de parcours et d’engagement, le maintien dans le projet d’intégration dépend de la participation du bénéficiaire, à savoir :

- Participer obligatoirement aux cours de français qui seront proposés,
- Participer aux activités d’animation et d’information proposées par le service,
- Veiller à la bonne application des comptes, budgets et droits concernés,
- Se rendre aux rendez-vous fixés par les services publics,
- Collaborer avec l’équipe de Forum réfugiés-Cosi et tenir informé le référent en temps utile de tout changement de situation,
- Autoriser Forum réfugiés-Cosi à communiquer aux Autorités les informations relatives à votre situation administrative,
- Tenir informé le référent avant toute absence.⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁴ Cerema, *Rapport d’enquête sur l’application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions* (November 2016).

⁶¹⁵ Interview with Municipal Official, Marie de Lille, Lille (2 June 2015).

⁶¹⁶ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

⁶¹⁷ Forum Réfugiés, ‘Contrat de parcours et d’engagement visant l’intégration en région lyonnaise’ in Deplhine Roucaute, ‘A Lyon, un contrat d’intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms’, *Le Monde* (23 May

Contracts were typically confidential, and the few I managed to locate varied. Yet, from these contracts and information gleaned from interviews with government officials, I identified six main conditions of *accompagnement*. The first was continued education of Roma children in French schools. While state assisted with *scolarisation*, it also obliged parents to ensure that it was maintained. As a regional official argued, l'engagement de l'état était de les aider à s'insérer, à trouver un logement, à donner les conditions juridiques pour trouver un emploi, la condition pour eux c'était de scolariser leurs enfants'.⁶¹⁸ A MOUS in Nice had a basic contract, which explicitly highlighted *scolarisation* as a requirement of state-support:

Le	
<u>Objet : application de la circulaire INT 1233053C du 26/08/2012</u>	
Je soussigné,	accepte l'offre d'hébergement provisoire de l'Etat, au
bénéfice de ma famille, soit :	
-	
-	
-	
et m'engage à maintenir la scolarisation de mes enfants jusqu' au terme de l'année scolaire.	
L'hébergement sera offert à l'adresse suivante, au moins jusqu'au terme de l'année scolaire.	
Le sous-préfet chargé de mission	Le requérant

A regional official shared a copy of this contract with me during an interview and insisted that 'la scolarisation des enfants était une condition préalable et une obligation du dispositif'.⁶¹⁹

Second, the French state required adult Roma to actively seek employment and pursue French language training. As a regional official from the Gironde claimed, 'il y a des devoirs qui nous engagent à les accompagner sur toutes les étapes de scolarisation, santé, formation professionnelle, accès à l'emploi et recherche de logement et il y a des obligations pour eux: obligation d'avoir une participation active dans la recherche d'emploi.' The official added that 'Lorsqu'une personne ne travaille pas, soit elle suit des

2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁶¹⁸ Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁶¹⁹ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (16 June 2015).

cours de français qui sont organisés par l'association, soit elle suit une formation professionnelle, soit une préparation à l'entretien d'embauche.' The suggestion was that Roma had to demonstrate efforts to contribute to the French economy if they were to receive public assistance. The emphasis the French state placed on work also suggested that officials sought to marry republican ideals with neo-liberal ones. In this sense, contributing to the French economy was a form of assimilating into the melting pot of French society.

Third, *dispositifs* required the evicted camp residents to abandon *la vie collective*. For example, a *village d'insertion* in Lille required residents to sign three contracts upon entry: 'un contrat d'hébergement auquel sont joints un règlement de fonctionnement collectif et un projet individuel'.⁶²⁰ In doing so, participants agreed to accept 'les obligations de scolariser les enfants, de séparation intra-groupe, d'apprentissage de la langue'. If residents did not respect these obligations 'elles peuvent subir une éviction au bout d'un certain temps'.⁶²¹ Similarly in Lyon, the contract for Andatu specified rules for 'vie en collectivité et visites autorisés'. It stated that 'Il est formellement interdit d'héberger dans sa chambre ou son logement en sous location des personnes en dehors de la liste des bénéficiaires de l'opération. L'usage des locaux et l'utilisation des équipements sont exclusivement réservés aux résidents. Des contrôles d'occupation inopinés peuvent être organisés.'⁶²²

The rules for 'vie en collectivité et visites autorisés' also included a statement regulating cultural and religious behaviour:

La vie dans le lieu d'hébergement collectif est fondée sur le respect de l'autre et le respect des différences culturelles, politiques, religieuses et sociales, qui restent dans la sphère du privé. Afin de préserver la qualité de vie de chacun, chaque résident doit conserver en tout temps et tout lieu une attitude correcte et respectueuse des autres. Aucune manifestation d'ordre publique ou religieux ne sera tolérée dans les locaux du dispositif.⁶²³

⁶²⁰ Cerema, *Rapport d'enquête sur l'application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions* (November 2016), p. 34.

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² Forum Réfugiés, 'Contrat de parcours et d'engagement visant l'intégration en région lyonnaise' in Deplhine Roucaute, 'A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms', *Le Monde* (23 May 2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁶²³ Ibid.

Although evacuations removed Roma from the public sphere, the statement suggested that the alternative housing afforded to a select few was not considered part of the private domain. The suggestion was that not all residential sites were part of the private domain. If the state subsidised housing, it could enforce republican principles associated with the public sphere on its residents. In agreeing to the terms of *accompagnement*, Roma had to relinquish activities that French authorities and associations deemed to be of a cultural, political, religious and social nature, even inside their homes. As such, the process of integrating Roma through *hébergement* allowed the French state to redefine the boundaries between the public sphere and the private domain.

Linked to this was a fourth condition of *accompagnement*: the respect for common areas. For instance, Andatu laid down the following rules governing the ‘[U]tilisation des parties communes’:

- Les parties communes sont composées d’une cuisine (plaques de cuisson, évier), d’une salle à manger (casiers, tables, chaises) et de sanitaires.
- L’utilisation collective de ces équipements implique de la part de chaque hébergé une discipline rigoureuse. Chacun doit veiller à maintenir les lieux communs dans un état de propreté satisfaisante.
- La cuisine est réservée aux occupants du foyer uniquement.
- Il est interdit d’entreposer quelque objet que ce soit dans les parties communes, l’allée, les escaliers, l’immeuble... et d’abandonner les encombrants dans le quartier.

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Failure to follow these instructions could have severe consequences:

En cas de détériorations ou de négligences caractérisées, Forum réfugiés-Cosi sera dans l’obligation de facturer aux personnes hébergées les travaux de remise en l’état, voire de prononcer la fin de la prise en charge et l’exclusion de l’opération. Dans l’impossibilité de déterminer le responsable, le montant des réparations est partagé à parts égales entre les personnes hébergées sur le même palier.⁶²⁵

To most adults, the rules specified in the Andatu contract would appear rudimentary if not infantilising. This suggested that the French officials and members of Forum Réfugiés responsible for writing the contract viewed Roma as uneducated at best and primitive at worst. Though similar to the house rules of a boarding school or university college, it appeared that the French state and its contractors saw the upkeep of communal areas as a way of teaching Roma how to be civilised. The assumption was that if Roma were able to

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

conform to the rules governing shared living spaces they would be capable of respecting the norms of French society. This meant that the French state could establish rules in insertion initiatives to guide the socialisation of Roma towards autonomous living.

Fifth, Roma had to justify leave from the *dispositif*, as most did not permit extended periods of absence. Adoma, the association responsible for the Hollande government's national mission à la résorption des bidonvilles, reported that '3 ménages ont été exclus pour n'avoir pas respecté les dispositions de leur contrat de séjour (principalement pour absence prolongée et non justifiée).'⁶²⁶ Similarly, the *dispositif* Andatu cited prolonged absence as grounds for expulsion. The contract noted that 'Toute absence prolongée non prévenue sera sanctionnée. Un entretien aura lieu et sera suivi d'un courrier d'avertissement. En cas de récidive, Forum réfugiés-Cosi pourra prononcer l'exclusion définitive.'⁶²⁷ A regional official from the Rhône confirmed this, stating that 'on a eu le cas où la personne suivie par le dispositif Andatu est rentrée chez elle pendant quelques mois en Roumanie. C'est la migration pendulaire. Elle a été exclue du dispositif Andatu.'⁶²⁸ Thus similarly to selection, the process of integration restricted the right of EU citizens to move freely.

The sixth condition of *accompagnement* was compliance with the law. This was because illegal activities constituted grounds for immediate expulsion. In Montreuil for example, French authorities expelled one family from the MOUS and extradited them to Romania 'suite à des problèmes avec les services de police'. Andatu shared this condition, stating that:

L'exclusion peut, en outre, être prononcée par Forum réfugiés-Cosi pour les motifs suivants :

- non respect du règlement intérieur ;
- actes de violence à l'encontre des autres résidents ou d'un personnel ;
- comportements délictueux et infraction à la législation française entraînant des poursuites judiciaires ;
- fausses déclarations concernant l'identité ou la situation personnelle ;
- refus de transfert vers une autre prise en charge ;

⁶²⁶ Adoma, *Mission nationale d'appui à la résorption des bidonvilles, mars 2014 – décembre 2016 : Rapport d'activité 2014* (24 March 2015).

⁶²⁷ Forum Réfugiés, 'Contrat de parcours et d'engagement visant l'intégration en région lyonnaise' in Deplhine Roucaute, 'A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms', *Le Monde* (23 May 2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁶²⁸ Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

- refus d'une proposition d'hébergement ou de logement.⁶²⁹

These requirements suggest that in order to be eligible for *accompagnement* and to retain their place in the *dispositif*, Roma were required to adhere to the French law. Thus, although *villages d'insertion* and Andtatu's *stabilisation* phase isolated Roma from French society and restricted the right to free movement, they were not exempt from French law. The French government's measures of integrating Roma tested the limits of EU law while remaining loyal to French law.

Deploying the idea of integration to achieve segregation?

Although officials used the republican idea of integration to communicate and justify insertion policies, integration was rarely achieved. Most examples of *accompagnement* excluded Roma from French society, and left them dependent on French government support. Inside the French administrations, officials tended to discuss Roma integration in a pessimistic way. A regional official lamented 'il n'y a pas de réussite. Globalement c'est un échec...chaque fois qu'une petite chose fonctionne c'est comme si on vidait la mer avec une petite cuillère. Le sentiment d'échec est là et les réussites sont des réussites qui ne viennent pas compenser ce sentiment d'échec.'⁶³⁰ Participants were not necessarily responsible for the failure of insertion initiatives. Barriers from within the French system hampered the integration of evicted Roma into French society. This section examines which outcomes of *dispositifs* officials considered as successes and failures, and then investigates the political and financial barriers that impeded the integration of Roma in France.

Successes and Failures

Overwhelmingly, local and regional officials spoke of the results of *dispositifs d'insertion* as disappointing. The principal challenge cited was the inability to transition Roma from *hébergement* to *logement*. In other words, the justification of integration policies did not

⁶²⁹ Forum Réfugiés, 'Contrat de parcours et d'engagement visant l'intégration en région lyonnaise' in Deplhine Roucaute, 'A Lyon, un contrat d'intégration réservé à quatre cents Roms', *Le Monde* (23 May 2013): http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/23/a-lyon-un-contrat-d-integration-reserve-a-quatre-cents-roms_3414805_3224.html (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁶³⁰ Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Nord, Lille (8 June 2015).

lead to autonomous living. For example, a regional official highlighted this as the basis for closing *villages d'insertion* in Seine-Saint-Denis:

Nous sommes en train de fermer les villages d'insertion. Ces villages d'insertion sont un échec pour deux raisons : les personnes n'ont pas utilisé pour la plupart les villages d'insertion comme un moyen d'accéder vers l'autonomie, c'est à dire accepter de se former, d'apprendre la langue française, de répondre aux offres de formations professionnelles que nous leur faisons et ont utilisé ça de manière complètement consumériste et n'ont pas utilisé les offres. Nous avons aussi beaucoup de difficultés à avoir des foyers avec au moins un salaire et donc nous avons du mal à les placer en logement social. Nous n'avons réussi que pour une minorité à les orienter vers du logement social.⁶³¹

Contrary to its aims, it appeared that *villages d'insertion* failed to guide participants towards autonomous life in France. A report written by an *énarque* during her internship at the Préfecture of Seine-Saint-Denis echoed this point. It stated that 'Le département de la Seine-Saint-Denis a été pionnier dans les années 2000 avec la création de 4 villages d'insertion. Mais du fait des contraintes en termes de droit au séjour et d'accès au marché du travail, les villages d'insertion n'ont pu donner la preuve de leur efficacité en ce qui concerne l'insertion professionnelle et le relogement'.⁶³² The difficulty of attaining *logement* was not only a problem for *dispositifs* in Seine-Saint-Denis. A MOUS in Yvelines reported that 'aucune solution de logement n'avait pu être proposée, les bailleurs sociaux disposant très peu de logements adaptés aux ressources et à la composition familiale de cette population'.⁶³³ Even Andatu, a *dispositif* that guaranteed access to rent controlled apartments in Lyon, failed to lead participants to a state of complete autonomy. A regional official from the Rhône admitted that:

On considère qu'il y a 1/3 des familles qui sont intégrés. Si on dit la vérité, c'est qu'elles respectent les lois de la république, et que les enfants sont scolarisés mais ça ne veut pas dire qu'elles ont un emploi elles vivent pratiquement toutes avec les minima sociaux. C'est donc assez difficile. Avec tous les efforts qui ont été faits, 1/3 des familles sont intégrées mais en vivant de l'aide publique.⁶³⁴

Adding to this comment, another official from the Rhône noted that 'si on enlève l'aide publique ces personnes-là ne peuvent pas subsister seules en France; elles ne sont pas parvenues à franchir ce cap'.⁶³⁵ Although Andatu's participants were fortunate to receive

⁶³¹ Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (7 September 2015).

⁶³² Prune Helfter-Noah, Stagiaire ENA, *Rapport à l'attention de Monsieur le préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis: Experiences d'insertion menées à l'égard des occupants de campements illicites et propositions de politiques publiques* (December 2014).

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ Interview with Regional Official 3, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁶³⁵ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

logement without having to wait in line, they remained dependent on the state for rent, and therefore never reached the programme's third and final phase of integration.

French officials argued that the failure to attain *logement* was often linked to problems of *insertion professionnelle*. In writing about problems of 'l'insertion professionnelle et le relogement' the intern from Seine-Saint-Denis argued that problems of securing employment and poor language proficiency were inextricably linked.⁶³⁶ Similarly, Didier Leschi, the Préfet à l'Egalité des Chances of Seine-Saint-Denis, claimed that 'Dans les faits, il est très difficile de trouver un logement social pour ces familles, même dans le contingent préfectoral. L'autre difficulté, c'est l'emploi. Une très faible minorité parvient à obtenir un emploi stable, et encore il s'agit la plupart du temps d'un emploi aidé'.⁶³⁷ The official formerly responsible for managing Andatu also maintained that 'la grosse difficulté a été la maîtrise de la langue française qui était un critère d'insertion professionnelle' and argued that for some this was the reason 'le travail n'était pas retenu'.⁶³⁸ One official from the Rhône put this argument in context, stating 'Ce qui est d'autant plus compliqué c'est qu'en France, la crise de 2008 on n'en est clairement pas sortie. Les gens qui ont une qualification en France qui maîtrisent le français ont des difficultés pour trouver un emploi, donc c'est d'autant plus handicapant pour de personnes nouvellement arrivées illettrées ou ne maîtrisant pas parfaitement le français.' Thus, while autonomy and in most cases *logement* (notwithstanding Andatu) depended on employment, the ability to speak and read French was a condition of employment.

Furthermore, officials highlighted domiciliation as another obstacle to integration. In the case of Yvelines for example, 'le refus provisoire du CCAS de domicilier les familles rendait très difficiles certaines démarches administratives'.⁶³⁹ Notably, access to healthcare, such as registering for a doctor, was contingent upon domiciliation. As a national official from the Ministry of Social Affairs claimed 'c'est le même problème

⁶³⁶ Prune Helfter-Noah, Stagiare ENA, *Rapport à l'attention de Monsieur le préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis: Experiences d'insertion menées à l'égard des occupants de campements illicites et propositions de politiques publiques* (December 2014).

⁶³⁷ Didier Leschi, Préfet à l'Egalité des Chances, Seine-Saint-Denis, cited in 'Roms dans le 93: la fin des villages d'insertion', *Le Parisien* (21 September 2015): <http://www.leparisien.fr/aubervilliers-93300/roms-dans-le-93-la-fin-des-villages-d-insertion-21-09-2015-5113741.php> (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁶³⁸ Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

⁶³⁹ Prune Helfter-Noah, Stagiare ENA, *Rapport à l'attention de Monsieur le préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis: Experiences d'insertion menées à l'égard des occupants de campements illicites et propositions de politiques publiques* (December 2014).

pour la couverture santé: le fait d'avoir une assurance maladie et l'accès aux soins. C'est la domiciliation ce que vous appelez la registration, nous on appelle ça domiciliation.'⁶⁴⁰ Conversely, the provision of healthcare was sometimes viewed positively because some 'Roma' did obtain domiciliation and were incorporated into the French health system. For instance, a *bilan* of a MOUS in Montreuil reported that 'en ce qui concerne l'accès aux soins, le bilan de trois années est plutôt positif'.⁶⁴¹ But others, such as the national official from the Ministry of Social Affairs, contended 'il y a un énorme travail qui est encore à faire'.⁶⁴²

However, alongside criticisms of *accompagnement*, *scolarisation* emerged as a beacon of optimism. A national official stated that 'on a quand même des vrais résultats sur la scolarisation des enfants'.⁶⁴³ This view was reflected at a local level. According to a municipal official:

La scolarisation c'est très important parce que les enfants sont facteurs d'intégration. Souvent on dit que ce sont les femmes qui sont facteur d'intégration mais chez les Roms ce sont les enfants. Ce sont les enfants qui apprennent le français, qui ensuite deviennent les médiateurs avec les administrations, même si on peut considérer que ce n'est pas leur rôle, dans la cellule familiale c'est comme ça que ça se passe.⁶⁴⁴

The implication was that by gaining an education in *l'école républicaine*, Roma children were able to integrate into French society, even if adults could not. A regional official from the Rhône asserted this explicitly, claiming that 'le grand point positif c'est les enfants. Je pense que c'est un pari vers la deuxième génération Andatu au final'.⁶⁴⁵ From this perspective, second-generation migrants were the key to integration, which explained why many local and regional officials spoke of *scolarisation* as the priority of their *dispositifs*. Adding to this assertion, another regional official from the Rhône claimed:

Lorsque vous faites un programme comme Andatu vous savez très bien que les adultes qui entrent dans le programme, ils vont de toute façon toute leur vie avoir des difficultés. En revanche, les générations futures, elles vont s'intégrer dans la société, elles vont connaître l'éducation, l'accès à tout ce qu'un français peut avoir comme droit et comme obligations et ils vont se fondre dans sa société comme n'importe quel migrant. C'est le

⁶⁴⁰ Interview with National Official 2, DAEI, Paris (29 February 2016).

⁶⁴¹ Ministère de l'Intérieur et. al., 'Annexes III: Opérations d'insertion in Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements', *Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁶⁴² National Official 3, DAEI, Paris (29 February 2016).

⁶⁴³ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

⁶⁴⁴ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁶⁴⁵ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

This comment demonstrated the official's reliance on the republican idea of integration to justify the ethnically selective Andatu initiative. Yet, it also revealed that the official framed the idea of integration as an ideal, which adult participants rarely realised in practice. The suggestion was that in the case of the Roma, adults tended to lack the capacity to absorb new customs, preventing their integration into French society. As well as its racialised undertones, the comment implied that the French state's approach to integration was in fact ageist.

Officials across all levels of government tended to communicate the *scolarisation* of Roma children as a success, but there were still challenges in practice. A municipal official maintained, 'les réussites je vous l'ai dit tout à l'heure, c'est la scolarisation des enfants. Mais le plus grand défi c'est de poursuivre cette scolarisation. Le danger, c'est que dès qu'ils ne sont plus à l'école primaire, ils disparaient de l'école'.⁶⁴⁷ The difficulties in maintaining the attendance of Roma children after primary school was partly a product of the administrative structure of French schools. Although the school curriculum was nationally consistent, the management of the schools themselves, especially the task of enrolment, was divided among different levels of government. 'La responsabilité appartient aux communes pour le niveau primaire, pour le collège c'est au département, et les lycées appartiennent à la région' argued the municipal official.⁶⁴⁸ As such Roma had to overcome challenges of enrolment at each stage of education, which sometimes meant they slipped through the cracks of the system and did not progress to the next level of studies.

Additionally, a national inter-ministerial report highlighted practical challenges related to the *scolarisation* of Roma children:

Par ailleurs, la réalité des parcours scolaires se heurte à des obstacles importants. Il peut s'agir de difficultés dues à l'éloignement des écoles, au déséquilibre des capacités d'accueil, au manque de personnels disposant des compétences nécessaires à la prise en charge d'élèves non francophones. La mission a observé également le risque de blocage que pouvait entraîner la prise en charge de groupes importants et la nécessité de veiller à prévenir la tentation d'organiser des "classes à caractère ethnique" qui sont contraires aux

⁶⁴⁶ Interview with Regional Official 4, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁶⁴⁷ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015).

⁶⁴⁸ Interview with Municipal Official, Mairie de Villeurbanne, Lyon (10 June 2015).

This excerpt exposes that although officials were largely optimistic about the potential Roma children could reach through *scolarisation*, challenges to their integration persisted. The republican idea of transforming 'foreign' children into 'Frenchmen' through *l'école républicaine* did not eliminate difficulties the French state experienced in their attempts to integrate Roma children in practice.

Political and Financial Barriers

Some officials argued the frequent failure of local and regional insertion *dispositifs* was a function of the participants' characteristics, accusing Roma of lacking the capacity to fully integrate into French society. Reflecting on the poor results of a *village d'insertion*, a regional official stated that 'la plupart des Roms ne sont pas capable de s'intégrer'.⁶⁵⁰ The implication was that factors inherent to these so-called Roma prevented them from becoming civilised. This remark absolved the French state of responsibility for failing to achieve the objectives set out in *dispositifs*, but the implicit link between civilisation and ethnicity revealed more about the prejudices of the official than impediments to Roma integration. Political discourse on integration initiatives revealed that the French state had a significant part to play in preventing the realisation of integration through two principal barriers.

The first barrier to integration was political will. Alternative housing to accommodate evicted camp residents depended upon elected local officials. Municipal governments often owned the sites on which *villages d'insertion* and other segregated insertion projects were built. This meant it was up to the local mayor to decide whether to grant Prefects and/or associations permission to use municipal land for this purpose or renew existing *dispositifs*. A national inter-ministeral report acknowledged this problem, highlighting that 'les difficultés de montage de ces opérations tiennent généralement à des facteurs externes: négociations complexes avec les partenaires publics pour la recherche des terrains disponibles [et] réticence des élus en raison du faible seuil d'acceptabilité

⁶⁴⁹ Ministère de l'Intérieur et. al., *Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁶⁵⁰ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

sociale de leurs administrés'.⁶⁵¹ Even Sarkozy's Secretary for European Affairs, Lellouche conceded 'Il faut la volonté politique d'intégrer ces personnes'.⁶⁵² Cerema referenced a MOUS in Bordeaux to exemplify this point:

Le pilotage de la MOUS est alors confié à la préfecture avec la collaboration de la ville de Bordeaux (le squat est situé sur la commune) et de la communauté urbaine de Bordeaux (propriétaire du bâtiment) qui co-financent le dispositif. Ce projet a pu voir le jour grâce au fort engagement des élus.⁶⁵³

The integration of Roma was thus made possible through the will of local mayors. The example also illuminated the fact that insertion *dispositifs* depended on the co-ordination of multiple local and regional administrations with sometimes competing agendas, which was not always easy to accomplish.

But insertion initiatives were not always popular among French politicians. A regional official from the Alpes-Maritimes noted that 'dès qu'on parle de les installer sur un terrain, de mettre à disposition des mobil-homes pour pouvoir les accueillir, il y a immédiatement un tir frontal des communes, un refus des élus, et en général des populations qui sont viscéralement hostiles à l'arrivée de ces Roms'.⁶⁵⁴ This comment made clear that the *accompagnement* of Roma was not only unpopular with local politicians but also with their constituents. A regional official from Ile-de-France shared the same concerns, stating that 'les élus locaux ne veulent pas les villages d'insertion. C'est ultra impopulaire. Si vous allez voir un maire et vous lui dites "je vais vous installer un village d'insertion chez vous", il n'y en a aucun qui veulent. Du moins très très peu'.⁶⁵⁵

A regional official from the Nord noted that the issue of securing alternative housing for evicted Roma became more challenging after the 2014 municipal elections, claiming that 'depuis la montée du Front National, c'est beaucoup plus difficile d'obtenir des lieux

⁶⁵¹ Ministère de l'Intérieur et. al., *Evaluation des dispositifs d'accompagnement des personnes présentes dans les campements* (May 2013).

⁶⁵² Pierre Lellouche, Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires européennes, *Conférence de presse sur les relations franco-slovaques, la consolidation de la Zone euro, la question des droits de l'homme en Iran, l'accord militaire francobritannique et sur la situation des Roms au sein de l'Union européenne*, Bratislava (5 November 2010).

⁶⁵³ Cerema, *Rapport d'enquête sur l'application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions* (November 2016), p. 26.

⁶⁵⁴ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁶⁵⁵ Interview with Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris (4 December 2014).

d'hébergement. Les portes se ferment'.⁶⁵⁶ This highlighted the role external political pressure played in inhibiting the integration of evicted Roma. A senior national official expanded on this argument, asserting that the *accompagnement* of Roma was a key issue in the 2014 municipal elections:

Tout va dépendre de la volonté des élus locaux, de s'engager. Les dernières élections municipales en France ce printemps-là [2014] ont montrées que ceux qui se sont engagés dans la politique d'insertion ou de tentative de politique d'insertion, ont été battus. Ils étaient battus sur ce sujet-là. Et donc cette question était importante pour le basculement municipal parce qu'en réalité, même les personnes qui habitent dans les communes proche de Paris populaires qui ne vivent pas bien, s'expriment « pourquoi l'Etat fait quelque chose pour ces gens-là et pas pour nous ». Ils peuvent porter plainte parce qu'il y a aussi des réalités de délinquance. Ils peuvent avoir des problèmes...on a eu une manifestation dans le quartier nord de Marseille en décembre 2012. Les habitats sont descendus et qui ont expulsés eux-mêmes la petite communauté Rom, [les habitants] sont des immigrés eux-mêmes.⁶⁵⁷

Local politicians' objections to *accompagnement* initiatives appeared to correlate with public opinion. This revealed that in practice *accompagnement* measures were difficult to implement, even after they were incorporated into the Hollande government's national circular of 26 August 2012, hindering the integration of Roma in France.

Finance was a second barrier to integration. Insertion *dispositifs* were a considerable public expense. Dihal reported that 'les expériences de villages d'insertion existant montrent qu'il faut mobiliser des moyens d'investissement initial pouvant aller de 700,000 € à 1,200,000 €. Les coûts de fonctionnement annuel varient quant à eux de 500,000 € à 1,000,000 € (Mous comprise)'.⁶⁵⁸ A compounding problem was that insertion projects overran their projected timeframes, draining the public purse for longer than officials had budgeted. As French officials were rarely satisfied with the results these *dispositifs* produced, it is not surprising that some believed the costs attendant to assimilating Roma were unjustifiable. In the words of a senior national official 'les villages d'insertion, ça a concerné très peu de gens, ça a coûté très cher. Ça n'a pas forcément été inefficace mais on ne peut pas dire que de mettre tout l'argent pour ce peu de personnes produise des bons résultats'.⁶⁵⁹ A regional official from the Alpes-

⁶⁵⁶ Interview with Regional Official, DDCS, Lille (8 June 2015).

⁶⁵⁷ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

⁶⁵⁸ Dihal, *Vade-mecum à l'usage des correspondant 'points de contact départementaux' de la mission relative à l'anticipation et l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites* (version 10 December 2013).

⁶⁵⁹ Interview with National Official 1, Dihal, Paris (5 December 2014).

Maritimes also maintained that ‘ce sont des expériences qui ne donnent pas forcément des résultats totalement encourageants, parce que leur coût est tel au niveau de l’accompagnement social, qu’on trouve rapidement les limites de l’exercice’.⁶⁶⁰ Similarly, a regional official from Seine-Saint-Denis complained, ‘nous avois dépensés ici trop d’argent dans les villages d’insertion qui sont un échec patent.’⁶⁶¹ Across the country French officials considered the cost of *villages d’insertion* greater than its benefits.

Yet, problems of cost were not confined to models of segregated insertion. Even though many officials championed the approach of integrating Roma based on *mixité*, the decision to close and avoid replicating Andatu was largely due to cost. The regional official who had previously managed Andatu stated ‘après la modélisation du système, Andatu n’a pas été dupliquée pour des raisons de coût. Je pense qu’il y a une grosse partie qui a bloqué et c’est le coût. Ça coûtait excessivement cher.’⁶⁶² To replace Andatu, in Autumn 2015 the Préfecture of the Rhône established an initiative that resembled a *village d’insertion* called ‘Insertion par l’Emploi et l’Ecole’ (I2E or IEE). Cerema noted that ‘Le principe repose sur la création deux villages d’insertion composés respectivement de 15 et 16 bungalows achetés par la préfecture, pouvant accueillir au total 160 personnes’.⁶⁶³ The total budget of I2E was estimated at three million euros for a period of three years, which was roughly equivalent to the final cost of Andatu at 2,650,000 euros excluding social benefits (these were a considerable expenses, for example the Conseil Général du Rhône spent an additional 814,000 euros on *Revenu de solidarité active*).⁶⁶⁴ However, without paying for social benefits such as Revenu de solidarité active, I2E was considerably cheaper. It also used a different funding structure to Andatu. Whereas Andatu relied on EU structural funds (Feder and FSE) to cover about half of the cost, I2E gained EU financing for 70 to 80 percent of expenses.⁶⁶⁵ The replacement of Andatu, a *dispositif* based on *mixité*, with I2E, a *dispositif* based on segregated insertion, demonstrated that resources limited the state’s capacity to integrate participants into French society. The replacement of Andatu highlighted how in practice French officials

⁶⁶⁰ Interview with Regional Official 2, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice (10 September 2015).

⁶⁶¹ Interview with Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny (12 June 2015).

⁶⁶² Interview with Regional Official 5, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon (11 June 2015).

⁶⁶³ Cerema, *Rapport d’enquête sur l’application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012 en 4 cas et 6 questions* (November 2016), p. 44.

⁶⁶⁴ Bertrand Enjalbal, ‘Roms : que vaut le nouveau programme d’insertion dans le Rhône ?’, *Rue89Lyon* (2 October 2015): <http://www.rue89lyon.fr/2015/10/02/roms-nouveau-programme-insertion-rhone/> (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

implementing policies were sometimes forced to abandon the republican idea of integration they used to communicate and justify policies in the first place.

Conclusion

Despite the French state's discourse of integration, insertion initiatives had the perverse effect of isolating Roma, leaving them dependent on public support. As a consequence, the outcomes produced by the insertion projects contradicted the republican idea of integration, which inspired them in the first place. By providing participants with a social, cultural and economic education, the French state's insertion projects were similar to its treatment of post-colonial migrants living in *bidonvilles* in the 1950s and 1960s, and reflected the original *mission civilisatrice* pursued by the officials and politicians of the Third Republic. In each case the assumption was that foreign populations were underdeveloped and helpless, requiring public assistance to attain a level of civilisation commensurate with French society. However, the French state's efforts to 'civilise' Roma stood out in one respect: its focus on autonomous living. In this context, the word 'autonomous' not only meant independence from the state, it also meant the cutting of 'clan' ties with extended family members. It is through this logic that French officials framed extended families as a mark of backwardness and sought to use the republican idea of integration to justify a social programme of transforming them into nuclear units. In so doing, French officials used the republican idea of integration to conceal housing and welfare policies based on the heteronormative idea of a nuclear family, which targeted 'Roma' communities living in slums. The republican idea of integration allowed officials to rationalise ethnically selective policies.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have examined how French officials used republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma. In so doing, I have analysed the discourse of political actors working on these policies at local, regional, national and EU levels of government, and contributed to a growing literature on the French state's treatment of Europe's Roma community, the limits of EU citizenship as a form of protection against racism, and the rise of neo-republicanism in French politics. My first empirical chapter (chapter three) explored how the French state's insistence on universalism allowed officials to deny the existence of policies targeting the Roma. It revealed differences between the Sarkozy and Hollande governments' approaches to universalism, arguing that universalism only became a discursive strategy to demonstrate commitment to France's republican tradition under Hollande, in spite of the Hollande government's intensified program of evacuations. Chapter four highlighted how officials deployed the idea of a 'neutral' public sphere to rationalise the eviction and deportation of Roma living in illegal camps. It argued that neutrality was a normative concept officials used to frame Roma camps as a communitarian threat to the French public sphere. Chapter five investigated the basis on which the French state chose to support or reject evicted Roma residents. It exposed a logic of administrative selection based on whether a resident possessed the willingness and capacity to integrate, and maintained that interpretations of what constituted such a willingness and capacity were highly subjective and suspect. It also raised ethical concerns about the outsourcing of public policy to non-government associations, who determined which Roma to support or reject. Chapter six scrutinised the process of integration that selected Roma undertook in exchange for state support. It found that despite the French state's rigorous administrative selection and socialisation programmes, evicted Roma tended to remain segregated from rather than integrated in French society. In sum, my thesis demonstrated how the strategic deployment of republican ideas allowed the French state to target an ethnic community.

My focus on the strategic deployment of republican ideas did not mean I viewed them as empty or entirely up for grabs. Rather, I recognised that republican ideas have evolved in response to certain events throughout French history and each time an official invoked a republican concept it had historical connotations. However, I also appreciated that republican ideas were polyvalent, and through this thesis I argued that French officials

exploited this polyvalence in their strategic deployment of republican ideas. It was precisely the flexibility, ambiguity and, at times, contradictions of republican ideas that allowed them to be used to communicate and justify ethnically targeted policies. In the case of universalism, for example, the Sarkozy and Hollande administrations insisted that their policies on illegal camps conformed to republican principles and they claimed that they did not target a single ethnic community. But references to the Roma slipped into their political discourses. This revealed that, behind a universalist defence, their policies were based on ethnic stereotypes.

The flexibility of republican ideas hinged upon the different interpretations of the officials deploying them. This meant officials could use the same ideas, but their interpretations varied. Sometimes this reflected partisan divisions. The Sarkozy government deployed the republican concept of universalism reluctantly to respond to criticism from Brussels, in an attempt to minimise the political and legal cost of their policies that overtly referred to ‘Roma’ camps. In contrast, the Hollande government used universalist rhetoric proactively to disassociate itself from its predecessors by establishing a national policy document on the evacuation of illegal camps that did not mention the Roma. This shift was largely rhetorical as a number of Socialist officials continued to frame illegal camps as a Roma problem in their political discourses and evacuations intensified under Hollande. As the Hollande government could not provide alternative housing for the majority of persons it displaced, the national policy of evacuating illegal camps contributed to France’s housing crisis.

Interpretations of republican ideas were not necessarily partisan. The discourse of regional and local officials, both elected politicians and appointed civil servants, offered different readings of the republican concept of integration. Some officials framed integration as an end that Roma could achieve once they had been segregated from French society in *villages d’insertion* and were taught the skills to subsist without support from the state. In this sense integration was synonymous with autonomy. Other officials, such as those working on the Andatu social housing project in the Rhône, framed integration as a process rather than a desired goal. They argued that integration should be built into insertion initiatives, which is why Andatu encouraged social mixing by proving rent controlled apartments to its participants dispersed throughout Lyon.

Even government contractors, hired to assess which evicted ‘Roma’ should receive state support, exhibited diverse readings of republican ideas. For example, the contractor GIP Habitat et Interventions Sociales specified employment, language and education as indicators of integration. Yet, a report produced by one of its competitors, Adoma, used different categories to assess the ‘degré d’intégration’: ‘personnes domiciliées administrativement, enfants scolarisés et personnes bénéficiant d’une couverture médicale’.⁶⁶⁶ The word integration was the same, but the interpretation differed. Thus, even contractors working on behalf of the French state, as well as those who were direct employees of it, exploited the polyvalence of republican ideas.

Deploying Republican Ideas to Communicate and Justify a Roma Policy

In my analysis of political discourse, I found three ways in which French officials can exploit the polyvalence of republican ideas to communicate and justify policies targeting the Roma.⁶⁶⁷ First, French officials can emphasise one republican idea, even if it conflicted with another republican idea. For example, they could prioritise the republican concept of a neutral public sphere over integration. As I discovered, officials tended to insist that evacuating ‘Roma’ camps was essential and justified this policy on the basis that it would preserve the neutrality of the French public sphere. They framed the integration of children as less important than addressing the threats that ‘Roma’ camps posed to the neutrality of the French public sphere. However, despite the emphasis officials placed on preserving the public sphere, they could not deny that evacuations were disruptive. This was especially the case for children. An evacuation at any time of year could interrupt the integration of children who could be displaced far from the schools in which they were enrolled, hindering their literacy, confidence and social development. Human rights activist groups such as Amnesty International argued that evacuating camps during the school term was even more problematic because it meant that evicted students struggled to complete the necessary assessments to pass the academic year, leading to high repeat rates. Although French officials devoted some energy to integrating Roma after they had been evicted, evacuations could be one of the

⁶⁶⁶ Adoma, *Mission nationale d’appui à la résorption des bidonvilles, mars 2014 – décembre 2016 : Rapport d’activité 2014* (24 March 2015).

⁶⁶⁷ These findings build upon the theoretical framework provided by Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, ‘Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive institutionalist approach’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1) (2017), pp. 133-150.

factors hindering Roma integration in the first place. This revealed that republican ideas were not always complementary. The strategic deployment of one republican idea could destabilise another.

Second, I learned that French officials can use republican ideas to mask alternative, less politically credible ideas. In other words, republican language can communicate and justify policies based on racist, anti-gypsy, crypto-Christian, heteronormative, class-based, security focused and/or multicultural assumptions. If a French official were to describe evacuations as expelling poor and unclean people from French neighbourhoods, the official would likely be criticised as being classist and, potentially, racist. But, by strategically deploying the republican idea of preserving the French public sphere, an official can justify evacuations as countering communitarianism. French officials did refer to ‘Roma’ camps as substandard and squalid, but the argument of countering communitarianism was more politically credible than an aversion to treating poverty. Perhaps the most fundamental example of this strategy was the French state’s denial of a Roma policy. Insisting that there was no such thing as a Roma policy, while framing illegal camps as a Roma problem, allowed officials to mask ethnic measures with universalist rhetoric.

Third, I discovered that republican ideas can disguise ‘thicker’ conceptions of identity despite their supposed neutrality, thereby allowing officials to structurally favour a particular set of norms over others. For example, French officials were able to exploit the heteronormative and crypto-Christian bias embedded in the concept of a neutral public sphere. Neutrality was not objective; it was a normative benchmark that officials constructed to categorise ‘Roma’ camps as challenging the heteronormative and crypto-Christian norms of French society. These included the idea that families should be small nuclear units with two parents of the opposite sex, and that nuclear units should live in their own self-contained accommodation. By exploiting this bias, French officials were able to frame large extended Roma families who often lived in communal dwellings as clans that challenged the neutrality of the French public sphere and could use this argument to justify systematic evacuations. Another example was the loaded republican concept of integration. The term integration had particularly strong historical connotations of France’s colonial *mission civilisatrice* in the Third Republic. When deploying the idea of integration in relation to the Roma, French officials were able to

exploit its historical bias to communicate and justify their ethnically targeted *insertion* initiatives. In their political discourse, officials could frame the Roma as underdeveloped and helpless, requiring the assistance of the state to attain a level of autonomy commensurate with French society. Using the term integration implied that the Roma were incapable of assimilating on their own, which allowed French officials to rationalise their intervention. As such, the republican ideas created an opportunity for French officials to exploit pre-conceptions to rationalise their policies targeting the Roma.

These three strategies shed light on the ways in which the strategic deployment of republican ideas facilitated discrimination of the Roma. It is important to note that the French state's focus on the Roma has often been emphatically ethnic. This may sound self-evident, but it is an analytically significant factor differentiating my work from existing scholarship on republicanism. Scholars have tended to explore the link between republican ideas and the French state's policies targeting religious communities, particularly Muslims. My focus on an ethnic question – the French state's targeting of the Roma – explains a key omission from my thesis: the republican concept of *laïcité*. Despite the prevalence of *laïcité* in public debate in France, it was not present in political discourses on the Roma. As such, my thesis demonstrates that republican ideas can be strategically deployed independently of debates about religion in contemporary France. My thesis also illuminates how French officials used republican ideas other than *laïcité* to communicate and justify policies that often discriminated against a European ethnic community, many of whom were EU citizens. The French state's strategic deployment of republican ideas to other ethnic questions merits further exploration and is beyond the scope of this thesis.

A Futile Policy

In practice, the strategic deployment of republican ideas often led to ineffective policies. Paradoxically, the policies officials designed did not resolve the Roma problem they constructed. As my empirical chapters demonstrate, there were discrepancies between the language of policy proposals and the discourse of French officials implementing the policies on the ground. First, the strategic deployment of universalism did not ensure the equal treatment of all individuals. Instead, universalist rhetoric concealed racist ideas. Denying the existence of a Roma policy marginalised a population that officials framed

as Roma and allowed them to argue that the disproportionate impact on the Roma was an unintended consequence of a colour-blind policy. Universalism also stimulated xenophobia, since French officials were unable to identify and protect vulnerable populations who were victims of ethnic discrimination.

Second, the discourse on neutralising the French public sphere by evacuating ‘Roma’ slums did not dissolve communitarianism. Instead, evacuations fragmented slums into smaller clusters. This fragmentation also suggested that the Hollande government’s national mission *à la résorption des bidonvilles* did not in fact achieve its goal of eradicating slums as the French state had accomplished in the 1960s. Additionally, policies designed to incentivise exit and facilitate deportations did not reduce the total number of people living in slums. These policies did not prevent Romanian and Bulgarian migrants from returning to France via its porous and unmanned borders, nor did they deter new migrants from choosing to settle in France.

Third, individualised *diagnostic* assessments of illegal camp residents excluded Roma on the basis of collective stereotypes. The fact that regional officials subcontracted the task of undertaking *diagnostics* to associations raised ethical and financial concerns. Associations did not always respect the anonymity of participants and sometimes they included a category of ethnicity in their assessments, which reproduced the collective ethnic discrimination that the policy of individualised *diagnostic* assessments aimed to avoid. Reflecting on *diagnostics*, officials also complained that the cost of hiring associations was not commensurate with the quality of product they delivered. This meant *diagnostics* were too expensive to justify and yet not sufficiently well financed to yield results that could help officials make informed decisions.

Fourth, regional and local *insertion* projects designed to integrate Roma and guide them towards autonomy tended to isolate Roma from the rest of French society and left them dependent on government support. This meant that the strategic deployment of the republican idea of integration led to segregation, rendering the policy an unjustified public expense. Moreover, although *insertion* initiatives came to be included in the Hollande government’s policy of *accompagnement*, centralising the oversight of integration did not help. The fact that *insertion* projects were largely ineffective highlighted that integration of foreigners into a new society is always a gradual process

and cannot easily be accelerated. The failure of *insertion* also raised questions about why French officials assumed that Roma could not integrate on their own. I would argue that the republican idea of integration was a frequently a veil for reinforcing prejudices against the Roma.

The fact that the strategic deployment of republican ideas resulted in ineffective policies was not simply because French officials were out of touch with the problems of modern society. As Emile Chabal has pointed out, the argument that French politics is removed from empirical reality rests upon caricatures of French politicians and policymakers as tempestuous people, seduced by abstract, anachronistic ideas.⁶⁶⁸ Instead, the dislocation between the language of policy proposals and the discourse of officials implementing the policies on the ground was underpinned by a common dilemma: officials sought to design policies devoid of ethnic distinctions to resolve a problem they framed in ethnic terms. Given the contradictions contained in this dilemma, it is not surprising that the political discourse of officials was inconsistent. Despite removing ethnic references in national circulars, policies targeting the Roma persisted at a local and regional level, and officials often referenced the Roma candidly during interview discussions. Additionally, government reports, and policy documents intended for French and EU technocrats explicitly used the term Roma, albeit in different ways. In many of my interviews, officials both denied the existence of the Roma community and simultaneously referred to the Roma explicitly in relation to their policies

The Legitimacy of French Republicanism

If French Roma policy was ineffective, why did public officials continue to use republican ideas to communicate and justify their policies? I would suggest that the French state's discursive attachment to republican ideas is linked to the revival of republicanism as the imprimatur of French policy and political action following the golden years of the *trente glorieuses*. Since then, France has experienced at least two significant economic crises, the most recent of which stemmed from fractures in the European project that France had worked so hard to build, placing tremendous strain on the French welfare state and propelling more of its citizens towards poverty. Alongside

⁶⁶⁸ Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 262.

internal instability the French state experienced international insecurity, typified by the rise of Islamist terrorism that affected France directly since the Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 2015, ongoing war in the Middle East, and mass migration of refugees escaping humanitarian disaster for a better life in Europe. Consequently, France, in common with other western democracies, has seen the partial collapse of the Left-Right political divide and growing tensions between liberalism and populism. As the 2017 presidential elections confirmed, Emmanuel Macron's En Marche movement and Marine Le Pen's revitalised Front National sidelined mainstream Socialist and Conservative parties that had governed France without interruption since the 1980s.

Amidst the backdrop of instability, the flexibility and polyvalence of republicanism has made it one of the only durable cluster of ideas officials have been able to mobilise. This perhaps explains why politicians from different factions have sought to rebrand their parties and policies in republican rhetoric. For example, in May 2015 the Centre-Right Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) adopted the new title 'Les Républicains', led by former President Sarkozy, and, after winning the French presidential election in May 2017, Macron's En Marche party changed its name to 'La République en Marche'. Even Marine Le Pen, who came second, referred to the Front National as 'l'Alliance patriote et républicaine'.⁶⁶⁹ Today, republican language has truly transcended political divisions, even though interpretations of republican ideas remain highly contested. The republican public philosophy and its core ideas have become a symbol of certainty that officials can deploy to persuade French citizens that France will survive this period of uncertainty.

It is possible that this preoccupation with public philosophies is a French eccentricity. French officials do seem unusually concerned with anchoring their policy proposals in overarching republican rhetoric. To substantiate this claim, however, would require further study of how officials in other countries have used comparable public philosophies to communicate and justify their policies.⁶⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the case of the

⁶⁶⁹ Marine Le Pen, Présidente du Front National, *Déclaration sur les résultats du second tour de l'élection présidentielle*, Paris (7 May 2017).

⁶⁷⁰ For studies that compare national public philosophies see Erik Bleich, *Race Politics in Britain and France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).

Roma illustrates how French officials could use a public philosophy to legitimise even the most discriminatory, ineffective and unjustifiably expensive policies. In doing so, it draws attention to the politically untouchable status that public philosophies can carry, making it difficult for officials to challenge them. For example, if a French official was to criticise the republican idea of universalism in a public forum, other officials and political commentators could accuse the official of having racist inclinations. Although generalising about the influence of all public philosophies is outside the scope of this thesis, inferences can be drawn about the ways in which the French state deployed similar republican ideas to communicate and justify other vulnerable and exposed migrant communities beyond the Roma.

Beyond the Roma in France

The recent phenomenon of slums in France is not confined to the Roma. Since at least 2002 migrants, mainly from East Africa and the Middle East, have constructed informal settlements in France. The largest and most well-known of these was the ‘Jungle’ in Calais, which at its peak capacity in 2016 housed over 6,500 people. Of course, there were clear differences between migrants living in slums such as Calais and those the French state framed as Roma. Most were not EU citizens and did not want to remain in France. Instead, many hoped to settle in the United Kingdom and saw France as a transit stop to their final destination. This was in part due to a predominance of English as a first or second language in these migrant settlements, but it was also based on a perception of Britain as a country with greater economic prospects and a reaction to the fact that France had one of the lowest rates of granting asylum in Europe. Despite their preference for Britain, the Touquet border control treaty often obstructed these migrants from taking the final leg of their journey because it allowed British officials to conduct immigration controls in France, shifting the border across the channel from Kent to Calais. Consequently, many migrants were turned away. If migrants had relatives in Britain they could apply for a family reunification claim, but difficulties navigating administrative requirements and an oversaturation of the UK Border Agency led to long and sometimes apparently indefinite delays. Additionally, these migrants tended to travel alone or in small families, which stood in contrast to the extended family structure officials associated with Roma. This meant that public criticism of these migrant camps did not raise the *phénomène clanique* as an issue.

Still, the French state's treatment of migrant communities living in informal settlements was often similar to the case of the Roma. First, French officials framed evacuations as imperative, and justified them as humanitarian operations. This reflected the tendencies of *humanisme et fermeté* within republican philosophy. As President Hollande stated in a speech on the Calais camp in September 2016, France 'est capable d'être digne, d'être humaine et en même temps d'être responsable, parce que nous avons des règles claires'.⁶⁷¹ After the evacuation of Calais the following month, a journalist asked Hollande whether 'ces déplacements aujourd'hui ont-ils une portée symbolique?' and the President replied 'oui le symbole, c'est qu'il y a des valeurs en France qui doivent être toujours rappelées. Ces valeurs sont la solidarité, la fraternité, l'humanisme'.⁶⁷² Second, the French state's handling of evicted or soon-to-be evicted residents rested on the idea that foreigners had to conform to French society through a process of integration or face deportation. As Hollande exclaimed, 'nous faisons en sorte d'accueillir humainement, dignement des personnes qui vont faire leur demande de droit d'asile. Celles et ceux qui pourront faire valoir ce droit seront donc dans une démarche d'intégration. Celles et ceux qui ne pourront pas faire valoir ce droit, parce que relevant d'autres conditions, seront raccompagnés.'⁶⁷³ The strategic deployment of the republican idea of integration in Hollande's speech was unmistakable.

Evacuations of migrant settlements also had comparable consequences to the case of the Roma, leading to the fragmentation of slums rather than their eradication, which in turn provoked further evacuations. The migrants from Calais and other evicted slums tended to erect informal settlements elsewhere or join other existing camps. For example, an evacuation of a settlement in Porte de la Chapelle in Paris in July 2017 contained over 2700 migrants from Sudan, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Nigeria and elsewhere. Many of these migrants were evicted from Calais, and the evacuation was the thirty-fourth of its kind since June 2015. Additionally, following the demolition of the Calais 'jungle', a number of migrants joined the neighbouring settlement in Dunkirk, which primarily consisted of Iraqi Kurds. Responding to the insalubrious conditions of the slum, the

⁶⁷¹ François Hollande, Président de la République, *Déclaration sur les centres d'accueil et d'orientation et les demandeurs d'asile à Tours* (24 September 2016).

⁶⁷² Ibid., *Déclaration à Doué-La-Fontaine* (29 October 2016).

⁶⁷³ Ibid., *Déclaration sur les centres d'accueil et d'orientation et les demandeurs d'asile à Tours* (24 September 2016).

Mayor of Dunkirk Damien Careme, used local authority funds to build a refugee camp for 2500 residents in March 2016. Equipped with basic amenities and wooden cabins as well as a principle of temporary accommodation, the Dunkirk refugee camp bore a striking resemblance to the *villages d'insertion* for Roma. Dunkirk was also the first internationally recognised refugee camp in France. Unfortunately, in April 2017, a large fire destroyed the facility, rendering it uninhabitable.

Despite its international acclaim, Dunkirk was an anomaly. In most cases the French state relied on orientation centres to house evicted migrants until they decided to register their asylum in France or return to their country of origin.⁶⁷⁴ If a migrant was granted asylum, they were eligible for accommodation in one of France's asylum reception centres. However, a number of problems arose. Not only was there a shortage of alternative housing relative to the number of refugees, but most refugees were refused asylum, leaving them homeless and effectively stateless. This was similar to the plight of evicted Roma who the French state framed as unassimilable, and thus unsuitable for state support. Additionally, many migrants were reluctant to register for asylum in France because, if they managed to cross the channel, they risked being sent back to France. This is because, under the Dublin agreement, the first country an asylum seeker enters is responsible for processing their application. Instead of living in state accommodation, these migrants preferred to remain irregular to maximise their prospects of reaching the United Kingdom. This was analogous to the situation of Roma who preferred to live in informal settlements rather than the French state's *insertion* projects, affording them the freedom to enter and exit France of their own accord.

The comparison between migrant and Roma settlements in France exposes the inability of the French welfare state to meet the demands of vulnerable communities and highlights the housing crisis that governments of the Fifth Republic have struggled to manage. Perhaps more fundamentally, however, it draws attention to the dominance of republicanism as the public philosophy of choice for French officials when they need to communicate and justify their policies on informal settlements in France. In doing so, it

⁶⁷⁴ These took the form of Centres d'accueil et d'orientation (CAO), which were state-owned buildings offering *hébergement* to evicted migrants while they contemplated the decision to return to their countries of origin or register their asylum in France. Once the French state had officially granted asylum to a migrant, they were offered a place in a Centre d'Accueil de Demandeurs d'Asile (CADA).

helps to explain why the French state is so firmly opposed to *bidonvilles* and *campements illicites*, and why it continues to pursue evacuations in the absence of alternative arrangements. In the words of President Hollande, ‘La France ce n'est pas une France où on trouvera des campements...Il ne peut pas y avoir en France de camps’.⁶⁷⁵ As long as the French state fails to address its social housing shortage and continues to associate the provision of social housing with permanent settlement in France, the *phénomène des bidonvilles* will persist. Until then, it is likely that public officials will continue to frame informal migrant settlements as an ethnic problem, while also using a colour-blind republican public philosophy to justify their policy response.

⁶⁷⁵ François Hollande, Président de la République, *Déclaration sur les centres d'accueil et d'orientation et les demandeurs d'asile à Tours* (24 September 2016).

Sample Interview Questions

1. Pouvez-vous me dire un mot sur votre rôle en tant que...?
2. Quel est l'objectif principal du gouvernement Français dans le domaine de la politique à l'égard des Roms?
3. Quelle est votre perspective sur la politique poursuivie à l'égard des campements illicites?
4. La présence des campements illicites représente-elle un défi pour l'état?
5. Quelle est la différence entre un campement autorisé et un campement illicite ?
 - S'agit-il d'une problématique sanitaire, de sécurité ou encore d'une violation de propriété privée?
6. Pouvez-vous me dire un mot sur les projets d'intégration et d'insertion ?
7. Par quels biais les projets d'intégration sont-ils mise en œuvre?
8. Qu'entendez vous par la notion d'intégration ?
9. En général, les habitants des campements illicites veulent-ils s'intégrer à la société française ou vont-ils davantage vers une communautarisation et un éloignement de la société française ?
10. Pouvez-vous me parler de la politique d'évacuation et de démantèlement des campements illicites ?
11. L'Etat propose-t-il une solution de logement pour les expulsés ?
12. Il me semble qu'un individu peut être expulsé du territoire français s'il représente une menace pour l'ordre public. Que signifie 'l'ordre public' ? Quelle serait pour vous la solution idéale ?
 - Pourquoi ces individus sont-ils considérés comme « dangereux » ?
13. Quelles mesures avez-vous prises pour empêcher l'installation de nouveaux campements illicites en France ?
14. La politique suivie à l'égard des Roms a-t-elle changé depuis l'élection de François Hollande et encore depuis la nomination du Premier Ministre Manuel Valls?
15. La politique suivie à l'égard des Roms a été critiquée pour son caractère « antirépublicain ». Que pensez vous de cette affirmation ?
16. Y a-t-il des similitudes entre la politique suivie à l'égard des Roms et d'autre politiques d'immigration en France (par exemple, les populations étrangères issue de Maghreb ou les populations de l'ex-empire colonial français) ?
17. Une politique envers les Roms doit-elle incarner certaines valeurs ? si oui, lesquelles ?
18. En ce qui concerne la politique suivie à l'égard des Roms, quelles sont les plus grandes réussites et quels sont les plus grands défis ?

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| 4 “ “ | Regional Official, Préfecture de Paris, Paris |
| 5 “ “ | National Official, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Paris |
| 5 “ “ | National Official 1, Dihal, Paris |
| 8 “ “ | National Official 1, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris |
| 8 “ “ | National Official 2, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris |
| 9 “ “ | National Official 2, Dihal, Paris |
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| 1 “ “ | National Official 2, Dihal, Paris |
| 1 “ “ | National Official 3, Dihal, Paris |
| 2 “ “ | Municipal Official, Marie de Lille, Lille |
| 2 “ “ | Government Consultant 1, Adoma, Paris |
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| 10 “ “ | Regional Official 1, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon |
| 10 “ “ | Regional Official 2, Préfecture du Rhône, Lyon |
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| 12 “ “ | Regional Official 1, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny |
| 16 “ “ | Regional Official 1, Préfecture des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice |
| 17 “ “ | Regional Official 2, Préfecture de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Bobigny |
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14 Mar. 2016	European Commission Official, DG REGIO, Brussels
14 “ “	European Commission Official, DG EMPL, Brussels
14 “ “	European Commission Official, DG JUST, Brussels

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